Steps to war : an analysis of the mechanisms causing the Israel - Hezbollah conflict to escalate by Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv
STEPS TO WAR 
An analysis of  the mechanisms causing the Israel – Hezbollah conflict to escalate.  
HÅVARD MOKLEIV NYGÅRD 
 
Masteroppgave i Statsvitenskap Universitetet i Oslo - Institutt for 
Statsvitenskap Våren 2009  
UNIVERSITETET I OSLO 








The thesis examines escalation of international crisis involving both a state and a non-state actor. 
It takes as its starting point the following empirical anomaly. In the summer of 2006 Hezbollah 
kidnapped two Israeli soldiers. This set in motion a chain of events which ended in what is now 
called the Second Lebanon War. In October of 2000 Hezbollah however carried out an almost 
identical operation. The organization kidnapped three and in the process killed four Israeli 
soldiers, but this time in contrast no process of escalation followed. These two events will be 
studied as cases of international crisis. By integrating domestic politics into international 
relations, I will explain why the 2006 Olmert government made decisions so drastically different 
from the 2000 Barak government. Utilizing a controlled comparison design and game theory I 
will argue that the combination of a weak Israeli government that came under severe criticism 
from the Knesset, the shift in the regional balance of power and the information asymmetry that 
marked the interaction between Israel and Hezbollah together explain why the Hezbollah 
operation in 2006 escalation into a war, while the almost identical operation in 2000 did not.  
I will structure this thesis around three spheres: the systemic, the internal Israeli and the direct 
relationship between Israel and Hezbollah. In all of these spheres I will study a particular 
strategic interaction which I argue is of decisive importance for understanding the trajectories of 
the different cases. In the systemic sphere I will focus on the interaction between Israel and Iran, 
and to a lesser extent Iran and Hezbollah. In the internal Israeli sphere I will focus on the 
interaction of the Israeli government with the public and with the legislature, and finally in the 
last chapter on the interaction between Israel and Hezbollah. Relying on a rationalist framework 
that makes it possible to draw on insights from different corners of international relations, as well 
as from comparative politics, I specify five mechanisms. When these mechanisms are operable at 
the same time I argue that the risk of escalation increases substantially. The five mechanisms are: 
(1) audience cost, the (2) inclination to share responsibility, (3) standing up to a bully, (4) 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Wars continue to capture our imagination, they have been a part of our history, is a part of our 
present, and will – despite our best our hopes to the contrary, be a part of our future. In the last 
few months alone we have seen terrible wars in Gaza, on Sri-Lanka and in the DR Congo, to 
name just a few. Although we may never see a time without war, there is always the hope than an 
increased knowledge of the phenomenon of war can help reduce the danger of this most extreme 
of human activities. At the most profound - and possible pretentious - level that is the goal of this 
thesis: To further, if only marginally, our understanding of the causes of war. Reflecting on his 
experience as a soldier in the Spanish civil war George Orwell describes how a war, at least at its 
onset, can feel, both for its spectators and its participants, glamorous: “In the Ramblas they halted 
us while a borrowed band played some revolutionary tune or other. Once again the conquering-
hero stuff - shouting and enthusiasm, red flags and red and black flags everywhere, friendly 
crowds thronging the pavement to have a look at us, women waving from the windows. How 
natural it all seemed then; how remote and improbable now!” (Orwell 2003: 13). As Orwell 
spends the rest of his book making clear marching-bands and waving crowds is of course not the 
reality of war. The reality of war is intensely brutal, but the depiction of war is often clouded with 
euphemisms. Kurt Vonnegut exposes one such euphemism and with this warns us that the 
brutality of war can not be masked behind military jargon: “The Germans and the dog was 
engaged in a military operation which had an amusingly self-explanatory name, a human 
enterprise which is seldom described in detail, (...) It is called ‘mopping up’”. (2005: 66). 
This study flows from an empirical anomaly. On July 12th 2006 Hezbollah kidnapped two and in 
the process killed three Israeli soldiers. That operation set in motion a chain of events that 
eventually led to the Second Lebanon war, a war with more than a thousand battle-deaths. On 
October 7th 2000 Hezbollah carried out an almost identical operation. The organization 
kidnapped three and in the process killed four Israeli soldiers. This time around in contrast no 
comparable chain of events started, and no war ensued. The question then is why did these two 
almost identical Hezbollah actions have so dramatically different consequences? Or in other 
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words, why was the Hezbollah operation in 2006 followed by a process of escalation that led to a 
war, while the identical operation in 2000 was followed by no escalation at all. This thesis will 
focus on trying to answer that question. By looking at internal and external factors I will try to 
explain why the 2006 Olmert government made so drastically different decisions than the 2000 
Barak government. This introductory chapter will start with a brief literature review, before I 
move on to a more detailed description of the area of study, and the rational behind it. Following 
this I will very briefly sum up my main findings before I discuss issues relating to methods, 
choice of cases and validity and reliability.  
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
In essence this thesis is about the causes of war. The literature on the causes of war is vast and 
growing. Jack Levy (1998) notes in a review of the field that the literature is increasing in 
complexity and rigor. I could not possible manage a comprehensive literature review of the field, 
but I will briefly touch on a few important contributions in order to show where my work stands 
in the literature as a whole. These and other writings on the causes of war will also be discussed 
throughout the following chapters. Most of the work on the causes of war focuses on wars 
between sovereign states. This is especially true for work within the neo-realist tradition. Waltz 
sees the causes of war as being related to the balance of power and to the concepts of 
miscalculation and overreaction (Waltz 2008), and Mearsheimer traces wars, in essence, to great 
power competition (Mearsheimer 2001). In a comprehensive study of the causes of war another 
realist, Stephan van Evera argues that false optimism, first mover advantage, fluctuations in 
relative power, to what extent resources are cumulative and how easy conquest is, are important 
factors (Van Evera 1999). Both van Evera and Waltz belong to the rationalist tradition in war 
studies, and this tradition was heavily influenced by Geoffrey Blainey’s seminal The Causes of 
War (1988). It is hard to sum up Blainey’s core arguments since the book is not as systematical a 
study with hypotheses and predictions as e.g. van Evera’s work, but two of his chief arguments 
are that wars arise not from imbalances in power between states, but rather from disagreements 
over the balance of power. Secondly, he argues at length that war and peace should not been seen 
as distinct phenomena, but rather that war and peace are two sides of the same coin.  
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Writing from an opposing camp Richard Ned Lebow’s analysis of international crisis, and 
escalation of crisis, use social psychology to explain how misperception and miscalculation 
causes war (1981). Lebow argues that in contrast to the rationalist models used in the above 
mentioned works, leaders are characterized by bounded rationality. Lebow analyses three types 
of crises which all have different origins and trajectories, he labels them: brinkmanship1, spinoff 
and justification of hostility. Justification of hostility crisis are unique in that they are initiated by 
leaders in order to provide a casus belli, spinoff crisis are outgrowths of other wars, while 
brinkmanship crisis are crisis occurring when an actor attempts to challenge an adversary’s 
commitments. Moving back to the rationalist framework David Sobek argues that assumption of 
rationality are “more often correct than wrong” (Sobek 2009: 200). Sobek’s book analyzes the 
causes of war at different levels of analysis, and he tries, as I will in the following, to integrate 
domestic politics into the study of causes of war. Sobek’s book is also extremely interesting in 
that it considers, although briefly, conflicts between state and non-state actors.  
The literature on conflicts between states and non-states is smaller, and it focuses almost 
exclusively on civil wars, failed states or terrorism. Both the literature on failed states and on 
civil war is, in a broader perspective, relevant here since Lebanon has experienced a civil war and 
been on the brink, at least, of being a failed state. The literature is not, however, immediately 
relevant for understanding escalation or non-escalation of the crisis between Israel and 
Hezbollah. The literature on international terrorism is also relevant but most of this literature is 
geared either towards determining how to deal with terrorism (Enders and Sandler 1993), or to 
explaining aspects of terrorism as e.g recruiting (Bueno de Mesquita 2005) or suicide terrorism 
(Pape 2003). In addition to the immediately interesting aspects of the cases in this study in and by 
themselves, this study will seek to fill a void in the literature by looking at how states and non-
states interact in prolonged conflicts. This will enhance the literature on the causes of war in 
general since the dynamics and factors commonly found as important for explaining how crisis 
escalates into wars between states, are likely to be different from the dynamics and factors 
important in relationships between states and non-states. An understanding of if and how these 
factors are different is of substantial theoretical interest. The study will also enhance the literature 
on international terrorism by examining the aspect - conventional war between an insurgency 
                                                 
1
 I will use another model of brinkmanship crisis in chapter 6.  
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group and a state, and the reasons for such a war, which is not thoroughly studied in the literature. 
In addition this study will continue the effort of integrating domestic and international politics, 
which at some point will perhaps make it possible to formulate a cohesive theory of international 
politics drawing on both domestic and systemic factors.  
1.3 WHAT AND WHY? 
As noted above this study at its most general is a study of the causes of war, or more precisely of 
why crisis escalate into wars, and a study of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Both of 
these could be seen as overarching themes. I will not however structure the thesis to be a study of 
the Israel – Hezbollah conflict, but will rather use that conflict as a case study of the causes of 
escalation. I will ask a series of more specific questions, phrased as three primary hypotheses in 
chapters five, six and seven, with the goal that these specific questions together will answer the 
question of which factors explain why the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah experience 
sudden instances of escalation. The three primary hypotheses will tap into three different spheres: 
the international / systemic, the internal Israeli, and the interaction between Israel and Hezbollah, 
but the primary hypotheses will all be stated in a general way. I.e. in chapter four the level of 
analysis will be the systemic level and the unit of analysis will be Israel’s relationship with 
strategic adversaries in the region. In chapter five the level of analysis will be domestic, and the 
unit of analysis will be the Israeli government’s interaction with the public and the legislature. 
Finally in chapter six the level of analysis will again be, somewhat, systemic and the unit of 
analysis will be the interaction of Israel and Hezbollah. Thus in all of the analytical chapters the 
unit of analysis will be various kinds of strategic interaction. The strategic choice approach 
(Lake and Powell 1999) adopted will be discussed in chapter five. As noted the different 
hypotheses will be stated in a general way, but the hypotheses, and the indicators I will deduce 
from them, will all be tested on my two primary cases, the 2000 and 2006 Israel – Hezbollah 
confrontations. Underlying my entire argument is the view that since these two cases at the onset 
were so startlingly similar, there has to be important differences in Israeli internal and / or 
external relations that explains why Israel took the steps it took in 2006, and why it did not take 
those steps in 2000.  
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There is no single theory that explains why crisis escalate, hence I have drawn on a number of 
different theories. All of these have in common, however, a rationalist framework which makes it 
possible, as Helen Milner argues (1998), to take theories from e.g. comparative and international 
politics and combine these. Since I am not testing a cohesive theory I have chosen to rely on 
mechanisms instead of overarching theories (Elster 2007a). I have chosen five mechanisms 
drawn from different corners of the international relations literature which I believe together 
explains what makes the conflict escalate. The mechanisms are (1) audience cost, the (2) 
inclination to share responsibility, (3) standing up to a bully, (4) learning and (5) competition. 
These five mechanisms will be explained and discussed in chapter two. I could of course have 
chosen a number of different mechanisms, but since the literature on my very specific field 
within international relations is, as I have shown, very limited I have decided to take what are 
common mechanisms from important contributions to the literature as a whole. The audience cost 
mechanism has been thoroughly debated, and stems in this form from the work of James Fearon 
(1994). The audience cost mechanism is closely related to the third “standing up to a bully” 
mechanism. This mechanism also stems from the work of James Fearon (1992) and it basically is 
a non-audience cost mechanism. The second mechanism which I have called sharing 
responsibility could just as easily have been called spreading cost. It explains, I argue, how the 
legislature can come to play an important part in foreign policy decisions. The fourth mechanism 
is learning, and it is designed to bring the history of the conflict into the analysis. Lastly the 
competition mechanism is taken from the neo-realist balance of power literature.  
1.4 ANSWERS  
My findings are especially interesting in light of Fearon (1994) and (1995) and Powell (2006), 
and they build and expand upon these works. Powell (2006) argues that there is a common 
mechanism linking the three types of commitment problems described by Fearon (1995) as 
explanations for war. He argues that large rapid shifts in power can be a mechanism in work in 
“preventive war, preemptive attacks arising from first-strike of offensive advantage, and conflicts 
resulting from bargaining over issues that affect future bargaining power” (Powell 2006: 171). 
Powell furthermore argues that war can come with complete information “when a state becomes 
convinced it is facing an adversary it would rather fight than accommodate” (2006: 194). I find in 
chapter four that an interaction effect stemming from a shift in the regional balance of power that 
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favored Iran combined with Israel’s uncertainty over who actually controls Hezbollah created a 
similar commitment problem as the ones described by Powell. In chapters five and six I find that 
Israel’s ability to signal its resolve by way of an audience cost mechanism was mediated, in a 
negative way, by a learning mechanism. In short Hezbollah had grown overly confident in its 
own prediction of how Israel would retaliate, and this confidence hampered Hezbollah’s ability 
recognize the signal of resolve sent by the Olmert government.  
To sum up my conclusions very briefly I will in the following chapters argue, in reverse order, 
that Hezbollah’s failure to take into account the history of the conflict, including their own past 
actions, led the Hezbollah leadership to miscalculate Israel’s response and misconceive Israel’s 
preferences in 2006. In essence Hezbollah had undermined their own prediction of Israeli 
behavior and failed to take into account that Israel’s preferences had changed between 2000 and 
2006. Secondly that the combination in Israel of a weak and vulnerable government faced with 
criticism from the legislature created a situation internally in Israel in 2006 that was conducive to 
escalation. And thirdly that the relative balance of power in the region had shifted between 2000 
and 2006, especially due to Iran’s ballistic missiles program, in a way that made Israel think 
differently about how to ensure its national security. All in all this mixture of factors, all of which 
where in place in 2006 but not in 2000, explains, I argue, via the mechanisms laid out in chapter 
two, why the conflict experienced a dramatic process of escalation in 2006, and why no such 
escalation took place in 2000.  
1.5 CHOOSING CASES  
The cases selected for this study have been chosen because of their value on the dependent 
variable, in this I have been careful to include both positive and negative cases to ensure variance 
on the dependent variable (King, Verba, and Keohane 1994: ch. 4). Deliberately choosing cases 
in this manner makes it possible to go beyond studying the effect of causal variables, to also 
study causal mechanisms and differences between necessary and sufficient conditions (Elster 
2007a: ch. 2; George and Bennett 2005: 23; Gerring 2006: 44), but it also ushers in issues of 
selection bias which I address below. I have two sets of cases each comprising three observations, 
thus all in all the study consists of six cases. The two sets are the crisis in 2000 and 2006, and 
each case consist of three sub-cases corresponding to the before mentioned three spheres. The 
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negative case, non-escalation, of 2000 is chosen according to the possibility principle (Mahoney 
and Goertz 2004). It is my view that had only a few factors been different in 2000, the conflict 
could have experienced an escalatory process along the lines of what happened in 2006. This of 
course is discussed at length in the following analytical chapters. With these cases I will test 
hypotheses deduced from the theoretical framework laid out in the next chapter, but following 
Rueschemeyer (2003) the analysis will also be used to revise in accordance with my findings the 
theoretical framework.  
1.6 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY  
This study is not a study of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. It is a study of escalating 
international crisis, with the two confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah in 2000 and 2006 
as cases of non-escalation and escalation respectively. In other words, my observations are only 
interesting as cases of escalating or non-escalating crisis (Gerring 2004). This feeds into the 
question of validity. It is fruitful to distinguish between two types of validity: external and 
internal. External validity concerns the issue of representativeness: are the cases comprising my 
sample representative for the relevant universe of cases of escalating crisis (Gerring 2006). 
External validity is often thought of as the weakness of case studies. By definition case studies 
consist of a few cases, and the danger that the cases selected are in some ways unique, with the 
consequence that the findings from the study are not relevant to other cases, “forever haunts case 
study research” (Gerring 2006: 43). External validity also concerns the issue of selection bias. In 
large-N studies several techniques can be used to ensure random selection of cases which greatly 
reduces the risk of selection bias. In case study research such randomization is nearly impossible, 
but also not desirable. If the external validity is weak, the internal validity of case studies is 
correspondingly strong. Case studies makes it possible to: “peer into the box of causality to locate 
the intermediate factors lying between some structural factors and its purported effect” (Gerring 
2006: 45). An example is the interaction effect I find in chapter five, which would have been 
almost impossible to discover if I had employed quantitative methods. The external validity of 
this case study will be discussed in later chapters in conjunction with discussing my findings, as 
well as in the concluding chapter.  
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While validity concerns the issue of whether or not one asks the right questions of the right cases, 
reliability concerns the issue of how those questions are asked and how answers are arrived at. 
Findings are reliable in as far as you would get the same answer every time you ask the same 
question. In quantitative studies replication and different robustness checks can increase a study’s 
reliability, but such tools are not as readily available in qualitative research. Coding criteria, how 
different variables are coded, how assumptions are arrived at, how sources are interpreted and 
how tension between conflicting sources is resolved will be discussed throughout this study and 
decisions will be made as transparent as possible. This will, in theory, make it possible to 
replicate this study which will increase it reliability.  
1.7 METHODS  
In this study I will test hypotheses inferred from the theoretical framework and use the findings to 
revise the theoretical framework. The study is constructed as a case study where an implicit 
controlled experiment between a negative and a positive case will be carried out. I am, however, 
a little hesitant to call this a controlled experiment. I will argue that learning, defined as process 
by which an actor comes to hold correct or incorrect assumptions about how another actor will 
behave in future interaction based on past interaction, is important to understand the choices 
Israel and Hezbollah make. If this is correct then my two cases, the 2000 and 2006 confrontation, 
are not independent of each other, which they would have to be if one was to carry out a proper 
experiment. I will also employ counter-factual reasoning in conjunction with a game theoretic 
analysis. On counter-factual reasoning McKeown (2004: 163) argues that: “In situations where 
theory is ill formed and immature, thought experiments reveal latent contradictions and gaps in 
theories and direct the analyst’s search toward nodes in the social interaction process where 
action might plausibly have diverged from the path that it did follow”. Furthermore, following 
Fearon (1991) I will specify what the outcome would have been if one or several causes had been 
changed, i.e. what cause would have had to be altered in my negative case if that case should also 
have had experienced an escalatory process, and inversely with regards to my positive case. For 
each of the analytical chapters I will start by proposing a hypothesis that will be framed in a very 
general language. Step by step I will then move through the scope conditions I believe are 
necessary for the hypothesis to hold, also here moving from a general wording to a more and 
more case specific wording. In the end I will have one case specific primary hypothesis and 
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several indicators flowing from this, I will then deduce testable prediction from these indicators 
and put my theory to test through them.  
In chapters four and six I will employ game theory to analyze the empirical data. There are by 
and large two ways of doing a game theoretic analysis: either you (1) specify a game theoretic 
model first, and then see how this model fits with the data (see e.g: Powell 2007b) or you (2) use 
game theory to structure and analyze the data after it has been collected (e.g: Fearon 2004). With 
the first type you can see how different assumption gives different predictions, and study how the 
actual data conforms with or deviates from the specified model. The second type can be used to 
“make sense of” a vast and chaotic data material, i.e. to explain the observed outcome beyond 
simply noting that this or that factor seems to be important. This way of using game theory makes 
it possible to study the different decisions made by the actors and makes it easier to spot 
moments, nodes in game theoretic language, where different courses of action, which would have 
produced different outcomes, was possible.  
The strength of a game theoretic analysis is that it forces the researcher to be stringent and 
rigorous when arguing, as well as making the analysis transparent. A formal model is easily 
replicable, and because the method forces one to spell out all ones assumptions it is relatively 
easy to check for robustness by altering assumptions and seeing if this changes the outcome 
(McCarthy and Meirowitz 2007; Morrow 1994). All in all this increases reliability. Game theory, 
however, also have many critics. On the more general level, rational choice theory on which 
game theory builds, have been criticized for being a “flight from reality” (Shapiro 2007) and 
overly technical formal models have been criticized for lacking any real world relevance (Elster 
2007b). In the end I, at least, believe that the importance and usefulness of political science is 
invariably intertwined with the discipline’s ability to conduct relevant research on important 
issues. Therefore even though much of this critique has in turn been criticized for fighting against 
straw men, it is important to take note of it and strive to produce useful social science. This brief 
and general look at the methods employed will be expanded upon in conjunction with the actual 
use of the methods and discussion of results in the analytical chapters.   
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1.8 DATA AND SOURCES 
The data used in this study stems primarily from secondary sources. The media coverage of the 
both the region and conflict is extensive, and several news sources will be utilized. I will also 
draw heavily on scholarly articles and books, reports from research institutes and books written 
for a more general audience by various experts and knowledgeable observers, e.g. journalists. 
This data material will be complemented with interviews with experts and journalists in the 
region.   
1.9 PLAN OF THE THESIS 
Following this introductory chapter the next chapter lays out the theory which this thesis builds 
on. It will discuss the use of mechanisms, the different mechanisms I will examine through my 
primary hypotheses, and the rationalist framework I write within. The third chapter backgrounds 
the conflict, and is a brief history of the situation in the Middle East from the end of the 1973, or 
Yom Kippur, War until the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The fourth chapter is the 
first analytical chapter and it focuses on the systemic level, analyzing in particular Israel’s 
relationship with Iran, and Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah. The fifth chapter deals with 
internal Israeli politics and the decisions made by the Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert governments 
following the October 2000 and July 2006 Hezbollah kidnappings. The sixth chapter is the last 
analytical chapter and covers the direct strategic interaction between Israel and Hezbollah, 
focusing particularly on miscalculation and on information asymmetries. Lastly I end this thesis 
with a concluding chapter that sums up my main findings and discusses the implication of these 




Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and 
will never achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both  
sides alike and therefore constitute a moderating force. 
Carl von Clausewitz (1976: 78) 
  
This chapter lays the theoretical foundation for the following analytical chapters. To reiterate, the 
goal of this entire endeavor is to try to explain why two seemingly similar crises had so very 
different trajectories. In order to be able to explain this puzzle I believe it is necessary to address 
both the international and the domestic aspects of the situation. It might be perfectly possible to 
find a satisfactory explanation for why the crisis in 2006 escalated so much further than the one 
in 2000 at either the international or domestic level. Ultimately however I believe I will be able to 
paint a better and more nuanced picture by focusing on both aspects. Although in the end I will 
not have provided an explanation as parsimonious as one offered by a purely systemic view, I 
will offer a rigorous and fine-grained one. I employ a rationalist framework to structure my 
analysis. Following the same recipe as Moravcsik (1998) this framework is used to designate a 
set of assumptions that makes it possible to break my object of study, escalation of crisis, into 
smaller parts. More focused and much more nuanced theories will then be employed to analyze 
the different elements of the study.  
Mechanisms will be the central component of the theoretical framework. I will draw mechanism 
from other theories and show how these mechanisms link together different elements of the 
study, and explain why the crisis in 2006 escalated further than the one in 2000. The five 
mechanisms I propose together explain the escalation in 2006, as well as the non-escalation in 
2000, are: (1) audience cost, the (2) inclination to share responsibility, (3) standing up to a bully, 
(4) learning and (5) competition. These five mechanisms link together both domestic and 
international aspects, and show why the probability of an Israeli escalation was much greater in 
2006 than in 2000. The mechanism also makes it possible to show what other factors would have 
had to be present in order for the 2000 kidnappings to have set in motion the same escalatory 
process as in 2006. It would of course have been possible to include other mechanism, but as I 
explain in detail below, I believe these five mechanisms are necessary and sufficient causes in 
explaining the empirical puzzle. In the following I will first briefly consider what rationalism is, 
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then I will move on to rational institutionalism which this study builds on. After having 
considered the issues of how to determine actors’ preferences I move on to mechanism. I first 
spell out what mechanisms are, before I describe the mechanism that will be examined in this 
study.  
2.1 RATIONALISM 
As noted a partial aim in this thesis is to integrate domestic and international politics in order to 
create a coherent understanding of why crisis escalate. No single theory is capable of explaining 
every piece of this puzzle, so multiple theories will be employed to try to explain different parts 
of the puzzle. The different theories do however have to rest on a common foundation, and that 
foundation will in this case be rationalism, or more precisely rational institutionalism (Milner 
1998: 21). Escalation of crisis is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, and rationalism will 
simply be used as a framework in order to find a set of very basic assumptions that allows me to 
break the phenomenon up in multiple smaller parts that can be studied (Moravcsik 1998: 21). The 
smaller parts are the different mechanisms at work in the different spheres that together explain 
the object of study. More focused theories, which do not break with the basic assumptions of the 
rationalist framework, will then be employed in explaining the different parts of the puzzle. 
Rationalism in my context can be summarized as a method or recipe as laid out by Fearon and 
Wendt (2002: 54). You start with an (1) action or pattern of action to be explained. Then you (2) 
posit a set of actors with the capacity to take the action in question. Next you (3) propose a 
structure of interaction2, i.e. a sequence of choices, that embed the actions taken that you are 
interested in, in a larger universe of possible actions. Then you (4) make arguments about the 
preferences each actor holds. Lastly you (5) show under what conditions the outcome or patterns 
of action in question would emerge if the actors were choosing rationally in light of their beliefs 
and other actors’ choices. In a game-theoretic model beliefs are also subject to Bayesian 
updating, or learning3.    
                                                 
2
 E.g. a specific game. 
3
 Emphasis will be put on path dependence in this essay, so this is especially relevant. 
13 
 
2.2 RATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LOGIC OF TWO LEVEL GAMES 
The theory of rational institutionalism appears to be the most developed and rigorous theory for 
integrating domestic and international politics. The theory focuses on institutions, and on how 
institutions aggregate the diverse preferences of multiple actors into a collective decision. Milner 
(1998: 760 - 761) defines institutions as: “means by which the diverse preferences of individuals 
are aggregated into choices or outcomes for the collective”. This type of analysis implies a 
concern with mechanisms of collective choice in situations of strategic interaction. A rationalist 
model analysis either how outcomes change when you (1) alter institutions while holding 
preferences constant, or how outcomes change when you (2) alter preferences but hold 
institutions constant (Milner 1998: 783). For the following two reasons I will focus on changing 
preferences while institutions are held constant. First and foremost because Israel has not seen 
any major changes in the institutions that govern the country in the period from 2000 to 2006 
(Schindler 2008). A focus on changing institutions would therefore have to be a counter-factual 
analysis where I would argue e.g. that the outcome would not have occurred had this or that 
institution been different. Secondly because my focus is on the actors, and why the actors in 
question made different choices in 2006 compared to 2000, a focus on preferences, and especially 
changing preferences, seems both appropriate and fruitful. The focus on preferences is also 
emphasized by Moravcsik (1997). In his theory the key actors are not states, but groups and 
individuals inside of states. These actors behave on average rational. The state represents a subset 
of individuals, and the institutions of the state are key to understanding how diverse preferences 
are aggregated into state policy. Finally states are mutually dependent on each other, so the 
composition of state’s preferences determines international outcomes.   
A rationalist institutionalist framework makes it possible to relax two central assumptions in 
international politics: (1) that states are the primary actors in international politics and (2) that 
states are unitary actors. Relaxing the second assumption means “bringing domestic politics back 
in”. Milner (1998: 775) argues that in democratic states at least two actors vie for control over 
policy making: the executive and the legislature. In addition to this, important civil society 
institutions, political parties, the army etc may also be conceptualized as actors within the 
framework. The actors have a common attribute in that they share control over some or all of the 
key elements in the decision-making process: setting the agenda, devising policy proposals and 
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implementing policies. The strategic interaction of the actors within the Israeli political system 
determines policy outcome. It is the focus on strategic interaction that distinguishes this model 
from earlier work such as Allison (1999). Instead of just showing that different actors within the 
state hold different preferences, we can now model how these preferences are aggregated into 
collective outcomes.  
I will focus on the interaction between a state and a non-state actor, and this obviously makes it 
necessary to use a theory that does not view the state as the only relevant actor in international 
politics. In a rationalist intuitionalist framework the claim is that although not all institutions are 
similar, all institutions have mechanisms for aggregating diverse preferences into outcomes 
(Milner 1998: 780). By and large this reasoning has been applied to the importance of institutions 
in international relations. It has never been used to model the interaction between a state and a 
non-state actor like Hezbollah. The question therefore is to what extent Hezbollah shares this 
lowest common denominator. In her book on Hezbollah Judith Palmer Harik (2004) paints a 
picture of Hezbollah that justifies treating it as an institution. The highest authority in Hezbollah 
is the consultative council, followed hierarchically by the executive consultative council and a 
politburo (Harik 2004: 53 - 54). The politburo coordinates the work of Hezbollah’s various 
committees that deal with everything from garbage collection through education to violent 
terrorism (Harik 2004: ch. 6). Similarly Hamzeh (2004: ch 4) describes Hezbollah as a large and 
complex organization. Hezbollah provides different kinds of health care, e.g., for over 400.000 
individuals, and Hamzeh argues that the organization is best described as a “combination of what 
Maurice Duverger and Giovanni Sartori call mass party and cadre party” (2004: 74).   
2.3 SETTING PREFERENCES 
Determining the preferences of the different actors will be of central importance. In the literature 
this is done, mainly, in three ways: (1) by assumption, (2) by deducing them from basic interests 
or4 (3) by borrowing from other theories that can shed light on the actors’ preferences (Milner 
1998: 784). The goal is to combine the strength of game theory in analyzing situations of 
strategic interaction, with the knowledge of preferences and beliefs gained from e.g. 
constructivism (Milner 1998: 785). A constructivist example of how to determine preferences is 
                                                 
4
 This method introduces a new problem since you then have to determine the basic interests. 
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found in Johnston (1996). Johnston uses texts by Mao to construct a Chinese preference ranking 
in military conflict with another state: offensive operations will be preferred over static defense, 
and static defense will be preferred over accommodationist strategies (1996: 248). To borrow 
from constructivism in this way is appropriate as long as we do not violate the basic rationalist 
assumptions of the framework, and it mirrors what Moravcsik did in his study of European 
integration (1998: 18 - 19). All of these methods may be useful, but I will relay by and large on 
the second and the third. I will use deduction to construct Hezbollah’s preferences, and I will 
borrow from other theories and deduce to determine the preferences of Israel. I.e. for the Israeli 
case I will do some of the “ground work” myself by interviewing and by relaying on data 
collected from such interviews, books and other written sources  to determine preferences.   
2.4 ON MECHANISMS 
So far we have dealt with theory on an abstract level, but it is time to move on to more fine-
grained theories meant to explain each element in the analysis. In order to do that I have to make 
a small detour to explain what I mean by mechanisms. What I am interested in is uncovering the 
chain or sequence of mechanisms that make a situation develop from a state of crisis to a state of 
conflict. Mechanisms will be understood as “frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal 
patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate 
consequences” (Elster 2007a: 36). These mechanisms allow us to explain, but not to predict 
outcomes. Conversely you may define mechanisms as “a delimited class of events that alter 
interaction among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of 
situations” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 24). This later definition is especially useful since 
it highlights the importance of processes. A process can then be defined as a sequence of 
mechanisms.  
2.5 MECHANISMS OF ESCALATION 
I am looking for mechanisms in each of the spheres forming this analysis that can explain the 
escalatory process that can take a situation from crisis to conflict. The mechanisms I will consider 
are: domestic audience cost, desire to stand up to a bully, inclination to share responsibility, 
learning and competition. I am arguing, to make it explicit, that the following mechanisms 
explain why the crisis in 2006 escalated much further than the crisis in 2000, and furthermore that 
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these mechanism show that a focus on both international and domestic elements is necessary to 
arrive at a full and nuanced explanation.  
Table  2-1: The Framework5 
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2.5.1 AUDIENCE COST 
The audience cost mechanism links together two internal players in my framework, the Israeli 
cabinet and the public, and furthermore links these two actors with escalation of the crisis. 
International crisis are public events that take place before a domestic audience, “domestic 
audience cost arise from the action of domestic audiences concerned with whether the leadership 
is successful or unsuccessful at foreign policy” (Fearon 1994: 577). Michael Tomz recently 
carried out an experiment to check if he found evidence of audience cost, and at least for the 
American public he found considerably evidence of such (Tomz 2007). Tomz finds a marked 
increase in the proportion of people who strongly disapprove, and a marked decrease in the 
proportion of people who approve of the president in a situation where the president threatens to 
use force but then in the end fails to carry through on the threats. In short he finds that people 
care about the international reputation of their country and the leader.  
                                                 
5
 The design of this figure is borrowed from Moravcsik (1998). 
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Audience cost links together the executive and the public with escalation of crisis in the 
following manner. After both actors have made their first move, i.e. after one actor has provoked 
another actor and that actor has not simply ignored the provocation, the first actor face the option 
of either escalating or backing down. If the leader chooses to back down after having engaged 
with the foreign actor, he runs the risk of paying an audience cost as described above. Once a 
crisis has begun and the leader has escalated beyond a point of normal reaction he will find it 
hard to back down without losing face. I assume that the political leader has as a core preference 
the goal of serving and defending his country, but I also assume that the leader has a preference 
for staying in power (Milner 1997). His ability to stay in power will be severely limited if he 
suffers an audience cost, and therefore once he has escalated a crisis it is difficult to back down. I 
insert the clause “beyond a point of normal reaction” because the situation in Israel entails a 
steady stream of attacks. Most of these attacks are answered in one way or another, but this is 
more akin to a normal tit-for-tat situation. The danger of escalation, and with it the chance of 
suffering an audience cost, arises for an Israeli Prime Minister only when he reacts above and 
beyond the normal tit-for-tat procedure. If, however, a Prime Minister chooses to react above and 
beyond, audience cost as a mechanism alters the relations between the political leadership and the 
public, and through this a mechanism that can lead to escalation of a crisis. The causal chain is 
here quite straight forward. Once a decision to escalate has been made, the mechanism makes it 
difficult to back down and makes it more likely that crisis will escalate further. This mechanism 
can thus not explain the initial decision to escalate, but it can help explain why escalation is 
continued once it has reached a certain point.  
2.5.2 SHARING RESPONSIBILITY  
Milner argues that for the legislature to be relevant in international relations it has to be more 
hawkish then the executive (Milner 1997: 77 - 81). Only then will the legislature be able to alter 
the outcome of international trade negotiations, which is subject of her book. International crisis 
situations however are of a distinctively different nature from trade negotiations. Situations of 
crisis tend to move faster, and the decisions leaders make and the outcome this produce have 
more immediate, serious, and often fatal consequences. Compared with trade negotiations, 
decisions of war and peace are not, usually, motivated by partisan politics. Although they may of 
course be motivated by the desire for increased power, this is much less true in democracies than 
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in other or earlier regimes, if for no other reasons than because wars of conquest are not 
considered normal politics as they once were (Creveld 1991). The role of the legislature must 
therefore be analyzed in a very different way for my purposes here.  I suggest that the legislature 
can play an important role, and have decisive power, in situations of escalating crisis through the 
mechanism resulting from the very human instinct of wanting to share responsibility or to spread 
cost. 
The former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban alludes to this. In his autobiography he discusses 
former Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s decision to expand the cabinet with members of the 
opposition parties during the run up to the 1967 war. In his words: “Eshkol’s agreement to have 
opposition leaders join the meeting of the Cabinet Defense Committee showed that he, too, was 
moved by a natural instinct to share responsibility” (Eban 1977: 387). Another example of such 
behavior can possibly be found in President Bush’s decision to seek an authorization from 
congress before he invaded Iraq6, an authorization he did not legally need since the President has 
the prerogative as commander in chief to attack other countries (Bradly and Goldsmith 2005)7. 
Since decisions such as these are life and deaths decisions, which will affect the whole country in 
a much more brutal way than a new international trade deal, the legislative will, through the 
mechanism of sharing responsibility, play an important part. In real terms this means that the 
executive will be very careful in integrating the legislative in the decision making process, and 
she will take care to not stray too far from the views of the opposition. I expect that the executive 
will not escalate a crisis to the brink of war without having consulted heavily with prominent 
members of the legislative, so that the decision in the end appears to be the decision of the state 
and not just the executive. This mechanism thus explains how the legislature plays a part in 
escalation processes. The causal chain here is: Because of the inclination to share responsibility; 
the executive will consult with and try to make the legislature a part of the decisions that are 
made. This not only gives the legislature a place in the decision making process, it also gives it 
power over the outcome since it would be virtually impossible for any executive to ignore the 
legislature without losing all credibility after having included that body in the process.  
                                                 
6
 The now infamous “Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq” US 
Congress (Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq  2002).  
7
 I am shortcutting a constitutional debate here. Some argue that the President needs such an authorization, but most 
seem to think that he does not. Bradly and Goldsmith summaries the pro and con arguments (2005).  
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2.5.3 STANDING UP TO A BULLY & LEARNING 
Two mechanisms link Hezbollah and Israel. The first explains Hezbollahs decision to attack 
Israel, and the second deals with the issue of path dependence. Theoretically the Hezbollah 
leadership should be as concerned about audience cost as the Israeli leadership. Hezbollah is a 
complex organization (Harik 2004), and its leaders need support in the same way as the leader of 
a political party. Hezbollah has long been engaged in a tit-for-tat game with Israel where 
Hezbollah makes minor incursions into Israel, and Israel retaliates in kind. However in 2006 
Israel, to Hezbollah’s surprise, answered much more forcefully than it had in the past. This 
suggests another mechanism might be at work. Fearon argues that: “particularly in small, 
relatively powerless countries, publics may actually reward leaders for “standing up against” a 
larger state’s implicit or explicit threats” (Fearon 1992: 184). The mechanism here is one of 
anger. Anger is triggered, among other things, from the belief of being slighted (Elster 1999: 54) 
and according to Elster it is followed by a tendency to “cause the object of the emotion to suffer” 
(Elster 2007a: 153). The mechanism here works in two ways, but it is only relevant for this study 
in one of them. First it may explain Hezbollah’s decision to attack Israel in the first place; this 
decision is however outside of this study. Secondly, and definitely relevant here, it helps explain 
why the Hezbollah leadership did not pay an audience cost and therefore why the leadership 
decided to escalate the crisis. The chain here works as follows: first the anger mechanism induces 
Hezbollah to act against, real or perceived, oppression and oppressors. Secondly Hezbollah is not 
constrained by the audience cost mechanism, but rather is “pushed” by people’s desire to stand 
up to a bully and therefore escalates the crisis.  
Learning can be thought of as “a change in beliefs or change in one’s confidence in existing 
beliefs, which can result from exposure to new evidence, theories, or behavioral repertoires” 
(Simmons, Dobbin, and Garret 2006: 795). Paul Pierson warns that learning in politics may occur 
but “there is little reason, however, to think that this acts as a selection mechanism with anything 
like the efficiency-enhancing properties of market competition (…) [B]ecause political reality is 
so complex and the tasks of evaluating public performance and determining which options would 
be superior are so formidable, such self-correction is often limited” (Pierson 2004: 41). My 
understanding of learning is slightly different from Pierson’s, although his view informs mine to 
a great extent. While he argues that learning does not prevent path-dependence, i.e. learning in 
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politics is not efficiency-enhancing as it may be in market competition, I argue that learning 
rather leads to path-dependence. Learning in this study means that the lessons actors take with 
them from earlier interaction, influences the choices they make in later interactions. This means 
that learning does not necessarily ensure that actors will make better choices at later points, only 
that what they believe are the lessons learned from earlier encounters will inform later choices. 
Related to escalation, learning as a mechanism can work both ways. Learning about one’s 
adversary can both “harden” and “soften” the way we perceive him. If our perception is hardened 
we are more likely to think that brute force is the only way to deal with him, if it is softened the 
opposite might become our belief. The same mechanism may provide both effects, so it allows us 
to explain ex post, but not to predict (Elster 1999).  
It is important to note that this concept of learning is thicker than the concept of Bayesian 
learning in game theory. In Bayesian updating a player makes his choice based on the perceived 
probability of the other player being of a certain type, i.e. being e.g. either hawkish or dovish 
(Morrow 1994). It is not evident that this kind of learning will create path dependence, since it 
only implies that the players are able to make better informed choices. For this study learning will 
not only affect the preference ranking, which Bayesian updating does, it also will affect the 
preference formation. Through continued interaction actors, in this case the Israeli actors and 
Hezbollah, come to believe that they have deeper understanding of how an actor will behave in a 
given situation. This knowledge informs the choices they take, or to put it in game theoretic 
terms: it affects both the actors’ own preferences, and the preferences they believe the other 
actors have over the different outcomes. This ties together with the issue of how to determine 
preferences, and instead of just relaying on assumptions I may now draw on the literature e.g. on 
socialization from constructivism (Checkel 2001; Checkel and Zurn 2005). Through continued 
interaction the actors come to believe that they know how to deal with their enemy, this closes off 
a range of possible reactions to a provocation and through this mimics path dependence.  
2.5.4 COMPETITION  
The first two mechanisms operate in the sphere of domestic Israeli politics, the second two 
operate at level of the second sphere, the relationship between Israel and Hezbollah, whilst this 
fifth mechanism operate in the third sphere, the international system. The relationship between 
states can take on a variety of forms (Buzan and Wæver 2003), but I argue that the relationship 
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between Israel and Iran, which will be the focus in the third sphere, is best analyzed as one of 
classic anarchy and distrust. Calculation of power dominates the relationship between Israel and 
Iran, and such calculation leads to competition of power (Mearsheimer 2001: 18). The primary 
goal of any state, according to neorealist thinking, is survival. States “seek to maintain the 
territorial integrity and domestic political order (Mearsheimer 2001: 31). The combination of the 
desire for survival with anarchy and distrust, leads states to be fearful of each other, and this fear8 
induces states to behave aggressively. Anarchy and distrust are static factors in realist theory so 
they can not explain variation in the behavior of states. The central factor for explaining such 
variation is the capability states have to threaten each other. The capability to threaten varies and, 
and this variation explain why states grow more or less fearful of each other (Mearsheimer 2001: 
43). Powell (1999: ch 4) argues that variation in states capability to threaten each other can be a 
potent cause for war, especially in situations of asymmetric information. The mechanisms in 
operation are thus both fear and competition. According to Waltz behavior common for 
competitors is to: “imitate each other and become socialized to their system” (Waltz 1979: 128). 
Even though Iran on the face of it did not play an immediate role in the 2006 war, I expect Israel 
to “factor Iran in” when deciding how to respond to Hezbollah’s actions. This is due to the 
competition which necessitates that Israel has to consider not only its relationship with 
Hezbollah, but also its wider relationship with other powers in the region when engaging in 
conflict. To put it in realist terms I’m claiming that states, in this case Iran and Israel, are very 
sensitive to changes in relations of power between them, and that Israel is concerned about the 
growth of Iran (Waltz 2000).   
To grind it a little finer I will expect competition of power to play a part in Israel’s deliberations 
only when it considers other actors in the region to be an actual or future potential threat. Jordan 
is not now, and is not in the near future likely to constitute, a threat to Israel, so Jordan is not a 
factor in whether or not Israel chooses to go to war. The focus is on Iran because Iran was a very 
different actor in 2006 than in 2000. While Israel might have safely ignored Iran in 2000, the 
Olmert government may have felt that it was impossible to do so in 2006. The implicit hypothesis 
is that Israel in 2006 viewed Iran as a present or potential competitor. The logic behind this 
mechanism is that Israel will treat the confrontation with Hezbollah as a part of the competition 
                                                 
8
 On emotions, especially fear, in international politics see: Crawford (2000). 
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with Iran. Israel will therefore act in a manner that ensures that its position vis. a vis. Iran will be 
strengthened. If on the other hand no competition effect with Iran took place, such considerations 
would not be a part of Israel’s decision to escalate in 2006. Competition and fear leads to the 
following causal chain: after Israel is confronted by Hezbollah, she has the choice of not 
responding, escalating in a tit-for-tat manner or escalating in a more decisive manner. In a 
situation where Israel believes that escalating in a more decisive manner strengthens her 
competitive position, Israel will take this into account and when choosing how to act. The 
mechanism may however also work in the opposite direction; if a confrontation with an adversary 
could weaken state A’s position vis. a vis. state B, state A is more inclined not to escalate.   
2.6 CONCLUSION 
What makes a good theory? Obviously a theory is only as good as its explanatory power. A 
theory’s independent variables should explain as much as possible of the variation in the 
dependent variable, but at the same time it needs to, at least to a certain extent, be parsimonious, 
i.e. a theory should “elucidate by simplifying” (Van Evera 1997: 19). The focus on theory is very 
important in this study, and I will subject all of the mechanisms I have chosen to rigorous testing 
to see if they do have explanatory power. The underlying, implicit, grand theory is that both 
domestic and international factors are necessary, and conversely therefore that neither domestic 
nor international factors are alone sufficient, for explaining why the conflict between Israel and 
Hezbollah experiences seemingly abrupt “escalation moments”. I have deducted the five 
mechanisms comprising this study from theoretical works in order to test it in a way that will 
leave it open to falsification. In the next chapter I will provide an overview of the conflict 
between Israel and Hezbollah from the 1973 Yom Kippur war until the Israeli withdrawal from 
southern Lebanon in the summer of 2000. My analysis will start directly following that chapter. 
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3 THE BACKGROUND 
What cause have we to complain 
about their fierce hatred of us? 
Moshe Dayan (1976)  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter backgrounds the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. I start with the end 
of the Yom Kippur War, and cover the period up to Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. I have 
chosen the end of the Yom Kippur war as my starting point since this marks the final, thus far, all 
out war between Israel and its neighbors. Later conflicts would be much smaller and they would 
be between Israel and organizations such as the PLO, Hamas and Hezbollah rather than Egypt, 
Syria and Jordan. The end of the Yom Kippur war also marks, to a certain degree, the final border 
settlements between Israel and its neighbors. I am not claiming that there were not any border 
changes after 1973, but these came as a response to peaceful negotiations and not conquest. 
Although the period after 1973 is unmarked by conventional maneuver warfare involving Israel, 
it was far from peaceful. Israel was consistently engaged with various enemies both internal and 
external, and this period also saw the war between Iran and Iraq and the first Gulf War. In 
addition this period saw the end of the Cold War and with it the end of proxy wars and the 
demise of the Soviet Union as an important actor in the Middle East. 
In the following I will pay attention to both the internal political change in Israel as well as 
external developments. With regards to politics in Israel I will look at the election of Menachem 
Begin as the first non-labor movement Prime Minister in Israel following the Yom Kippur war, 
and the Oslo peace process and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. The disappointment with the 
Oslo process which led to the election of another Likud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and 
the following leftwards shift with the election on Ehud Barak. I will look at Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982, the Intifada and the appearance of Hamas and Hezbollah. This chapter will end 
with the election of Ehud Barak and the final Israel withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. The 
chapter will also give an appraisal of the balance of power between Israel and Hezbollah 
throughout the 1990s. 
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Figure  3-1: The Southern Lebanon Region9 
 
3.2 OCTOBER SURPRISE 
Reflecting on the 1973 war Israel’s one-eyed Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan observed that 
this was the most difficult of Israel’s wars. Not only had the Syrian and Egyptian armies 
technically been thoroughly upgraded, the fighting quality of the soldiers had vastly increased. In 
the closest thing an Israeli General can come to pay homage to Arab soldiers Dayan writes: “As 
for the fighting standard of the Arab soldiers, I can sum it up in one sentence: they did not run 
away. (…) Not this time. Now, in the Yom Kippur War, even when they suffered heavy 
causalities and recognized that the battle was lost, they did not run, they withdrew” (Dayan 1976: 
510). At kilometer 101 on the Suez-Cairo road on November 11th 1973 Israel and Egypt signed a 
cease-fire agreement ending what would be called the Yom Kippur or the Ramadan War (Morris 
                                                 
9
 Map retrieved from the UN. See: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/southern_lebanon.pdf  
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2001). The war started on October 6th with a combined attack by Syria and Egypt on Israel. It 
ended, one could argue, in 1977 when Likud emerged victorious from elections, broke the Labor 
movement’s monopoly on Prime Ministers in Israel and Menachem Begin formed a rightist 
cabinet (Schindler 2008: 146). The election of Begin as Prime Minister had far reaching 
consequences for Israel’s relations with the Arab states. The chief difference between the Labor 
movement and Likud was that the labor movement was pragmatic, whereas Likud was 
ideological. When Labor wanted to hold on to the territories occupied in 1967 for security 
reasons, Likud wanted them for ideological reasons (Shlaim 2001). 
Mindful of the fact that he internationally was considered to be both a fanatic and a warmonger, 
Begin decided to offer the post of foreign minister to Moshe Dayan. Dayan accepted the post on 
the condition that Israeli sovereignty was not extended to the occupied areas while peace 
negotiations with the Arab states was taking place (Shlaim 2001: 354). Begin, who had 
reportedly told Zbignew Brzezinski that: “My right eye will fall out, my right hand will fall off, 
before I ever agree to the dismantling of a single Jewish settlement” (Morris 2001: 468), accepted 
this condition and Dayan was put in charge of the peace negotiations with Egypt. The 
negotiations ended on the 26th of March 1979 with a peace treaty, the Camp David Accord, which 
normalized the relations between Israel and Egypt. In the following months Israel withdrew from 
the Sinai Peninsula in accordance with the plan, while Egypt was expelled from the Arab League 
for having broken ranks and made a deal with the enemy (Shlaim 2001). On the issue of 
autonomy for the Palestinians things did not look as optimistic. Prime Minister Begin had no real 
wish for the autonomy negotiations with the Palestinians to succeed, and in the end both Moshe 
Dayan and Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann, who had also broken ranks with the labor 
movement and joined Begin, resigned from the cabinet. Weizmann was so thoroughly 
disillusioned with the Begin leadership that while leaving the Prime Minister’s office after having 
delivered his letter of resignation he tore down a peace poster hanging on the wall, exclaiming 
“No one here wants peace” (Shlaim 2001: 383). The Camp David Accord proved durable, but it 
also meant that Israel no longer had to expect war with Egypt. This made it possible for the Begin 




3.3 ARIK’S WAR 
Alluding among other things to the training camps in the Beqaa valley Ariel Sharon described 
Lebanon in the 1970s as the “center of world terrorism” (Morris 2001: 499). The 1970s saw a 
marked increase in the number of cross-border terrorist attacks from Lebanon into northern 
Israel. The Lebanese government was unable to stop these attacks even though Israeli retribution 
wrought havoc on the Lebanese countryside (Morris 2001). After having launched operation 
“Peace for Galilee” and invaded Lebanon Israeli troops on the 20th of June 1982 encircled the 
Lebanese Presidential Palace. A few months later, in September, after the Lebanese president-
elect Bashir Gemayel was killed in an attack on the Phalange party headquarters, the Israeli army 
entered Beirut (Traboulsi 2007: 213 - 220). This was the culmination of a process that started 
with terrorist attacks on northern Israel and was followed by an alliance between Israel and the 
Lebanese Christian maronites. The Begin government had two goals in this process: to evict the 
PLO from Lebanon in order to have a freer hand in dealing with Gaza and the West Bank, and to 
ensure Christian domination over a Lebanon which would then sign a peace treaty and normalize 
relations with Israel (Morris 2001: Ch. 11). 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was carried out against the opposition of a majority of the 
cabinet, against the advice and recommendation of the intelligence community and against the 
explicit opposition of the senior ranks of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) (Schiff and Ya'ari 1984: 
301). The operation succeeded in ending PLO’s state within the state and eliminating the supply 
lines for international terrorism (Schiff and Ya'ari 1984: 306), but the war did not put an end to 
what the Begin government called the “Palestinian problem”. It did not turn Lebanon into a 
Christian dominated and reliable Israeli ally and it did not end Syria’s domination over the 
Lebanese state. On the contrary it plunged Lebanon even more deeply into civil strife, it 
heightened Syria’s domination, it brought about the forming of Hezbollah and it could of course 
never solve the “Palestinian problem” since it did not address that conflicts root cause at all 
(Morris 2001). The most infamous instance in the first Lebanon war is the massacres in Sabra and 
Shatilla. An Israeli commission of inquiry, the Khan commission, concluded that Israel bore 
responsibility for the massacres and went so far as comparing Israeli responsibility to the 
responsibility of Polish and Russian authorities for the pogroms carried out against Jews in the 
nineteenth century (Morris 2001: 548). 
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The IDF occupied Beirut until June 1985 when they redeployed to the south of Lebanon, in what 
would be called the security zone, where the IDF stayed until the summer of 2000. The operation 
managed to evict the PLO from Lebanon, but the victory was pyrrhic, in its place came a much 
more uncompromising organization: the Hezbollah (Shlaim 2001). In the course of the war Israel 
antagonized most of the population in Lebanon, and was subject to international condemnation, 
but the war also left the Israeli society bitterly divided (Morris 2001: 559). Peace Now, the Israeli 
peace organization, had as a governing principle not to organize demonstrations during a war. As 
a symbol of the internal division in Israel however, Peace Now organized a demonstration as 
early as July of 1982 which attracted more than 100.000 demonstrators (Schindler 2008: 177). 
This division not only occurred inside Israel, it also involved the Jewish diaspora in the U.S. The 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee10, decidedly an establishment organization, welcomed 
the same Reagan plan11 the Begin government was shocked by, and an opinion poll found that as 
much as 70 % of American Jews favored talks with the PLO if the PLO seized terrorist activities 
(Schindler 2008: 194). The reign of Menachem Begin ended in august of 1983 when he handed 
over the premiership to Yitzhak Shamir, his foreign minister.  
3.4 THE INTIFADA 
In 1986 Shimon Peres recognized the Palestinians as a separate people. Between Yitzhak 
Shamir’s attempts at blocking any negotiations with Palestine and the war between Iraq and Iran, 
which occupied most Arab governments at the time, the Palestinian issue, however, mostly 
receded from the spotlight in much of the 1980s (Schindler 2008). This changed suddenly when 
the first Intifada started in December of 1987. The intifada came as a surprise both to Israel and 
the PLO, and it had its cause in the inhabitants of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem’s 
national and economic aspirations (Morris 2001). It began not as an armed rebellion but, in 
Benny Morris’ words, “as a massive persistent campaign of civil resistance, with strikes and 
commercial shutdowns, accompanied by violent (though unarmed) demonstrations against the 
occupying forces. (…) The intifada was a political struggle (…) though it started as a mass 
protest against unbearable economic conditions” (Morris 2001: 561).   
                                                 
10
 Abbreviated AIPAC, this organization constitutes a vital part of what is often termed the Israel lobby.  
11
 The Reagan plan was issued unilaterally by the White House without prior consultations with the Israeli 
government. It argued that the West Bank settlements were an obstacle to peace (Schindler 2008: 175) 
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The PLO was acutely aware that if it was to have any success in confronting Israel it was vital to 
win the international propaganda war, and that the only way to do this was to maintain the image 
of the intifada as a popular revolt of a Palestinian David against an Israeli Goliath (Morris 2001: 
580). The use of guns was therefore forbidden, and tactics such as setting crops on fire was 
abandoned once it became clear that it harmed the intifada’s support among left-leaning Israelis 
and world opinion. The PLO also attempted to regain control over the occupied territories from 
Israel. Informants had been the backbone of the Israeli army’s operation in the occupied 
territories, but by targeting these collaborators the intifada managed to effectively sever the 
army’s control of both the West Bank and Gaza (Morris 2001). The Israeli army, on the other 
side, never succeeded in devising an effective strategy that would both put an end to the riots, and 
not put Israel at a disadvantage in the court of public opinion. From the start the top Israeli 
Generals told the cabinet that although they could deal with specific situations, they could not 
stop the intifada entirely and in the end the solution would have to be political (Morris 2001).  
The army’s biggest problem was to deal with riots and rioters without appearing to be using 
excessive force. To this end plastic bullets were introduced and teargas and truncheons became 
standard equipment for Israeli soldiers. All in all though the army did not show any reluctance to 
use force, rather it became more and more punitive: “curfews, traffic restrictions, school closures, 
house demolitions, deportations, collective punishments, administrative detainment – all 
measures that had hitherto been sporadic (…) now became customary” (Cohen 2008: 143). 
Martin van Creveld argues that the army was suffering from having to fight an enemy much 
weaker than itself, and it failed to take into account the moral implications of a prolonged 
struggle against a much weaker enemy (Creveld 1998: 346). In 1992 Yitzhak Shamir was 
defeated in elections and Yitzhak Rabin came to power. Riding a wave of first-time voters 
without strong party affiliations, Rabin’s election signaled the end of rigid adherence to ideology. 
Rabin wanted an autonomous Palestinian state and he wished to freeze all settlement (Schindler 
2008). The intifada ended formally in September of 1993 with the signing of the Oslo accord 
(Morris 2001: 594). It ended in something close to a draw with Israel recognizing the PLO and 
the PLO recognizing Israel. 
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3.5 ENTER: HAMAS   
In the early 1990s the PLO had to cope both with the aftermath of having backed Iraq during the 
first Gulf War, and a new competitor - Hamas (Morris 2001). As the PLO started the negotiations 
with Israel that led up to the Oslo Accords, it renounced the use of violence and recognized 
Israel. As a response to this, i.e. in order to be relevant and an alternative to the PLO, Hamas 
shifted its strategy towards violence and rejected any kind of recognition of Israel (Mishal and 
Sela 2006). In doing so Hamas was careful not to alienate the Palestinian public, it abided by the 
PLOs wish that Hamas would not launch any attacks against Israel from the territory of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and it did not, as it had done during the intifada, carry out any attacks 
against other Palestinian fractions (Mishal and Sela 2006: Ch. 3). This deference to the PLO is 
also evidenced by Hamas, on Yasser Arafat’s request, restraining all suicide attacks as the PLO 
was finalizing negotiations with Israel in the summer of 1995 (Pape 2003: 348). Hamas abided by 
this arrangement of not launching attacks from the PA more or less until 1998. After this it 
started to publicly challenge the PLO and Fatah. Perhaps the most important reason for this was 
the right shift the Israeli politics experienced with the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime 
Minister, and the consequences this had for the peace process (Mishal and Sela 2006; Schindler 
2008). When the second intifada broke out in 2000 Arafat’s Fatah had been effectively sidelined 
and Hamas was more or less running the show (Mishal and Sela 2006).  
3.6 HEZBOLLAH VS. ISRAEL 
The Hezbollah program that marked the launch of the organization in 1985 reads: “Let us put it 
truthfully: the sons of Hezbollah know who are their major enemies in the Middle East – the 
Phalange, Israel, France and the U.S. The sons of our umma are now in a state of growing 
confrontation with them (…)” Later in the same program they say: “We see in Israel the 
vanguard of the United States in our Islamic World. It is the hated enemy that must be fought 
until the hated ones get what they deserve” (Rabinovich and Reinharz 2008: 425 - 427). 
Hezbollah was launched as a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. 
Throughout the 1990s Israel and Hezbollah engaged in confrontations. Figure  3-2 shows battle 
deaths in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah as reported by the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson et al. 2002). What resembles a tit-for-tat game 
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developed between Israel and Hezbollah where both actors had an implicit understanding of what 
was and was not legitimate targets, and what constituted a legitimate response to a provocation.  
Figure  3-2: Battle-Related deaths in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah12 
 
The objects of study in this thesis are, as stated above, incidents of escalation. Two such incidents 
occurred in 1992 and 1996 when Israel, both times under the military leadership of Chief of Staff 
Ehud Barak, launched, respectively, operations “Accountability” and “Grapes of Wrath”. 
Unfortunately none of these incidents are picked up by the graph above. In both instances the 
Israeli operations came after Hezbollah had rocketed northern Israeli towns, which Hezbollah in 
turn saw as retaliations for Israeli actions against Hezbollah forces (Harik 2004). Hezbollah 
enjoyed the sponsorship of both Iran and Syria and the organization could not have become as 
effective a fighting organization as it is today without the help of these two countries (El-
Hokayem 2007). Initially Hezbollah was seen by both Syria and Iran as a means to achieve 
foreign policy goals, but because of the success Hezbollah has had in fighting Israel and the 
status this has brought the organization the relationship between Hezbollah and its patrons is no 
longer that simple. Iran and Syria are not in complete control of Hezbollah any longer (El-
Hokayem 2007). As Hezbollah has grown more autonomous from Syria and Iran, it has also often 
found itself having goals different from that of the Lebanese government. Hezbollah, as a Shiite 
Muslim organization, has often found itself at odds with the Lebanese government and especially 
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the large Lebanese Christian population, a tension Israel has consistently tried to take advantage 
of (Harik 2004). Israel has sought to make the Lebanese government and parts of the population 
turn against Hezbollah, by making the cost for Hezbollah actions against Israel unbearable for the 
Lebanese population (Harik 2004). Though so far this strategy has been unfruitful, and Hezbollah 
still enjoys support among large segments of the Lebanese population, in addition to the respect it 
commands in many other Arab and Muslim countries.  
There is an interesting contrast in the development in the Israeli relationship with its two most 
important non-state adversaries: The PLO, later Hamas, and Hezbollah. The relationship between 
Israel and the PLO has obviously had its ups and downs, but the trend has been one of increased 
mutual recognition and a desire for coexistence. The basics of this trend continued, as we will see 
below, under hard-line Likud cabinets as Benjamin Netanyahu’s, and even today when the peace 
process is at a standstill both Israeli and Palestinian decision-makers recognize each other’s right 
to exist, and acknowledge, albeit grudgingly, the need for a peace process. The relationship 
between Hezbollah and Israel, in contrast, was bad from the start and has consistently 
deteriorated. Hezbollah has never recognized Israel’s right to exist, and Israel has never treated 
Hezbollah as anything more than an illegitimate terrorist organization. The nuance is that Israel 
has, at certain times, reluctantly treated Hezbollah’s actions as legitimate wartime actions. The 
unwritten rules between Israel and Hezbollah, which Israel has broken whenever it saw fit13, 
stipulated that Israeli soldiers on Lebanese ground or in the Shabaa farms14 were legitimate 
targets for Hezbollah, and conversely that Hezbollah fighters were legitimate targets for Israel 
(ICG 2002; Sobelman 2004).  
Israel has been willing to abide by these rules when the regional situation was stable and the 
conflict with the Palestinians was quiet, e.g. in the period between 1996 and 2000. This changed 
however when Sharon came to power in 2001. After this an increased polarization has taken 
place where the right-wing has dominated Israeli politics, at the same time as Hezbollah’s support 
has increased in Lebanon. This comes in addition to the “palestinization” Hezbollah has gone 
                                                 
13
 Examples include operations: ”Accountability” and ”Grapes of Wrath”.  
14
 The Shabaa farms area is a small piece of Syrian land Israel occupied after the six-day war in 1967. A few months 
before the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 Lebanon and Hezbollah, supported by Syria, claimed that the land actually was 
Lebanese land and that Israel therefore had not completely withdrawn from Lebanese territory. Israel claims the land 
is Syrian, and the UN Security Council agrees with this interpretation and therefore confirmed in the summer of 2000 
that Israel had made a complete withdrawal in compliance with Security Council resolutions (ICG 2002: 33).  
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through were the organization increasingly sees the struggle of the Palestinians with Israel as 
their own struggle. One important reason for the difference in these relationships I argue is 
foreign policy. Hezbollah is seen as an agent of Syria and Iran and as long as Israel’s relationship 
with these two countries is contentious, Israel will have a contentious relationship with 
Hezbollah. The PLO, or Hamas, in contrast is not seen as being controlled by a rivaling state. In 
the next section I will take a short step back and look at the situation in Israel following the 
assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. 
3.7 WINDS FROM THE RIGHT 
In the tense days before the outbreak of the Six-day war in 1967 Yitzhak Rabin singlehandedly 
saved Israel from a military coup. By Ariel Sharon’s own admittance he proposed to then Chief 
of Staff, the highest rank in the Israeli Defense Force, Rabin that they should simply lock up the 
cabinet in their meeting room and launch a pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Rabin managed to 
restrain Sharon (Segev 2007: 308). Rabin was part of the first generation of Israeli leaders who 
was born in Israel and grew up after Israel had gained its independence. He had had a remarkable 
military and political career, which ended about a year after he had received the Nobel Peace 
Prize in what the Haaretz newspaper called a ideological-religious assassination (Schindler 2008: 
256). Following Rabin’s assassination Benyamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister for the 
right-wing Likud party. Netanyahu had managed to unite Israel’s fragmented right-wing parties, 
and eked out a narrow election win in 1996. His platform was basically a modernized form of 
Menachem Begin’s. He opposed a Palestinian state, favored the idea of a greater Israel and was 
unwilling to grant the Palestinians anything more than local autonomy over four urban areas 
(Schindler 2008: 257). Netanyahu’s narrow victory came as a surprise and disappointment to the 
inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank, and also to the White House. Shimon Peres, Rabin’s 
Foreign Minister and co-Nobel Laureate, had not managed to convince the Israeli public that he 
was Rabins natural successor. An increase in the number of suicide attacks after the Oslo accord 
had been signed convinced many Israeli’s, in line with the argument that terrorist attacks increase 
the support of right-wing parties (Berrebi and Klor 2008), that the peace process was moving too 
fast (Schindler 2008).  
33 
 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership was short-lived. The Wye agreement, negotiated under Bill 
Clintons auspices, stipulated the transfer of land from Israel to the Palestinian Authority. This 
was the first ever such concession by a Likud government, and it split Netanyahu’s cabinet and 
led to a fracture between Likud and the National Religious Party (Schindler 2008: 272 - 274). 
Netanyahu also lost public support. His handling of the conflict with the Palestinians and the 
Wye Agreement led to a lack of confidence in Netanyahu’s leadership abilities and in 1999 he 
called early elections in which he lost to Ehud Barak (Schindler 2008). Barak, a former Chief of 
Staff of the IDF who had been in charge of both operation “Accountability” in 1993 and “Grapes 
of Wrath” in 1996, hailed from the labor movement but put together a cabinet consisting of 
several right wing parties. He gave the Housing Ministry, which is in charge of the settlements, to 
the National Religious Party and this led to an unprecedented growth in settlements, to the 
disillusionment of the Israeli left (Schindler 2008: 274). The Camp David negotiations renewed 
the promise of a final peace agreement but in the end the negotiations, for a number of both 
Israeli and Palestinian reasons, failed.  
This set the stage for yet another right shift and the second intifada. In September 2000 Ariel 
Sharon took advantage of the tense situation between Israelis and Palestinians and made his 
definitive comeback to Israeli politics. He made his now infamous walk on the temple mount. 
Sharon’s tactical reason for this was to shore up support for the Likud party by showing the 
Israeli electorate that Likud would never agree to a partition of Jerusalem, which Barak had done 
during the Camp David negotiations. It also thoroughly provoked Palestinians and was a catalyst 
in igniting the second intifada (Schindler 2008: 281). A year later Sharon beat Barak in the 
general election, and became Prime Minister. The Camp David negotiations may have failed, but 
Ehud Barak did fulfill his campaign promise of a complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon. 
Barak had hoped to complete such a redeployment of troops within the framework of a peace 
agreement with Syria, this however proved impossible and the Barak cabinet gave the IDF orders 
of preparing for a complete withdrawal from Lebanon without any agreement (Morris 2001: 
654). The IDF General Staff opposed a withdrawal without any agreement, but they were unable 
to convince Ehud Barak otherwise and in April 2000 Israel informed the UN that it would 
withdraw all forces from Lebanon by that summer. 
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3.8 THE EFFICIENCY OF TERROR AND COUNTER-TERRORISM  
Hezbollah has one major advantage over Israel. For it to be successful the organization merely 
has to survive. What it takes for Israel to be successful on the other hand is unknown. In the 
overall war between Israel and Hezbollah or in any given campaign, the definition of an Israeli 
victory against an enemy that can be conceptualized both as a terrorist organization and as a 
social movement is unclear. When Israel has tried to define the objectives of victory, e.g. in the 
2006 war, the objectives set were unachievable from a military point of view and so the 
government set the military up for failure from day one (Harel and Issacharoff 2008). Since its 
birth by fire in 1947 and 48 the Israeli Defense Force has been built to do maneuver warfare: to 
quickly take the fight deep into enemy territory. With the rise of what Edward Luttwak has called 
“post-heroic warfare”, characterized by the importance of avoiding causalities to your own troops 
and to enemy civilians (Luttwak 1995), a very different operational doctrine has developed. 
Exemplified by the first Gulf War this new doctrine is based not on maneuvering, but on massive 
use of air strikes and artillery. Israel along with every other western country adopted this new 
operational doctrine and according to one expert: “The low number of casualties in this brand of 
fighting, the hi-tech style of war, and the ability to rely on Israel’s technological advantage all 
promoted this combat approach” (Kulick 2006). This new doctrine was put to a test by the IDF 
against Hezbollah in the 1993 operation “Accountability”, and took the organization by surprise. 
Hezbollah had prepared for a ground campaign, but instead the war was fought mostly in the air 
and from the Israeli side of the border, i.e. out of reach for the Hezbollah fighters (Kulick 2006). 
Although Israel did not force Hezbollah to capitulate, the organization was soundly defeated and 
for a brief moment Israel held the upper hand. The fact that this military success came shortly 
after the first Intifada had ended increased Israel’s feeling of victory, even though the IDF was 
incapable of completely suppressing Hezbollah’s ability to launch Katyusha rockets. The next 
encounter came in operation “Grapes of Wrath” in 1996. By now Hezbollah had adapted to 
Israel’s new fighting doctrine, and relied much more heavily on Katyusha rockets that could not 
be taken out by Israeli air power. Israel sent in limited ground troops only after it became clear 
that they were unable to suppress the Hezbollah rockets fire. The IDF thus played directly into 
Hezbollah’s hand and fought exactly the kind of war Hezbollah had prepared for since operation 
“Accountability” (Kulick 2006).  
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Since then Israel has withdrawn from southern Lebanon thereby giving Hezbollah the 
opportunity to build military infrastructure just across the Israeli border, and at the same time 
they have been unable to infiltrate the Hezbollah organization in the same way they have done 
with the Palestinian militias. This brief military history implies that the years of Israeli relative 
strength vis a vis Hezbollah was the years between 1993 and 96. In this period the conflict with 
the Palestinians was contained and a certain deterrence power was in place following operation 
“Accountability”. In the period between 1996 and 2006 however the situation was reversed. 
Operation “Grapes of Wrath” did not enhance but rather undermined Israeli deterrence power. 
The IDF failed to wage an operationally successful campaign against Hezbollah, thus enabling 
Hezbollah to increase both its support in Lebanon and its clout in the wider Arab and Muslim 
world. That Israel in this period failed to secure a peace agreement with Syria or with the 
Palestinians further weakened the Israel and strengthened Hezbollahs position. The failed 2003 
occupation of Iraq by Israel’s most important ally, the U.S, further exacerbated the situation. All 
in all after 1993 Israel has seen its deterrence power weakened by Hezbollah, and when attempts 
has been made to restore it, as in operation Grapes of Wrath, it has failed to do so. This is due to 
Israel’s inability to wage effective war against Hezbollah, and by the fact that Israel at present has 
no other leverage over Hezbollah than the threat to use military force. I.e. if Israel’s goal is to 
stop Hezbollah from firing katyusha rockets or attacking its troops, it has no other card to play 
than the military. Since the military card has proven ineffective after Hezbollah adapted to 
Israel’s new fighting doctrine it is only rational to expect Hezbollah to continue to challenge 
Israel, and this gives Hezbollah the upper hand  
This concludes this brief overview of the history and context of conflict between Israel and 
Hezbollah. This chapter ends with the final Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the next chapter 
will start my analysis of the steps to war, or to be more precise, my analysis of the causes 
explaining why the July 2006 confrontation was followed by a process of escalation, while the 
almost identical confrontation in October of 2000 was not. The next chapter will be fully devoted 




4 THE THIRD IMAGE – IRAN AND ISRAEL 
Hypothesis1: Given a conflict, latent or manifest, between two parties, the risk of one of 
the parties escalating the crisis depends on the adversary’s alliance with a third party.   
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Israel’s position in the Middle East is precarious. Although Israel now has stable peace 
agreements and diplomatic relations with Jordan and Egypt, most of the country’s immediate and 
more distant neighbors do not recognize Israel. This necessitates a very powerful international 
dimension in Israeli politics, and Israeli strategic thinking. When Israeli decision-makers arrive at 
decisions which in other countries would be completely internal, Israel invariably considers the 
broader regional context. I argue therefore that in order to understand Israel’s decision to take or 
not to take action against Hezbollah, one must analyze Israel’s broader strategic environment. 
This includes, but is not limited to, its relationship with neighboring countries like Syria and 
Jordan, its alliances with the U.S. and Turkey and relations to what Israel terms the periphery: 
e.g. India and Pakistan. In this chapter I will focus on the relationship between Israel and Iran. I 
argue that this relationship is Israel’s most important strategic challenge, and that understanding 
this relationship takes us a long way towards understanding Israel’s actions against Hezbollah. 
Today Israel and Iran are cardinal foes. Before the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran and Israel were, 
in the words of Yitzhak Rabin, best friends. Since 1979 the relationship between Israel and Iran 
has been antagonistic, but it has fluctuated and experienced both improvements and deteriorations 
throughout the period. In the period under consideration here, Iran and Israel have been 
contenders for power and influence in the region, and today, after the fall of Saddam’s Iraq, these 
two countries stand alone as regional great powers. The primary hypothesis, stated at the start of 
this chapter, deals with unstable three way relationships, as the one between Israel, Iran and 
Hezbollah. Based on this hypothesis I will argue that fluctuations in relative power between Israel 
and Iran explain an important part of the puzzle of why the 2006 Lebanon War experienced a 
much more dramatic escalatory process than the 2000 crisis between Israel and Hezbollah. In the 
following I will start by explaining the rationale behind my primary hypothesis. Then I will 
deduce six indicators that define the scope of the primary hypothesis and extends its logic. Based 
on these six intervening indicators I will deduce testable predictions which will then be tested 
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against the data. This method of testing deduced predictions will not, of course, offer conclusive 
evidence for the theory. The tests should instead be seen as a plausibility test (see George and 
Bennett 2005: 75; Gerring 2006: 41 - 42)15. My aim is to establish the plausibility of the theory I 
am testing, or more precisely to establish the plausibility of the X/Y relationship I am proposing 
in this chapter between Iran’s rise in power and Israel’s decision to escalate the conflict with 
Hezbollah. All in all I find considerable evidence supporting my theory.  
4.2 ON THE HYPOTHESIS 
The primary hypothesis (v.s.) is deduced from the theoretical framework, and the mechanism 
‘competition’ described under sub-heading  2.5.4 explains how it operates. As discussed in the 
theoretical chapter, the logic behind the hypothesis flows from states’ ability to threaten each 
other. The hypothesis states that in a conflict between two parties, A and B, the risk of escalation 
increases if either A or B is aligned with a third party, C, which in turn is an adversary to the 
other party. Thus if A and B is in a conflict, the risk of this conflict escalating increases if B is 
aligned with C which is also and adversary to A. In concrete terms the hypothesis reads that the 
risk of escalation in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah increases when Hezbollah is 
aligned with Iran, with which Israel has an adversarial relationship. This proposition of course 
only holds under certain scope conditions16. The primary hypothesis is mediated by two 
intervening indicators which define the scope of the primary hypothesis. The first intervening 
indicator concerns the shifts in the balance of power, while the second one concerns the absolute 
levels of power. Power is in this understood as military power. In Mearsheimers (2001: 55) 
words: “The balance of power, therefore, is a function of tangible assets – such as armored 
divisions and nuclear weapons – (…).” This clearly is a very limited understanding of power, and 
it obviously is but one of many different ways to view it.17 Despite its limitations I believe it is 
fruitful for my analysis. The issue of shifts in the balance of power relates to what Mearsheimer 
sees as one of the primary factors in explaining international relations systemic outcomes: states’ 
ability to threaten each other, an ability that of course varies (Mearsheimer 2001: 43). 
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 See Gortzak (2005) for an application of a plausibility probe.  
16
 On scope condition see e.g: (Munck 2004) 
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Indicator 1.1: Scope Condition – For the primary hypothesis to hold true one of the states 
must have experienced an increase in relative power. 
Shifts in the balance of power increase the risk of escalation in two situations. State A’s fear of 
another state will grow if state B increases its power so that it could become a potential threat in 
the near future. State A’s fear of state B will also grow if state B already has the same power 
capabilities as A but grows faster than A either by making technological jumps or by 
outperforming A in terms of growth in military spending18. In a three way relationship, as the one 
described in the primary hypothesis, state A will be more likely to escalate its conflict with state 
B if state B, or state B’s ally C, increases its power. The logic is that a reasonable stable, albeit 
contentious, relationship between three parties, can become unstable if the status quo power-
relationship shifts. In such a situation state A, or B or C, is forced to alter its status quo ante 
strategic thinking and this can lead the party to respond in a more forceful way than the same 
state would have done prior to the power shift. This can be either to offset a gain in power, or to 
thwart an increase in power. In concrete terms I expect that the risk of Israel escalating a 
confrontation with Hezbollah increases in situations where Hezbollah’s ally and sponsor Iran has 
increased its relative power vis-à-vis Israel, on the margins. It is important to note that this 
hypothesis only holds when the increase is marginal. If Iran were to increase its power 
dramatically this might induce Israel to not escalate, as I have already discussed. 
Indicator 1.2: Scope Condition – For the primary hypothesis to hold true the states must 
be actual contenders for power in the region. 
This indicator mediates the effect of both the primary hypothesis and the one just discussed. In a 
three way relationship where A and B is in conflict, A and C have an adversarial relationship, and 
B and C are closely allied the absolute levels of power will be important. If the difference in 
power between A and C is so big that C is not a contender for A in any meaningful way, C’s 
relationship to B will not be of any importance. If the opposite is true, however, and A is not a 
contender for C in any meaningful way, C’s relationship to B in conflict with A would have 
important effects on A’s behavior towards B. In both situations a mechanism is at work that very 
probably will lead to a stable and peaceful situation. Either A does not have to fear C and thus do 
not have to damage B to increase its security, or C is so superior to A that A could not consider 
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 Higher growth in military spending is of course, in the long run, determined by broader economic factors. States 
thus also watch such factors.  
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attacking B of fear of retaliation. Both these situations are only theoretical in this study. A third 
possibility is one where A and C have, more or less, the same power capabilities. In such 
situations a competition, and a security dilemma, is very likely19. This brings us back to the 
primary hypothesis which describes a three way relationship characterized by a conflict between 
A and B, an adversarial relationship between A and C and an alliance between C and B. Such a 
relationship is made unstable, because of competition, if the balance of power between the parties 
is more or less balanced. In concrete terms this intervening indicator states that the risk of the 
conflict between Israel and Hezbollah escalating increases if Hezbollah is aligned with another 
state that is both an adversary and a competitor to Israel, as Iran is. 
Indicator 1.3: Israel will fight Hezbollah in order to strengthen its strategic position in 
relation to Iran.  
Relationships characterized by a state facing a, perceived or real, proxy state or entity of another 
hostile state increases the risk of escalation by inducing leaders in that state to fight the proxy to 
weaken the sponsor state. The logic here is that Israel will be tempted to escalate a Hezbollah 
provocation because this gives them the opportunity to weaken Iran by destroying or hurting an 
instrument of Iranian foreign policy. If Hezbollah was viewed as an independent organization, 
with no ties to other adversarial states, Israeli leaders would not view the conflict as part of a 
wider regional conflict over power and influence and thus would be more likely to tolerate more 
from Hezbollah before risking a costly war. The relative cost of war is, however, decreased if by 
fighting Hezbollah Israel can in the process weaken Iran and thereby lowering the risk of a future 
even costlier war or attack on Iran. The fact that Hezbollah is an organization and not a state 
further increases the risk of escalation according to same logic. This is so because the cost is 
much lower for attacking a terrorist organization than for attacking another UN member state. 
Israel received widespread support for its attack on Hezbollah at the beginning of the 2006 war, 
support which even extended to Arab states (Harel and Issacharoff 2008). There is of course 
nothing new about the proxy war logic underlying this indicator and historical examples abound. 
To mention just one prominent example the Spanish civil war was used by both the Soviet Union 
and Nazi-Germany to test new weapons and technologies against each others (Beevor 2007).  
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Indicator 1.4: Israel will escalate the conflict with Hezbollah in order to show muscles 
and increase its ability to deter Iran. 
A second effect such relationships have is that they induce aggressive behavior against the proxy 
to intimidate the sponsor state. This increases the risk that Israel will exploit windows of 
opportunity, opened by Hezbollah activities, to reassert or strengthen its ability to deter Iran, and 
thereby strengthening its own position in relation to Iran. To coin it differently, the potential 
benefit Israel can reap by fighting a war against an Iranian allay, is higher than the benefits it can 
reap by fighting “just” a terrorist organization. In relation to the benefits then, the chance that the 
cost of fighting is deemed to be acceptable, becomes higher and thus the risk for escalation 
grows. The argument is that if Hezbollah was not aligned with Iran, the benefit for Israel of 
fighting the organization would be lower, and hence it would tolerate more provocations. When 
Hezbollah is aligned with Iran, fighting Hezbollah can yield potentially higher benefits since a 
defeat for Hezbollah would also be a defeat for Iran. Now it could also raise the costs so the 
interesting question is if it raises the benefits more than the costs. I will argue that it does. This in 
turn induces Israel to take advantage of windows opened by Hezbollah aggression. Let me give 
another historical example. Consider for a moment a counterfactual situation where the Vietcong 
had not been aligned with the Soviet Union. Besides helping an ally, France, the potential 
benefits for the U.S in fighting Vietcong would under such circumstances be much lower than the 
potential benefits of fighting a Vietcong aligned with the Soviet Union. This proposition, that 
states only fight wars were the costs outweigh the benefits, is in itself, of course, banal. The point 
here is however not to argue a banal proposition, but to identify intervening phenomena, or scope 
conditions, under which my primary hypothesis holds true. 
Indicator 1.5: Commitment problems – Because Israel can never be sure who controls 
Hezbollah, Israel will not negotiate and compromise with the organization.  
Fearon (1995: 401) argues, when listing the possible reasons for why rational leaders would 
chose to go to a costly war, that commitments problems, that inhibits leaders to: “settle on an 
efficient bargained outcome when for structural reason they cannot trust each other to uphold the 
deal” may lead to war20. I argue that relationships as the one between Israel, Iran and Hezbollah 
will exacerbate such issues because Israel can never be completely certain of whom is “running 
the show”. If Israel negotiates with Hezbollah it cannot be certain that Hezbollah will uphold the 
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agreement. This is usual, but it can be even less certain about this than in normal relations 
between countries because Israel does not know how much influence Iran holds over Hezbollah 
and to what extent Iran is able to push Hezbollah to go to a war that it does not want. This adds 
even more uncertainty to Israel’s leaders, and this uncertainty is likely, I argue, to increase the 
benefits Israel sees from an attack on Hezbollah. This because an act of escalation on Israel’s part 
will force both Hezbollah and Iran to show their hand and has the added effect of presenting a 
window for Israel whereby it can remove an adversary whose moves and actions it is almost 
impossible for Israel to predict. Since a move against Hezbollah forces both Hezbollah and Iran 
to show their hand, a move against Hezbollah is also part of Israel’s regional competition with 
Iran and therefore this hypothesis is connected with the two above. 
Indicator 1.6: Issue Indivisibility – The zero-sum nature of the conflict makes it much 
harder to negotiate and compromise.  
Some conflicts may resemble zero-sum conflicts, and zero-sum conflicts I argue are more prone 
to escalation. Conflicts that have an existential dimension, that revolve e.g. around values instead 
of issues, is an example of such zero-sum conflicts (Nicholson 1992). The logic is that if the issue 
at dispute is indivisible, Fearon use the examples of the issue of abortions (Fearon 1995), it is 
more or less impossible for rational agents to arrive at a compromise solution that satisfies both 
agents. If in our three way relationship A and C hold completely contradictory positions, then a 
conflict between A and B where B is closely aligned with C may take on the same dimension. If 
the foreign policy goal is the destruction of another state, as Iran under Ahmedinejad (Yoong 
2006)21 has called for, then a conflict between Israel and Iran’s ally Hezbollah will be perceived 
as a necessary war and this may increase the risk of escalation. Zero-sum games of this nature 
may increase the risk of “overreaction and miscalculation” (Waltz 2008: 62). This mechanism 
may be at work at the international level, but it may also be highly active at the domestic level 
(Fearon 1995: 382). 
4.3 PREDICTIONS  
Two predictions can be deduced directly from my primary hypothesis. That escalation will be 
more common in situations where state A is in a conflict with a state or entity closely aligned 
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with another adversarial state. And second, that states in such situations should be more eager 
than other states to escalate confrontations. It is difficult, however, to test these particular 
predictions directly since this would require a much larger data collection effort than what is 
feasible here. I will instead deduce predictions from each of the intervening indicators. This 
manner of testing a theory is of course weaker than directly testing the primary hypothesis, but 
taken together these tests will give us a good enough picture of the strength or weakness of the 
theory (Van Evera 1997, 1999)22. I deduce two predictions and one scope condition that has to be 
met in order for the primary hypothesis to be relevant.  
Scope Condition: 
1. Based on intervening hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 one can deduce the prediction that Iran 
was a competitor state to Israel in the period under consideration here, and that Iran 
increased its power, in relation to Israel, in the time between 2000 and 2006 
Predications:  
2. Based on intervening hypothesis 1.3 and 1.4 one can deduce the prediction that 
discussion about Iran and Iranian influence has figured heavily in the decision to 
escalate the conflict with Hezbollah in 2006, such discussion will be absent from the 
2000 discussion. I.e. when making strategic decision about what to do with Hezbollah, 
Israel also made decisions about how to maneuver in relation to Iran.  
3. Based on intervening hypothesis 1.5 and 1.6 one can deduce the prediction that Israeli 
leaders were reluctant to compromises with Hezbollah of fear that the organization 
would not stick to its promises. 
4.4 TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS:  
4.4.1 ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE LEVELS OF POWER 
Iran before the 1979 Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini was one of Israel’s few 
reliable allies in the Middle East. As late as 1987 Yitzhak Rabin said that: “Iran is Israel’s best 
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friend and we do not intend to change our position in relation to Tehran, because Khomeini’s 
regime will not last forever” (Parsi 2007: 127). This position, however, changed as it became 
increasingly clear that Khomeini’s reign would not end any time soon. The first question to 
answer then is whether or not Iran and Israel can be seen as competitors in the Middle East. For 
there to be an actual competitive relationship between the two, they need to, as prediction one 
states, be on the same level in terms of absolute power. This implies that the two states need to 
belong, in a broad sense, to the same class of powers. As I will argue in the following, this 
prediction correlates very well with the data. Clearly the Israeli military is technologically much 
more sophisticated than Iran’s. Iran’s military consists, by and large, of a patchwork of dated U.S 
military equipment from before the revolution and acquisitions from Russia and other countries 
(Raas and Long 2007). Nevertheless Iran’s military capabilities are large enough for it to pose a 
threat to Israel, and for it to be a contender for power and influence in the region. Iran’s order of 
battle consists of more than half a million troops, or 32 divisions, Israel in comparison can field 
16 divisions. The Israeli air force consists of about 500 combat aircrafts, while Iran has a little 
over 200, all of considerably older stock (Shapir 2009a, 2009b). The number of ground forces has 
been fairly stable in the period from 1996 to 2006, while the number of combat aircrafts has 
increased for both parties. Throughout the period Israel has spent around 8 % of GDP on defense, 
while Iran’s defense spending has fluctuated between 2 and 5 % of GDP. In real terms Israel 
spent between 8 and 11 billions dollars (constant 2006 USD) on defense, while Iran spent 
between 2 and 8 billion dollars23. 
It is obvious, from this brief review of assorted numbers, that the Israeli military is better 
equipped and more technologically advanced than the Iranian. But the numbers also reveal that 
Iran can field enough troops to be a regional contender for power, and in real terms the defense 
spending of the two countries is close enough for them to be considered competitors. This view is 
supported by Trita Parsi (2007: 209) who argues that: “the greatest danger Iran posed to Israel 
after 1996 was its ability to emerge as a regional player that could challenge Tel Aviv’s military 
and nuclear monopoly and limit the Jewish state’s military and political maneuverability”. This 
situation covers the period up until 2002, a period where Israel downgraded Iran from enemy to 
threat (Parsi 2007). Cordesman (2005) corroborates this and argues that Iran is the only regional 
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power, except for Israel, that poses a conventional military threat to gulf stability. In 2002, 
however, Iranian dissidents exposed Iran’s until then secret nuclear sites (Raas and Long 2007). 
At that point Iran became the gravest strategic threat to Israel, and if Iran does acquire a nuclear 
weapon it would become the first hostile country to be able to strike Israel in an utterly critical 
and devastating way (Kam 2007). Berman (2004) correspondingly argues that Iran has 
dramatically increased its military capabilities after 2003. In addition to the nuclear program, he 
points to the development and testing of the Shahab-3 missile which, with a range of 1300 km, 
gives Iran the capability to target Israel. In addition to this the 2003 U.S invasion of Iraq 
eliminated Iran’s number one enemy and contender for power in the region, thereby considerably 
improving Iran’s strategic environment. This data supports prediction 1. Iran was a contender for 
power and influence in the region both in 2000 and 2006, but between 2000 and 2006 Iran 
dramatically increased its ability to threaten Israel. There is considerable discussion about 
whether or not Iran’s motivation for developing a nuclear program was to be able to threaten 
Israel, but that discussion is not consequential here. The reason is simply that regardless of Iran’s 
intent, Israel feels threatened and thus behaves as if Iran was threatening the country for real. 
4.4.2 IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH V. ISRAEL 
I have predicted that discussion about Iran and Iranian influence figured heavily during the crisis 
and escalation in 2006, while such discussion were absent in 2000. Testing this prediction 
confronts me with a few obstacles I want to address before I proceed. Firstly, it is difficult to 
prove a counterfactual, i.e. it is difficult to prove, in the sense of finding a smoking gun, that no 
discussion about Iran and Iranian influence took place during the 2000 crisis. Since the absence 
of something is much harder to observe then the presence of the same thing, my findings with 
regards to this prediction will necessarily be less robust than other findings. Secondly, since I do 
not read Hebrew I have not been able to read the full report of the Winograd Commission, as 
every other non-Hebrew researcher I have only been able to read the official English summary of 
key findings24. This means that I have been cut off from an extremely valuable source, but much 
of the information from the report I have been able to get from other sources.  
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One way to analyze the importance of Iran and Iranian influence in 2000 and 2006 is to see how 
national security experts in Israel assessed the relationship between Israel and Iran in this period. 
Although Iran never completely disappeared from the radar, it is quite clear if you look at 
publications like the ‘Strategic Assessment’ published by the Institute for National Strategic 
Studies in Tel Aviv that discussion about Iran from a strategic point of view increased 
dramatically following 2003. In a 1999 article by Stuart Cohen (1999) entitled: “Israel's Three 
Strategic Challenges” Iran is mentioned only in passing and then always lumped together with 
other countries, as when Cohen at the beginning of the article argues that one challenge is to 
“cope with enemies like Syria and Iran”. Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was the Israeli Minister for 
Public Security and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the period 1999 to 2002, significantly 
strengthens my argument that Iran was not an important national security concern in 2000 when 
he is quoted as saying: “Iran wasn’t really on the agenda (…) In those two years, I think the 
agenda zeroed in on these particular questions, the Palestinians and the Syrians. I don’t remember 
one cabinet meeting – the reduced cabinet meeting, the so-called defense-foreign policy cabinet – 
where Iran was an issue” (Parsi 2007:215). In an interview with me Ben-Ami repeated this, and 
said that the top national security priorities for Israel in 2000 were making peace with the 
Palestinians and brokering a deal with Syria over the Golan Heights. He went on to say that Iran 
was “less of a consideration” (Ben-Ami 2009). 
When Hezbollah kidnapped three and killed four Israeli soldiers in 2000 Israel’s focus was not on 
Iran, but on Syria. Israel under Ehud Barak had tried since 1999 to reach a final peace-agreement 
with Syria, and Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Southern-Lebanon in May of 2000 was a part 
of this process (Schindler 2008: 275 - 277). Then Prime-Minister Ehud Barak had initiated a 
“Syria First” policy that entailed that making peace with Syria was the country’s primary national 
security priority. Barak’s Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami argues that Barak felt that “Syria, 
and not the Palestinian problem, was the main strategic challenge that needed to be neutralized. 
[Barak] perceived the threats to Israel in term of armored brigades, infantry divisions and missile 
batteries” (Ben-Ami 2006: 242). When Israel assessed its national security environment in 2000, 
therefore, Syria and not Iran was at the top of the agenda. The link between Iran and Hezbollah 
was perceived as less important than Syria’s link with the organization (Ben-Ami 2009). After 
the Hezbollah kidnappings the Israeli deputy Minister of Defense, Ephraim Sneh, told the 
Jerusalem Post that he believed Iran was pushing Hezbollah to carry out attacks, but Sneh 
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nevertheless argued that Israel would hold Syria responsible for any Hezbollah actions: “[Israel 
should] make it clear that the responsibility lies with Syria... If we have to cease [hostile 
activities], it will have to be done in the context, should we say, of Syria being the address. We 
are not making threats. This is a warning” (Rudge 2000).  
The interesting part of this argument is that top Israeli decision-makers clearly were aware that 
Iran was pulling Hezbollah’s strings, but they still choose to hold Syria accountable for 
Hezbollah actions. If Israel had been concerned about Hezbollah’s links with Iran in 2000 one 
would expect the warning Sneh makes to be addressed at Iran and not at Syria. The reason the 
relationship between Syria and Hezbollah in 2000 does not induce Israel to retaliate in the same 
fashion as the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah in 2006, ties back to my earlier discussion 
about absolute and relative levels of power. Although the structure of the conflict between Israel 
– Hezbollah – Syria is the same as the structure of the Israel – Hezbollah – Iran relationship, the 
important difference lays in Syria’s ability to threaten Israel. Syria in 2000 did not possess 
anything near the conventional or ballistic capability of Iran in 2006 (Cordesman 2001), and 
Shlomo Ben-Ami argues that the Israeli military establishment firmly believed they could deter 
and if necessary repel any Syrian attack (Ben-Ami 2006). In the period after 2000 Syria has fallen 
even farther behind Israel in military terms (Cordesman 2008).  
In 2006 the situation was very different. At this point Iran was viewed as a pre-eminent strategic 
threat, and Israel had grown increasingly concerned that Hezbollah was in fact Iran’s “western 
command” (Cordesman 2007: 9). In his assessment on the lessons of the 2006 Lebanon War 
Anthony Cordesman (2007: 9 - 10) argues that one of the primary goals of the war was to strike a 
devastating blow at Hezbollah in order to: “prevent the emergence of a major missile and rocket 
threat that Iran could use to launch chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons”. 
Corroborating this view Schiff (2006) argues that the Israeli defense establishment considered 
Hezbollah to be a frontal command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Although Israel had been 
concerned about Iranian activities from the mid 1990s25, the threat of Iran was amplified after 
2002. In early 2006 Efraim Inbar, head of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,  argued 
that Iran as a state: “is characterized by far-reaching goals in its foreign policy, a propensity for 
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high risk policies, intensive commitment and determination to implement these policies, and 
unconventional diplomatic style” (Inbar 2006: 88). Evidence of the concern about Iran is also 
found in commentaries immediately after the war. The newspaper Haaretz writes that in: “the 
conflict between Israel and Iran, by means of its proxy, Hezbollah, neither side achieved its 
strategic aim” (Avraham 2006). Israel has also taken, as reported by Haaretz, the unprecedented 
action of adding an extra command to its force structure. In addition to the northern, southern and 
central command which makes up the pillars of the Israeli Defense Force, a fourth command that 
is to address “countries which do not border Israel - in other words, [a] general in command of 
the Iran front” has been established (Benn 2006). 
To sum up, what I am arguing is that somewhere between 2000 and 2006 Israel started to 
perceive Iran as a pre-eminent national security threat. Israel has observed Iranian activity with 
increasing anxiousness since the 1979 revolution, and at some point in the mid 1990s Israel for 
the first time perceived Iran to be a clear and present national security threat, and a regional 
competitor for power. Until around 2002, however, Iran was seen as one among many potential 
threats. I am not able to give it an exact date but somewhere between 1999 when Ehud Barak 
rejected the idea that Iran was an enemy, and 2003 when Israel diplomats tried, unsuccessfully, to 
convince the U.S that it was Iran and not Iraq which constituted the biggest threat and therefore 
should be attacked (Parsi 2007: 218 and 239) Iran took center stage when Israel assessed its 
strategic environment. This data then supports prediction 2. The data shows that discussions 
about Iran and Iranian influence were very important in 2006, and almost absent in 2000. In other 
words it confirms the prediction that when making strategic decision about what to do with 
Hezbollah, Israel also made decisions about how to maneuver in relation to Iran. 
4.4.3 COMMITMENT AND COMPROMISE 
A very puzzling feature about the 2006 Lebanon War is the total and complete absence of direct 
communication between the parties after the war broke out. In the 34 days the war lasted, Israel 
or Hezbollah never directly negotiated for a cease-fire or end of hostilities, and the eventual 
cease-fire was instead the product of a U.N Security Council resolution (Harel and Issacharoff 
2008).  In the 2008 – 09 conflict in Gaza again there was no direct communication between Israel 
and Hamas, but in contrast to 2006 this time cease-fire negotiations took place between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority in Egypt. One could argue that Israel and Hezbollah simply are unable 
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to negotiate because of their diametrically opposed positions, or simply because they do not 
recognize each other. The problem with such an argument is that direct negotiations, concerning 
e.g. prisoner and hostage swaps, and indirect negotiations in the form of extensive signaling 
games between Israel and Hezbollah with regards to rules of behavior in the conflict between 
them had taken place frequently in the past (see e.g: Sobelman 2004). We now know that 
Hezbollah was taken by surprise by Israel’s forceful response to their actions, and we know that 
Israeli leaders realized, some time into the war, that they were unable to meet the objectives set 
for the war (Harel and Issacharoff 2008). The question then is: why did they not negotiate? The 
crucial actors in this chapter are not Israel and Hezbollah, but rather Iran and Israel and the focus 
is on the strategic interaction between these two actors. 











Note: The first move of the game belongs to Iran. In this move Iran chooses which strategic type Hezbollah will be in 
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(McCarthy and Meirowitz 2007: 204). Nature chooses whether player A is, e.g, of an aggressive 
or acquiescent type, and player B does not know what Nature has chosen when she makes her 
move. One way to understand the logic behind Israel’s refusal to communicate with Hezbollah, 
during the escalation process and the war is to substitute Iran for Nature. It is clear, as I have 
shown above, that Israeli leaders considers Iran to be the master behind Hezbollah, and some 
even go as far as calling Hezbollah Iran’s western command (Cordesman 2007). It is not unlikely 
therefore that Israel should believe that it is Iran that ultimately decides how Hezbollah acts26, or 
in other words that it is Iran that decides which strategic type Hezbollah is. The link that makes 
this relevant in the regional competition between Israel and Iran is that Israel may believe that by 
forcing Hezbollah to reveal what type it is, they will also force Iran to reveal their intentions, 
which feeds into the issue of regional competition discussed in this chapter. 
Figure  4-1 shows how this logic can be modeled and explained. The game starts with a move by 
Iran which chooses what type Hezbollah should be, the left hand side of the game tree shows an 
acquiescent type while the right shows an aggressive type. This move mimics Iran’s, real or 
merely perceived, control over Hezbollah as understood by Israeli leaders. In Hezbollah’s 
(denoted H) first move the organization must chose between initiating or not initiating a 
confrontation. The next move is Israel’s, and the dotted line between Israel’s two first nodes 
means that Israel does not know which of the two nodes it is at. If Hezbollah is of the aggressive 
type Israel is at the right-hand node, and if Hezbollah is acquiescent Israel is at the left-hand one. 
Israel now has to decide if it wants to continue the tit-for-tat game and respond with limited 
retaliations, or if it wants to escalate. If Israel escalates Hezbollah is forced to show its hand, and 
Israel therefore always chooses to escalate in this game. Hezbollah is forced to show its hand if 
Israel escalates, which becomes clear in the next move. If Hezbollah is of the acquiescent type it 
will choose to back down after Israel escalates, yielding a pay off of -1 and not the -2 Hezbollah 
gets if it escalates. If Hezbollah, on the other hand, is of the aggressive type it chooses to escalate 
further, yielding a pay off of 3.  
By escalating then Israel forces Hezbollah to show its hand or more precisely it forces Hezbollah 
to reveal its type, and obviously it will have national security implications for Israel what 
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strategic type Hezbollah is. The goal for Israel in this game is however not to discover 
Hezbollah’s strategic type, but Iran’s. Given the close link between Iran and Hezbollah Israeli 
leaders will, as I have argued above, believe they have learned something about Iran when they 
learn something about Hezbollah. Since Israel needs to force Hezbollah and Iran to show their 
hand, Israel will, given the intervening hypothesis mentioned above, escalate. This happens 
because of Israel’s basic uncertainty in Hezbollahs ability to compromise, an uncertainty caused 
by the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. This data then supports prediction 3.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
I have argued, implicitly, in this chapter that the 2000 confrontation between Israel and 
Hezbollah would have escalated had the above factors been changed, and furthermore that the 
risk of escalation in 2006 would have been significantly lower had the situation in 2006 more 
resembled the one in 2000. This chapter has dealt with the international context surrounding the 
conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. I have argued that the strong relationship between Iran and 
Hezbollah, with Iran as founder, arms supplier, and ideological guide, gives the direct conflict 
between the Israel and Hezbollah an international dimension. It should be stressed, however, that 
even if the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah had not been as strong as it is, any 
confrontation in the Middle East involving Israel will have an international dimension. In this 
chapter I have argued that three dimensions together explain why the Israel-Hezbollah conflict 
from time to time experience sudden escalatory processes. These are the international aspects, 
and in the next two chapters other factors will be brought in to complement these. The three 
aspects I have looked at have been power, in absolute and relative – shifting – terms, Israel’s 
concern for Iranian influence in general, and Israel’s concern for Iranian influence over 
Hezbollah. I started by stating a hypothesis deduced from the mechanism laid out in the 
theoretical chapter, and then deduced several intervening hypothesis and predictions from these. 
The predictions are meant to indirectly test my theory. Two of the predictions was put to an 
empirical test, while the last one was tested using game theory that may explain the logic behind 
Israel’s refusal to communicate with Hezbollah and thus tests the third prediction. 
I consider the test for the first prediction to be very strong, the test for the second to be somewhat 
weaker but still satisfying while the test for the third prediction is logically coherent and explains, 
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in my view, Israel’s behavior and therefore constitutes a satisfying test. All in all I consider the 
theory as having passed the tests, meaning that I argue I have established the plausibility of the 
theory. The theory which relies on a mechanism of competition is able to explain, by looking at 
the international aspects, why Israel chose to not to escalate after the Hezbollah provocations in 
2000 but did so in 2006. The theory therefore is both empirically sound and politically 
interesting. This international dimension is however only one of three dimension, and in the next 
chapter I will address the internal Israeli dimension.  
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5 THE SECOND IMAGE – ISRAEL 
Hypothesis 2: Given a conflict between two or more actors, the risk of escalation is 
greater if the government of one of the actors is faced by rivalry for the office of 
government, and this government in turn is both vulnerable and subject to severe 
criticism by other rivals for this office. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In On War Clausewitz writes: ”the only source of war is politics – the intercourse of governments 
and peoples (…) war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our 
thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left 
with something pointless and devoid of sense” (Clausewitz 1976: 605). This chapter addresses 
directly what Clausewitz terms the intercourse of governments and peoples in explaining 
escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Israeli politics is extremely interesting 
and almost equally complex and chaotic. Israeli cabinets most of the time consist of as many as 
six or seven parties and many of these control less than a handful of seats in the Knesset. The 
average life of an Israeli cabinet is, invariably, short. Parties come and go, and politicians defect 
from and join other parties all the time. In addition to an animated parliamentary sphere, Israel 
also has a vibrant civil society consisting of almost any possible grouping ranging from ultra-
orthodox Jews who oppose the state of Israel on religious terms, to equally liberal Tel Avivians. 
The Israeli Defense Force also plays an important role in Israeli politics, and Israel is probably 
one of the few, maybe even the only, democracy where the Chief of Staff of the armed forces 
attends the meetings of the Cabinet  (Cohen 2008). 
The primary aim of this chapter is to show that these internal dynamics matter in explaining 
international political outcomes as the 2006 war. It is of course impossible, and undesirable, to 
focus on every possible domestic aspect, and the focus in this chapter will be on two internal 
actors in addition to the government: the Knesset and the Israeli public. I will study how these 
two actors, both undeniably very broad and general, shape foreign policy and influence the 
outcome we here seek to explain. All the time though I will stay within the rationalist framework 
which makes it possible to integrate the findings here, with the findings from the previous and the 
next chapter. I will in the following argue that to understand why Ehud Olmert escalated the 
conflict with Hezbollah into a war in 2006, while Ehud Barak refrained from doing so; one has to 
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look at the actions taken by the Knesset, and the actions taken by the government in relations to 
the broader public. In short I find strong evidence for the importance of the Knesset in escalating 
a crisis, and for the effect audience cost. I start this chapter with a brief review of the literature on 
integrating domestic and international relations, focusing first on realist theory but then looking 
at liberalism. I end that section with a discussion of the strategic-choice approach adopted for my 
study here. I then discuss this chapter’s primary hypothesis, the indicators deduced from this and 
their predictions, before I test the predictions. I find strong evidence for two of the three 
indicators.  
In this chapter I have neither discussed the second Palestinian Intifada that had started when 
Hezbollah conducted its kidnapping in October of 2000, nor have I discussed the Hamas 
kidnapping that led to the Israeli operation on the Gaza strip at the time of 2006 Hezbollah 
kidnappings. One could of course argue that these two events are important for understanding the 
governments subsequent decisions vis-à-vis Hezbollah. I however believe that these two events, 
the 2000 Intifada and the 2006 operation in Gaza, should have the same effect on the 
government. In both cases one would expect reluctance from the government to open a second 
front, a reluctance to broaden the conflict and a reluctance to risk even more Israeli lives as well 
as international support. The Israeli governments was, furthermore, criticized sharply for their 
handling both of the Intifada and the Gaza operation. The events clearly are not identical, and the 
2000 intifada most probably occupied more of the public’s, media’s and the cabinet’s attention 
then the 2006 Hamas kidnappings. In both cases however the government was under sever 
pressure to settle the dispute, and restore order or insure the release of the captured solder. 
Because of this I argue that if I where to include these factors into the study I would in effect 
have introduced an independent variable that does not vary, and non-variance cannot explain the 
variance in the dependent variable. The reasons for the different reactions of the Olmert and 
Barak governments must be found, therefore, elsewhere.  
5.2 BRINGING DOMESTIC POLITICS BACK IN – A LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis seeks to integrate domestic and international factors into a coherent explanation of 
why the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah escalates. In doing this I encounter the issue of 
levels of analysis. J. David Singer argued in his seminal article that although different insights 
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could be found by focusing on different level of analysis, one should never mix levels in the same 
study. In his words: “We may utilize one level [of analysis] here and another level there, but we 
cannot afford to shift our orientation in the midst of a study” (Singer 1961: 90). In this literature 
review I will briefly consider a portion of the arguments made about levels of analysis, and about 
integrating domestic and international factors into one explanation. I will start by looking at the 
issue of levels of analysis, and then address the empirical issue of whether or not domestic 
politics matter. After this I will review the literature on how one can integrate domestic politics 
into a study that seeks to explain an international politics outcome.  
A central tenet of neorealism, which provided the cornerstone of the last chapter, has been the 
view that one should not mix levels of analysis and that theories of international politics that 
focus on the inside of the states are reductionist. Reductionism is understood to mean an 
approach where the whole can be understood by studying the attributes of the different parts 
(Waltz 1979: 18). The literature on the democratic peace provides as example. This body of work 
explains the lack of war between liberal democracies by pointing not at systemic factors like the 
balance of power, but by looking at the inside of the component parts, the states, and at their 
political regimes (Doyle 1986; Russett 1993). A systemic theory, in contrast, is in Waltz’ words, 
an “explanation of why different units behave similarly and, despite their variation, produce 
outcomes that fall within expected range” (Waltz 1979: 72). The caveat raised by Waltz and 
Singer is however not that one should not study all levels of analysis, but that when doing this 
one must be careful to differentiate between mixing and relating. Waltz writes: “In other words, 
understanding the likely consequence of any cause may depend on understanding its relation to 
other causes.  The possible interrelation of causes makes the problem of estimating the merit of 
various prescriptions more difficult still” (2001: 14). Singer in turn argues that the real effort 
must be made at contributing to a cumulative growth in science, and in his words this precluded 
mixing levels of analysis because: “Representing different levels of analysis couched in different 
frames of reference, they [propositions drawn from different levels] would defy theoretical 
integration; one may be a corollary of the other but they are not immediately combinable” (Singer 
1961: 91). The real issue then is that one should abstain from mixing levels of analysis into a 
framework were it becomes impossible to discern how the different factor interact to cause and 
outcome. This, however, does not preclude relating different levels of analysis to one another to 
create a coherent explanation.  
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The next question then is if domestic politics matter for explaining international political 
outcomes. Take as an example the 1967 Six Day War. Systemic factors, like the balance of 
power, and issues of first-mover advantage, clearly were important in accounting for this war but, 
as historian Tom Segev has showed, if one really wants to explain why the war came when it 
came you have to look at internal Israeli dynamics. Segev shows how the general mood in the 
country, and the vulnerability and weakness of the Levi Eshkol cabinet is absolutely crucial for 
understanding why the war came (Segev 2007). Other examples can be found in Kevin Narizny’s 
recent book. He argues that the shift in American grand strategy towards the periphery can be 
traced not to systemic but to internal factors, more precisely to the interest and preference of key 
societal groups. In his words: “In the first decades following the Civil War, few Americans were 
involved with peripheral markets (…) Consequently the impulse to expand was weak. Not until 
the end of the century, when exports surged and the debt declined, was there a change in course” 
(Narizny 2007:302). This brief example testifies to the importance of domestic politics in 
explaining a foreign politics outcome such as an interstate war. Now I will move on and look at 
the literature addressing how to integrate domestic and international politics.  
Waltz argues that his theory of international politics is not a theory of foreign policy. He argues 
that neorealist balance-of-power theory: “makes assumptions about the interest and motives of 
states, rather than explaining them. What it does explain are the constraints that confine all states. 
The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected reactions of states, but by 
itself the theory cannot explain those reactions” (Waltz 1979: 121). Other realists have argued, 
however, that neorealist theory can also be a theory foreign policy. Colin Elman argues that if 
structural international relations theory explains tendencies, then the actions taken by some states 
make up these tendencies (Elman 1996). While Telhami argues that it is possible to infer 
proposition on expected state behavior from structural realism because state’s foreign policy 
decisions are based on their opportunities, and the opportunities state’s have are in turn 
determined by the balance-of-power (Telhami 2002). The most systematic analysis of neorealism 
and domestic politics is carried out by Fearon (1998) who presents a template for distinguishing 
between systemic and domestic-politics theories. Fearon distinguishes between two types of 
neorealism. The first picture states as unitary actors, and a corresponding domestic-politics theory 
would thus be any theory where: “at least one state is presented as non-unitary, and at least one 
such state pursues a suboptimal foreign policy due, somehow, to the interaction of the actors 
56 
 
represented within the state” (Fearon 1998: 298 - 299). Examples of such a theories would be 
classical rational deterrence theories on the systemic side, and the recent book by Mearsheimer 
and Walt (2007) on the Israel lobby and U.S foreign policy on the domestic-politics side. 
Mearsheimer and Walt’s central argument is that the U.S pursues foreign policies that are not in 
its national interest, because of the influence of what they call the Israel Lobby in shaping U.S 
foreign policy. Fearon’s second type of structuralist theory also portrays states as unitary, but this 
type also excludes any role for unit level attributes. A corresponding domestic-politics theory 
would thus by any theory where at least one state is not unitary, and where the unit-level 
attributes, like political regime, is included to explain variation in state’s foreign policy (Fearon 
1998: 300). Examples of this second type would include theories on the democratic peace on the 
domestic politics side, and Waltzian neorealism on the structuralist side. 
Fearon argues that the first type of structuralist theories, which assume unitary actors but do not 
exclude arguments about unit-level attributes, in many ways accomplishes the task of integrating 
domestic and international politics. They do this by allowing “states to vary in unit-level 
characteristics (…) At the same time [as] such models incorporate these [unit-level 
characteristics] into a strategic or systemic analysis in which relative power can also matter” 
(1998: 304). This consistent reliance of levels of analysis does not any longer, however, represent 
the frontiers of international relations scholarship (Gourevitch 2002). In his review Gourevitch 
presents a number of different ways to model the interaction of domestic and international 
politics that does not rely on a strict adherence to levels of analysis. Gourevitch argues instead 
that one should start by looking at preferences held by actors, and institutions that aggregate these 
preferences into outcomes like foreign policy (2002: 310 - 12). Gourevitch’ centerpiece is his call 
to avoid “the reappearance of unitary actor assumptions” (2002: 322), which he sees as the great 
culprit in international relations theory.  
The risk with this call, however, is that we end up with a framework that clearly does not make 
the mistake of “flattening the role of domestic politics” (Gourevitch 2002: 309), but which 
completely disregard the systemic level, and the effects of this level on all states regardless on 
national attributes.  After all Fearon is quite right when he notes that the “surprise should not be 
that domestic-political factors are important in determining states’ foreign policies, but rather that 
highly constrained (…) systemic arguments have any explanatory purchase at all” (1998: 301). 
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What is needed therefore is a framework that makes it possible to keep the crucial insight of 
balance-of-power theory, but which also leave room for domestic political factors. One such 
approach I believe is the strategic-choice approach of Lake and Powell (1999)27. This approach is 
made possible by borrowing insight from comparative politics and other subfields that have built 
on the same rationalist foundation, which in turns makes it possible to relax the assumption that 
the state is a unitary actor, and this essence brings domestic politics back in (Milner 1998). By 
adopting Moravcsiks (1997) two-stage model, in which the preferences of domestic actors are 
aggregated in the first stage, and in the second stage the different states interact and vie for 
power, we can keep both the domestic and international level. Keep in mind though that in the 
second stage balance-of-power arguments informs my study. Balance-of-power arguments rests 
on the assumptions that the global distribution of power is central in explaining systemic 
outcomes, in contrast to Moravcsik’s liberalism which sees the distribution of preferences as the 
key explanatory variable. 
The strategic-choice approach builds on three principal components (Lake and Powell 1999: 4): 
(1) the unit of analysis is not the actor, e.g. a state, but rather the interaction of two or more 
actors. (2) The approach distinguishes between actors and their environments, actors are defined 
by beliefs and preferences, while the environment is disaggregated into actions taken by actors 
and available information. (3) Strategic-choice approach is agnostic and pragmatic as to which 
level of analysis is appropriate. Since the approach distinguishes between actors and their 
environments it is possible to conduct an array of “experiments”. The approach makes it possible 
to vary the properties – beliefs and preferences – of the actors while holding the environments 
constant, or hold these properties constant and vary the environment (Lake and Powell 1999: 13). 
In the last chapter I held the properties of the actors’ constant, and varied the environment. I saw 
how the interaction changed as the balance of power changed. In this chapter I will hold the 
environment constant, and vary the attributes of one of the actors: Israel.   
5.3 ON THE HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter’s primary hypothesis is deduced from the two mechanisms audience cost and 
sharing responsibility discussed in the theoretical chapter. The logic is that governments which 
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do not have to consider the actions of other domestic actors will be less prone to give in to public 
or legislative pressure to respond to a provocation. This argument could on the surface look like it 
implies that the government does not want to respond to a provocation, clearly a problematic 
assumption. I argue that the hypothesis does not necessarily imply an assumption of the 
preference to respond or not to respond to a provocation. The core preference of any cabinet, I 
assume, is to stay in power (Milner 1997 also argues this). To say that to stay in power is the core 
preference of the cabinet does not mean that it is the government’s28 only preference. In addition 
cabinets most likely have a range of substantial preferences for specific policies etc that they 
would like to enact. My argument here does not rest on the preference to staying in power to 
overshadow the other preferences, it does not even need to be the number one priority, but it 
needs to be one of the cabinets most important preferences. The ability to stay in power will be 
severely weakened if that cabinet fails to provide its citizens with security, which is the primary 
purpose of any government. Provocations, in turn, represent a threat to this security. A 
government confronted by a provocation will need to forcefully show that it still has the ability to 
provide security. The preference in questions then is not one of desire or not desire to respond to 
a provocation, clearly a long list of factors determine this, but rather the desire to stay in office 
shapes the preference structure in such a way that governments that have to engage in strategic 
interaction with other domestic actor are more likely to forcefully respond to provocations. 
In general terms I have postulated that governments which have to engage strategically with other 
domestic actors, are more likely to respond forcefully to a provocation and thus escalate a crisis 
than other governments. If in a conflict between A and B, A is a state where the government face 
rivalry for power, which means that it is dependent on the legislature and / or the electorate for its 
survival, these two internal players may push the government to respond to a provocation in a 
more forceful way than it initially wanted to. This does not, however, need to be explicit 
pressure. Recall that the strategic-choice approach focuses on the interaction, and differentiates 
between the actors and the environment of the actors. The environment is in turn made up of 
information and actions taken by other actors. This means that actions taken by the government 
in question provides the other actors with information that in turn alters the strategic interaction. 
If, on the other hand, in a conflict between A and B, both A and B were completely unitary 
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actors, which did not need to consider other domestic actors, the interaction of A and B with their 
societies would be irrelevant to the international political outcome I here seek to explain. Built 
into my hypothesis is an interaction term. I have hypothesized that the combination of a 
government which is engaged in competition for power and which is vulnerable and subject to 
severe criticism creates an interaction effect which increases the risk of escalation. In concrete 
terms I hypothesize that the 2006 Olmert government was both vulnerable at the time of the 
Hezbollah kidnappings and put under severe criticism after the abduction, and that this created a 
situation that increased the risk of escalation. Furthermore I hypothesize that no such 
combination took place during the 2000 Hezbollah kidnappings. This is a very broad hypothesis 
however, so in the following I will deduce several indicators aimed at tapping into what exactly I 
expect would be different in 2006 compared to 2000 for this hypothesis to be true.  Each of the 
following indicators therefore is designed to tap into different parts of the primary hypothesis, 
and one would expect several of them to hold true if the primary model is to have any 
explanatory power.   
Indicator 5.1: The Israeli government in power in 2000 was more stable and stronger 
than the government of 2006.  
In a conflict between two actors, A and B, where the leadership of at least one of the actors is 
elected by democratic popular elections, the degree to which that leadership feels that they enjoy 
the backing of the electorate will influence the risk of escalation. This because the primary aim of 
the leadership is to stay in power, and only the electorate can ensure this. If the leadership of 
either A or B does not enjoy the backing of the electorate, they will both be more prone to foreign 
policy adventurism, and be more prone to yield to pressure from the parliament to severely 
retaliate against a provocation (Kuperman 2003). This effect will be exacerbated in situations 
with coalition governments, since in coalition governments the cost of a failed escalation is 
divided between the members (Prins and Sprecher 1999). A central part of the primary hypothesis 
is the issue of vulnerable governments, and this indicator taps into that part of the model. It is 
connected with the dependent variable in this study, escalation, through its part in the primary 
model.  The logic is that given a latent conflict, where at least one actor has a democratic regime, 
this actor will be able to ignore a provocation if it enjoys the trust of the electorate that ultimately 
decides its political future. In situations where the government is weak, however, it will have to 
forcefully retaliate in order to survive. This indicator can be seen to argue the same point as the 
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literature on diversionary politics, which has argued that weak leaders are more likely to initiate 
conflict. They do this to divert attention from the e.g. economic problems (Lai and Reiter 2005)29. 
This is however not my argument. I argue that politically weak governments will yield to 
domestic pressure and escalate a crisis, pressure a stronger government might have been able to 
withstand. I expect therefore that in 2006 the Israeli government was weaker, and less stable than 
the government in 2000, and that the 2006 government was seen as lacking in national security 
competence.  
Indicator 5.2: Audience Cost: Olmert caught in his own rhetoric. 
If all actors in a conflict had complete information on each other’s preference structure, and these 
actors were rational, no wars would occur (Fearon 1994). Complete information is however very 
rare in international relations, and rational wars then occur because the different actors do not 
know how far the other is willing to go, and how much he is willing to risk to gain what he is 
after (Fearon 1994, 1995). Actors engaged in an escalatory process may of course choose to 
concede and back down, but Fearon argues that actors at some point will suffer an audience cost 
if he escalates far enough and then backs down. Crises are always “to some extent public events, 
carried on before interested domestic and international political spectators. For example, making 
a “show of force” and then failing to carry through if one’s demands are not met is typically more 
costly for a leader then not having mobilized (…) because foreign and domestic audiences may 
interpret this as a ‘foreign policy failure’” (Fearon 1992: 39). Hans Morgenthau also alluded to 
this when he argued for the importance of not conducting diplomatic negotiations in public: 
“Public opinion, while dreading war, demands that its diplomats act as heroes who do not yield in 
the face of the enemy, even at the risk of war, and condemns as weaklings and traitors those who 
yield” (Morgenthau 2006: 553). This audience cost mechanism has the potential of locking 
leaders into a path to war, because of the cost inferred from backing down after a they reach a 
certain point (Fearon 1994). Given a conflict, therefore, between A and B, the possibility of 
escalation leading to war is greater in situations where either A or B engages in a “show of force” 
that would lead to a significant audience cost if the same actor were to back down. A show of 
force may include either the actual deployment of force, e.g. the Egyptian deployment of several 
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 These authors argue however that the diversionary politics proposition is flawed and that politically vulnerable 
leaders are less likely to initiate crises.  
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divisions on the border with Israel in the crisis leading to the 1967 War (see e.g: Oren 2002: 63), 
or verbal, e.g. President Bush’s ultimatum to Saddam Hussein before the 1991 Gulf War. 
This indicator is tied to escalation by the way it taps into the issue of competition. If a 
government is engaged in rivalry for power then the ultimate referee to that competition, in this 
case the electorate, should be included in the study. Here then the issue of rivalry for power is 
studied through the effect it has by creating audience costs that in turn increases the risk of 
escalation. I expect the indicator to be present in 2006 and absent in 2000. I argue that the 
audience cost mechanism is especially important in the case of Israeli foreign policy. The 
importance of being able to provide security is relatively more important for Israeli leaders than 
the leaders of many other countries. Not because security is not a number one priority for most 
governments, but because the Israeli public, rightly or wrongly, consider itself to be facing a 
number of enemies, and the government’s ability to deal with these enemies will inevitably be of 
supreme importance for the public. I expect therefore that the 2006 Olmert government, after 
Hezbollah had made its move, engaged in a considerable show of force that would have led to a 
severe audience cost had it backed down. In 2000 in contrast I expect that the Barak government 
did not engage in a show of force comparable to 2006. 
To grind it a little further, let me briefly consider the issue of framing. If B provokes A, which is 
an electoral democracy, the risk of escalation will be much higher if A’s leadership immediately 
after the attack frames the provocations as a severe national security issue. If A instead chooses to 
frame it simply as another step a normal tit-for-tat game, the risk of escalation will be much 
lower. Framing may clearly be both an independent and a dependent variable. I could just as well 
have focused on what causes this or that framing, but for this study framing will be seen as an 
independent variable, which influences the risk of escalation. I expect therefore that the 2000 
Barak government tried to downplay the significance of the October Hezbollah attacks, while the 
2006 Olmert government instead choose to exacerbate the significance of the attack.  
Indicator 5.3: Pressure and criticism from the Knesset increased the risk of escalation.  
As noted in chapter two, Milner finds in her study of trade negotiations that the legislature only 
plays a decisive role if it is relatively more hawkish then the cabinet (Milner 1997). I theorized 
however that in matters of war and peace the legislature can play an important part both by being 
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more hawkish and more dovish, since I expect executives to want to share responsibility for 
matters as important as putting the country on a path to war. Given a conflict, therefore, between 
A and B, I expect that the risk of escalation will increase in situations where the legislature exerts 
pressure on the cabinet to escalate the crisis, and decrease when the legislature calls for 
moderation. The importance of this part is that it explicitly breaks the unitary actor assumption of 
structural theories, and gives another domestic actors, in this case the legislature, and explicit 
place in foreign policy formulation and therefore also in the outcome of international politics. 
This indicator is tied to the dependent variable by measuring the part of the model that deals with 
the issue of vulnerability and criticism. Concretely I expect that the Israeli Knesset in 2006 
openly supported the Olmert government’s decision to escalate in the days before the start of the 
2006 Lebanon war, and pushed for harsh retaliations. I am concentrating on Knesset activity 
before the start of the war, since it is very unusual for a legislature to severely criticize the 
government during a war. I furthermore expect that in 2000 the Knesset did not openly push for 
harsher retaliations against Hezbollah. When I refer to Knesset activity in this I mean, simply, 
that important opposition members of the Knesset publicly voiced their positions, or directly tried 
to convince cabinet members that they should change their position.  
5.4 PREDICTIONS 
From the primary hypothesis one can deduce the prediction that escalation is more likely in 
situations where a government that has to compete for political office is vulnerable and under 
severe criticism from the opposition or other groups in the society. As in the last chapter, 
however, it is not feasible to test that prediction, so I have deduced predictions from the 
indicators and test the primary hypothesis and the theory through these. As I noted in the last 
chapter this manner of testing a theory is of course weaker than directly testing the primary 
hypothesis, but taken together these tests will give us a satisfactory picture of the strength or 
weakness of the theory (Van Evera 1997, 1999).  
1. Based on indicator 5.1 I deduce the prediction that the Barak government enjoyed 
a higher approval rating during the time of the October 2000 Hezbollah attacks, 
than the Olmert government enjoyed at the time of the July 2006 attacks. Also I 
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predict that the Barak government was seen as more competent in the area of 
national security then the 2006 Olmert government. 
2. Based on indicator 5.2 I deduce the prediction that the Olmert government made a 
much greater show of force in 2006, than the Barak government did in 2000. I also 
deduce the prediction that the public statements of the Olmert government after 
the 2006 Hezbollah attacks, framed the provocation in much harsher language 
then the Barak government did after the 2000 attacks.  
3. Based on indicator 5.3 I deduce the prediction that the opposition in the Israeli 
Knesset in 2006 was much more vocal in condemning the Hezbollah attacks and 
pushing for harsh retaliations then the opposition was in 2000.  
5.5 TESTING THE PREDICTIONS 
5.5.1 OPINIONS POLL AND APPROVAL RATINGS  
In 1999 Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister by a virtual landslide. He won 56 % of the votes, 
and his party30 took 20 % compared to 14 % for the closest competitor Likud (Hazan and Diskin 
2000). This was a substantial majority by Israeli standards. Barak was elected with the hope from 
the left and the peace movement that he would finalize a peace agreement with the Palestinians, 
and he promised during the campaign to unilaterally withdraw from Southern Lebanon (Schindler 
2008). When he came into office, then, Barak enjoyed widespread support in addition to having 
the trust and confidence of the military as a former Chief of Staff. Since it is difficult to make a 
convincing argument about a former Chief of Staff’s inability to handle national security, Barak 
had the benefit of having his back free on such issues. Barak’s popularity nevertheless quickly 
diminished. As early as February of 2000 Haaretz published an article in which the journalist 
writes: “The weekend's newspaper polls exposed a near fatal blow to public faith in Ehud Barak” 
(Aluf 2000)31. In the same newspaper on the 15th of September, just a few weeks before the 
October 7 Hezbollah kidnappings, a commentator writes: “Now, as he enters the 14th month of 
his first term of office, Barak is losing valuable points in the trust department. His zig-zags or 
continuous fluctuations are gradually leading people to wonder if what he is doing can be called a 
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 Ehud Barak belonged to the Labour party but had set up a new party for the 1999 elections called “One Israel” in 
order to appeal to centrist voters.  
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 I have tried to locate the actual polls to get the numbers, but to no avail.  
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program, or just another political ploy” (Yoel 2000b), the same commentator writes two months 
later that “Barak has already lost 60 percent of his voters” (Yoel 2000a). The weakening of the 
government was not only commented on by the pundits, it was also felt by members of the 
government. The Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami quotes his diary: “I am troubled (…). The 
government is falling apart, and I wonder during this tense flight who it is exactly that we are 
representing” (Ben-Ami 2006: 281). Ehud Barak was, according to Ben-Ami, obsessed with 
opinion polls and had polls conducted on a wide variety of issues, these polls, furthermore, had a 
big impact on his decision-making (Ben-Ami 2009).  
Interestingly the Olmert administration had a very similar trajectory. In the March 2006 elections 
when Olmert32 was at the top of the ticket Kadima got 22 % of the votes, compared to 15 % for 
the closest competitor Labour-Meimad (Diskin and Hazan 2007). The election result was widely 
interpreted as a firm victory for Olmert and his policies. The Olmert government, nevertheless, 
quickly came under fire. Months before the war the government was criticized for not having 
enough weight on security issue. Neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister of Defense had 
substantial military experience. The usual situation in Israel is rather that key personnel in the 
government have spent extensive time in the military, as e.g. Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak and 
Ariel Sharon who had all been generals. The hardest criticism was directed at Amir Peretz, the 
Minister of Defense. He had hoped to get the finance portfolio, and was seen as a lightweight in 
the defense minister’s chair from day one. In an interview with Haaretz in June of 2006 he 
expressed his belief that the Prime Minister was trying to undermine him: “the move by Prime 
Minister Ehud Olmert and his finance minister, Abraham Hirchson, was supposed to send Peretz 
a message: We have an alternative coalition” (Verter 2006). One week after having taken office 
following the popular Ariel Sharon’s heart attack in January of 2006, Olmert got an approval 
rating of 71 % according to a Jerusalem post poll (Jerusalem-Post 2006). Half a year later, in 
early June of 2006, that approval had dropped to 36 % in a Haaretz poll33 in spite of the fact that 
Prime ministers usually enjoy wide public support in the early stages of their term (Verter, Benn, 
and Khoury 2006). The Minister of Defense feared even worse and got a 31 % approval rating in 
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 Obviously these polls are not directly comparable, but every poll I looked at showed the same trend so I feel 
confident claiming that the Olmert government lost popularity quickly.  
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the same poll. The government also quickly came under criticism for failing to reduce the number 
of rockets hitting the Israeli town of Sderot (Verter 2006). 
I predicted that the Barak government would enjoy a higher approval rating, as well as being seen 
as more competent in security affairs. As far as security affairs are concerned I believe I can 
argue that the Barak government was indeed seen as more competent than the Olmert 
government. As for the first and most important part of my prediction, however, the data offers 
no support for it what so ever. Both the Barak government and the Olmert government were weak 
and unstable at the time of the Hezbollah attacks. The Barak government had a low approval 
rating, and the governing coalition was falling apart. The Olmert government also had to cope 
with low public approval, as well as internal competition and strife. You cannot test a theory 
based on only two observations, but clearly this evidence is very interesting. It can be seen to 
corroborate the diversionary politics theory which argues that weak leaders are more likely to 
initiate conflict that may divert attention from internal problems and bolster approval. I am 
however reluctant to draw the conclusion that these finding strengthen that theory. Not because I 
have an argument against it, but because by design I have variation in the dependent variable, but 
no variation in the independent variable. I.e. if I wanted to test the diversionary politics theory, I 
would need additional observations where you have the risk of conflict as well as a strong and 
stable government, and then see if such a situation would have a different trajectory. What can be 
said however is that for the Israeli case it looks like the strength and stability of the government is 
not a decisive factor in explain escalation of international crises. Weak governments may or may 
not choose to escalate, yielding the interesting conclusion that a weak government in 
parliamentary system seems to enjoy quite a lot of autonomy from public opinion in making 
foreign policy decision.  
What makes this observation even more interesting is the fact that the Barak government pledged 
to the Israeli public before they withdrew from Southern Lebanon in the summer of 2000, that 
they would not tolerate any Hezbollah provocations (Ben-Ami 2009). The Barak government 
thus broke this pledge by not responding more forcefully to the kidnappings, and this happened 
just months after the withdrawal so the pledge would surely still be remembered by the public. 
That a weak government with a Prime Minister obsessed with his public approval and polling 
was able to make such a decision is, to say the least, very interesting. It does, however, highlight 
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the importance of the interaction term in the primary model. This term was included to be able to 
study the interaction of rivalry with vulnerability and criticism. If the interaction of these factors 
were irrelevant one would have expected the measurement of this indicator to be much closer to 
the prediction. Since it is not I can conclude that the measurement of this indicator supports the 
primary model, and it shows how the different parts of the term mediates the effect of 
competition, on the one hand, and vulnerability and criticism on the other hand.  
5.5.2 CRY HAVOC, AND LET SLIP THE DOGS OF WAR 
I have predicted that by making a show of force the Olmert government through the mechanism 
of audience cost would be pushed to escalate the confrontation with Hezbollah. The Barak 
government in turn did not make a show of force and thus did not incur an audience cost. I found 
no evidence of my last prediction, but on the issue of audience cost there was a substantial 
difference between the governments of Olmert and Barak. I predicted that the Olmert government 
would frame the Hezbollah provocation as a much greater security challenge then the Barak 
administration. Differences in framing is especially interesting given the fact that the two 
Hezbollah provocations were almost identical in scope and achievements, so one could expect 
different governments to treat them in roughly the same way. In the summer of 2000, as I have 
already mentioned, the Barak government made a pledge that no Hezbollah provocations would 
be tolerated. This was a vital part of the Barak governments “deal” with the Israeli public 
following the withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Ehud Barak did, of course, not take lightly on 
the Hezbollah provocation of October 7th. In a speech to the Knesset four days after the attack he 
said that he held Hezbollah, Syria and Lebanon responsible for the safety of the three IDF 
soldiers, and that Hezbollah should grant the Red Cross or the United Nations access to the 
soldiers as soon as possible (Alon 2000). In this speech Barak focused however not on Hezbollah, 
but on the threat posed by the Palestinian Authority’s recent release of several Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad prisoners. The day after the attack Barak also focused on the responsibility of Hezbollah of 
the well-being of the soldiers, and promised that Israel would retaliate (Harel, Gal, and Benn 
2000). All in all, though, it is difficult to consider this as any thing but very restrained rhetoric 
from an Israeli Prime Minister. Barak never went further than to state that Israel preserved the 
right to retaliate at a place and time they saw fit (Harel and Issacharoff 2008: 39 - 41). Instead of 
escalating Barak seems to be trying to shift attention to the threat posed by Palestinian 
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organization. Importantly he does not give any ultimatums that would increase a possible future 
audience cost.  
The 2006 Olmert government behaved in a startlingly different manner. From the work of the 
Winograd commission we now know that Olmert himself thought that Israel was in danger of 
loosing its ability to deter, and that Israel’s resolve was being tested by Hezbollah (quoted in: 
Merom 2008: 10). Olmert also communicated this to the public. In a speech to the Israeli Knesset 
on the 17th of July, five days after the Hezbollah attack, he made it clear that he would not 
tolerate the Hezbollah actions, and that the organization would pay a steep price for their 
provocation. Olmert said34: “There are moments in the life of a nation, when it is compelled to 
look directly into the face of reality and say: no more! (...) When missiles are launched at our 
residents and cities, our answer will be war with all the strength, determination, valor, sacrifice 
and dedication that characterize this nation”. While Barak’s statements in 2000 seems to have 
tried to calm things down, Olmert’s speech sounds very much like the speech of a general 
rallying his troops. After having made such a speech it would be difficult for any leader to back 
down and settle for limited retaliations or a purely negotiated settlement. Such an action would 
have greatly undermined the credibility of the leader, and would probably also leave the leader 
looking like a fool. Michael Tomz (2007) argues that audience cost arise because citizens care 
about the reputation of their country, and that they especially disapprove of empty threats. 
Clearly you cannot give a speech like the one Olmert gave and then not be thought of as making 
empty threats if you opt for a negotiated settlement.  
So far I have concentrated only on verbal threats to the use of force, but audience cost may also 
be incurred by actual shows of force. In the case of the Barak government no such show of force 
was put on. Barak talked about retaliations but never went further, as mentioned above, than to 
state that Israel preserved the right to retaliate at a place and time they saw fit. The government of 
Ehud Olmert acted differently. Following the Hezbollah kidnappings the Olmert government 
discussed a number of retaliatory options, but they never, as far as available evidence shows, 
discussed not retaliating. In the end they decided that Israel’s first response would be an attack on 
Hezbollah’s Fadjr rockets (Harel and Issacharoff 2008: 86). The Fadjr rockets are by far 
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 Speech by Ehud Olmert to the Knesset 17/07/06. Transcript found on the website of the office of the Prime 
Minister: http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Speeches/2006/07/speechknesset170706.html  
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Hezbollah’s most lethal rockets, they are reasonably accurate and have a range of between 43 and 
75 km (Rubin 2007). This might not seem like a drastic step, but Harel and Issacharoff argue that 
of the possible operations the government and military considered, the option they landed on, 
which the military estimated could cost as many as 400 Lebanese civilian deaths, was “the 
harshest possible operation” (2008: 79). Hezbollah responded to this attack by launching a large 
amount of Katyusha rockets at Israel, and this led to the eventual Israeli ground invasion of 
Southern Lebanon since, as the Israeli Air Force had made clear, they were not capable of 
destroying the much smaller Katyusha rockets from the air (Harel and Issacharoff 2008; Rubin 
2007). 
I find ample evidence for prediction 2. Although Ehud Barak had pledged to the Israeli electorate 
that no Hezbollah provocations would be tolerated, he opted to not retaliate against Hezbollah 
after the October 2000 kidnapping. He did not make a show of force verbally or by actual 
military power, and therefore he never incurred an audience cost. The 2006 Olmert government 
behaved differently. Following the attack Olmert, as well as other senior member of the cabinet, 
made public declarations that clearly amounted to a show of force that would have made the 
government look almost ridiculous if they had decided to ignore the provocation as Barak did. 
The Olmert government could have opted for limited retaliations, but they chose instead to 
respond in what has been characterized as the harshest possible way. This response from Olmert 
led to, as the IDF predicted, prolonged Katyusha rocket attacks from Hezbollah, an in light of 
Olmert’s public declarations and his initial harsh response he had locked himself into a trajectory 
that meant that he had to escalate even further. This in turn led to the Israeli ground invasion. It is 
perfectly plausible that the 2006 war had ended with limited Israeli retaliations had Olmert been 
more cautious in his public remarks, and the cabinet had opted for milder retaliations. All in all 
this provides strong and satisfactory evidence for prediction 2.  
5.5.3 ENTER: KNESSET 
Although the last section on audience cost implicitly introduced another actor, public opinion, 
into an international politics outcome, this section does so explicitly. This section looks at the 
direct effect of the legislature, in my case the Israeli Knesset, on an international politics 
outcome. Some work has been done on the role of the legislatures in trade negotiations, and these 
find that the legislature have an impact only if it is more hawkish than the cabinet (Milner 1997). 
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Very few studies, however, have looked directly at the role of legislatures in the process leading 
to a war. Ranan Kuperman in one such study finds evidence supporting his hypothesis that 
“discontent expressed by individual Knesset members have a significant impact” (Kuperman 
2003: 684) on the risk of Israeli retaliations. In the following I will show that Knesset members 
voiced very harsh critique of the Olmert government following the Hezbollah kidnappings on 
July 12th 2006, and that no comparable level of critique was fielded at Ehud Barak’s government 
in 2000. For the 2000 case I once again have to find the absence of something. This, I want to 
stress, always leaves open the possibility that the fact that I have not found X, does not mean X is 
not to be found anywhere. I might simply have overlooked it, or looked in the wrong place. I 
have, however, searched extensively in the archives of both the Jerusalem Post and Haaretz, as 
well as the Keesings World News Archive35. I have also red the memoir of the then Foreign 
Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami and conducted an interview with him (Ben-Ami 2006, 2009). Ben-
Ami told me that the government was criticized for not responding to the Hezbollah provocations 
(Ben-Ami 2009), but this criticism does not seem to have been very severe. All in all, considering 
all the non-evidence, I believe it is plausible to argue that the Knesset in October of 2000 where 
very restrained in their criticism of the government after the October Hezbollah kidnappings. 
There may be many reasons for this restrained, but that is not relevant for this study.  
In 2006 in contrast the Olmert government came under massive critique as early as the day after 
the Hezbollah attack. The very next day Israeli Members of Knesset (MK) demanded that Israel 
respond to the provocation by attacking targets in Lebanon and Syria, as well as Hezbollah bases. 
Yuval Steinitz, MK for Likud and chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense 
Committee said that “Israel must exact a heavy price for the attack from Lebanon and Syria as 
well as from Hezbollah, including by striking at both civilian and military infrastructure” 
(Gideon, Shlomo, and Assaf 2006). Some MKs went even further and demanded on the day 
following the attack that Olmert and the Minister of Defense Amir Peretz had to resign. Yisrael 
Katz, also from the Likud, is quoted saying: “the Hezbollah assault was a direct result of the 
erosion of Israel's deterrence caused by the government's failure to respond to rocket fire from 
Gaza on Sderot. Since Olmert and Peretz were responsible for this policy, they must go” (Gideon, 
Shlomo et al. 2006). Benyamin Netanyahu followed suit and demanded that Israel should “Fight 
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 See respectively: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/jpost/search.html - 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml  - http://www.keesingsbeta.com/  
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them [Hezbollah], bash them, smash them” (Harel and Issacharoff 2008: 107). Based on this I 
believe I can plausibly argue that the Knesset in 2006 pushed for a harsh Israeli response, and 
that the government would have been met with waves of critique if they had instead opted for 
limited retaliations. This is exacerbated by the fact that some Knesset members even went as far 
as to call for the immediate resignation of the cabinet after the attack. Barak was met with no 
comparable criticism. I therefore argue that I have sufficient evidence supporting prediction 3.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
I found in this chapter evidence supporting two of my three predictions. I found evidence 
supporting the theory that claims that audience cost can be an important mechanism in the 
escalation of crisis. I argued that Ehud Olmerts boisterous rhetoric following the Hezbollah attack 
would have stripped him of all credibility had he opted, as Barak did, to not engage Hezbollah. 
Barak in contrast was very restrained in his communication after the October 2000 attack, and 
this gave him room for maneuvering. In essence it gave him the possibility to refrain from a 
counter-attack without the public perception of a foreign policy fiasco. I also found evidence 
supporting the mechanism laid out in chapter two where I argued that a Prime Minister’s natural 
inclination for sharing responsibility, or spreading the cost, for a life and death decision as the 
decision to go to war is important. This gives the legislature a prominent place in the framework 
and clearly deviates from the traditional unitary actor models. I showed that none of the massive 
pressure mounted on the Olmert government, and the harsh criticism, after the Hezbollah attack 
was fielded against Ehud Barak. If Barak had been met with the same level of criticism, which he 
very well might have been, one can plausible argue that it had been difficult for him not to 
respond more forcefully to the provocation.  
I did not, however, find evidence supporting my first hypothesis predicting that the Barak 
government would be more stable and stronger than the Olmert government. Both the Barak and 
the Olmert government suffered from low approval ratings and internal conflicts when Hezbollah 
attacked. This chapter’s primary hypothesis then is supported by two of the three deduced 
indicators. I find it very interesting that the weakness of a government does not have an impact 
on the escalation of crisis in my cases. The indicator did however support the central logic of my 
primary model that highlights the importance of the interaction of rivalry with vulnerability and 
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criticism. I do believe though that I can plausible argue that the strategic interaction of the 
government, which makes the decision to escalate, with other domestic actors is important for 
understanding why crisis escalate. I have shown how the behavior of the Knesset, and the 
behavior of the government towards the electorate which controls its fate, is important for 
understanding why a crisis will grow into a full blown war. I have in this chapter broken the 
unitary actor assumption, and the value-added is a more complex and nuanced understanding of 
why seemingly similar Hezbollah provocations have radically different consequences. The focus 
of this chapter has been narrow, I could of course have focused on many more domestic actors, 
but as a plausibility probe I believe this as been very fruitful, and that the value of looking inside 
a state has been somewhat established. In the next chapter I will move on to look at the direct 
bilateral relationship between Israel and Hezbollah. 
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6 ISRAEL VS. HEZBOLLAH 
He closed his eyes, prayed for his boy, for all of them. 
He put his hand down on black dirt, was reminded:  
Pennsylvania. I am the invader 
Michael Shaara (2001: 103). 
Hypothesis 3: A combination of one-sided incomplete information and simple, in contrast 
to complex, learning, make conflicts more likely to escalate.  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the strategic interaction of Israel and Hezbollah. It constitutes the last 
analytical chapter in my analysis of the reasons for why the Hezbollah actions of 2006 led to a so 
much more dramatic process of escalation than the almost identical operation the organization 
undertook in 2000. In analyzing this interaction I will rely on game theory. Game theory has the 
fascinating ability to bring to light unintuitive results, to make sense of seemingly unsenseble 
behavior. Game theory also, however, simplifies and presents a stylized version of the world. 
When dealing with the world in a game theoretic manner it is therefore useful to keep in mind the 
following passage from Lev Tolstoi’s War and Peace: “(…) the military term "to cut off" has no 
meaning. One can cut off a slice of bread, but not an army. To cut off an army- to bar its road- is 
quite impossible, for there is always plenty of room to avoid capture and there is the night when 
nothing can be seen, as the military scientists might convince themselves by the example of 
Krasnoe and of the Berezina. It is only possible to capture prisoners if they agree to be captured, 
just as it is only possible to catch a swallow if it settles on one's hand. Men can only be taken 
prisoners if they surrender according to the rules of strategy and tactics, as the Germans did.” 
(Tolstoi 2005: 963). Beware of getting lost in abstractions is Tolstoi’s caveat.   
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is intriguing in its complexity, but one of the most 
interesting aspects is the simple observation that this is a prolonged conflict between a state and a 
non-state. In the interaction of sovereign states in the anarchic realm of international politics 
information on what and how much this or that actors wants to achieve something is of supreme 
importance. This realization has fostered many scholars to study how states can credibly 
communicate with and commit to each other (see e.g the seminal:  Keohane 2005). James Fearon 
(1995) notes in relation to this that had state’s leaders been able to credible communicate with 
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each other, wars would not occur since it would almost always be possible to reach Pareto 
optimal negotiated settlements. I will draw on this literature in the following, but the interaction 
of concern here is not one between two states, but between a state and a non-state36. This ushers 
in another set of issues related to information that will be the focus of the analysis. All in all I will 
argue that the interaction between Israel and Hezbollah has been marked by an information 
asymmetry, and this asymmetry provides a vital key for explaining the trajectory of the crisis. In 
this, as in most crises, one piece of information is especially important37: how far are you willing 
to go at achieve a certain goal. In game theoretic terms the question is how resolved you are. An 
actor with high resolve is willing to go far, she might even deem a war acceptable, to achieve a 
goal, while an actor with low resolve will yield at much earlier point in the crisis. Basically actors 
want to know two types of information. They want to have information about their own resolve, 
i.e. about their own willingness to fight, and about their opponent(s) resolve, i.e. its willingness to 
fight. In most cases actors know their own resolve, but the degree to which they know the other 
actors resolve varies. In short I find that prior to 2006 Hezbollah on the balance held more 
information about Israel’s resolve, than Israel held on Hezbollah’s. This information asymmetry, 
which stems from the nature of the interaction and is thus a systemic factor, has shaped the 
conflict and very often given, as will be discussed in detail below, Hezbollah the upper hand. The 
information asymmetry has however not been stable, and this in turn I will propose is a potent 
explanation for why the conflict escalated much more dramatically in 2006 then in 2000.  
I will suggest that Hezbollah failed to take into account the dynamics of crisis, and thus failed to 
recognize that Israel’s preference structure over time changed. This points to the significance of 
the difference between complex and simple learning, and I will argue that Hezbollah engaged in 
simple learning and because of this failed to take into account the dynamics of the conflict. As a 
consequence of this Hezbollah by its own actions undermined its own prediction of how Israel 
would act. I argue that Hezbollah seems to not have realized that the history of the conflict 
greatly influenced Israel’s preference structure, and therefore that Hezbollah failed to see that 
Israel was much more resolved in 2006 then in 2000. In other words by striking a series of small 
blows at Israel throughout the period, Hezbollah made Israel more resolved, but Hezbollah did 
not take this into account when it predicted how Israel would behave following its 2006 
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 Arguably Hezbollah in some areas constitute almost a quasi-state.  
37
 This does of course not mean that other types of information might not be important as well.  
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kidnappings. The conclusions drawn from this analysis have interesting implications for how 
states in general should behave towards non-state entities in prolonged conflicts. As will be 
elaborated in the conclusion I suggest that in dealing with enemies such as Hezbollah it may be 
efficient for Israel to make threats which, to borrow a phrase from Shelling (1980), leaves 
something to chance. I will start this chapter by briefly discussing the assumption of rationality 
and the implications this has for the study of Hezbollah, then I will deduce a set of indicators and 
predictions. Two predictions will be tested, but the bulk of the chapter will be spent testing the 
second prediction that concerns the role of private information and the credibility of signals. In 
this I will find strong evidence for my hypothesis about the role of asymmetric information, and 
the effect this has had on the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. I will conclude by offering 
some thoughts about how the findings from this chapter relates to conflicts between states and 
non-state more generally.  
6.2 THE ASSUMPTION OF RATIONALITY  
I treat Hezbollah as an inherently rational actor38 in this chapter, and this has some implications 
that I want to briefly note. In abstract terms the rationality assumption means simply that 
Hezbollah has a set of aims, and that they choose the best way to achieve these aims. Hezbollah 
is thus seen as an entity which decides how to act, i.e. which strategies to employ, based on the 
strategies of other actors, and which therefore will adjust their behavior when other actors adjusts 
theirs. Other authors also treat terrorist39 organization as inherently rational entities. In their study 
of Hamas Mishal and Sela shows how Hamas at different times have altered their strategy in light 
of strategy changes made by the PLO and Israel. When the PLO adopted a non-violence strategy 
towards Israel during the Oslo accords process, Hamas changed its stance and became more 
violent so as to not be rendered irrelevant (Mishal and Sela 2006). Powell similarly in his article 
on how to defend against terrorist attacks treats terrorist organizations as highly rational entities 
that decides which targets to strike based on “calculations” on where they can attack most 
efficiently (Powell 2007a). It is furthermore clear from Nicholas Blanfords analysis of 
Hezbollah’s tactics and strategy during the 2006 war that the organization had invested 
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 Elster defines actions as rational if the actions taken are optimal, given the beliefs, these beliefs must be as well 
supported as possible, given the evidence, and the evidence must result from an optimal investment in information 
gathering (Elster 2007a: 191).  
39
 Obviously Hezbollah is more than just a terrorist organization, but that is beside the point here. 
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considerable time and resources in determining the optimal way to deploy their forces to counter 
an Israeli attack, and this evidence shows Hezbollah as a highly strategic actor (Blanford 2006). 
In line with this I will treat Hezbollah as a calculating and strategic player, which does not fight 
simply for the sake of fighting, and which is not fanatical. The focus on information also flows 
naturally from assumption of rationality. If actors are to be considered rational they must, at a 
minimum, make informed decisions. This information may be both correct and erroneous without 
undermining the rationality assumption. In a rationalist framework then a study of information is 
necessary for understanding the actions of the different actors. I will discuss the fruitfulness of a 
rationalist framework in the concluding chapter. 
6.3 ON THE HYPOTHESES 
Indicator 6.2: Hezbollah less susceptible to incurring an audience cost.  
Audience cost as discussed in the last chapter can drive escalation if leaders get caught in their 
own rhetoric and have to choose between escalation and the image of having conducted a failed 
foreign policy. This in turn may hurt the leader’s chance of re-election. For small countries 
however leaders may not have to pay an audience cost, but will instead be rewarded for “standing 
up to a bully”. This non-audience cost mechanism can then cause escalation since it creates the 
possibility of one party’s leadership continuously engaging and provoking another party on a 
small scale, without having to pay a cost for their behavior. This keeps the conflict alive, which 
in turn creates the possibility of an escalation taking place at any time. In Fearon’s argument 
audience cost makes it possible for states to signal their intent (Fearon 1994), but if some states, 
or other entities, do not have a mechanism for signaling their intent the risk of escalation may 
rise. I expect that Hezbollah’s leadership never incurs an audience cost for putting on a show of 
force and then backing down.  
Indicator 6.1: The combination of past incomplete information and learning makes 
escalation more likely. 
Incomplete and private information has been argued to be important explanations for why 
rational leaders would choose to go to war. Fearon argues that leaders have private information 
about their resolve in a specific crisis, i.e. their willingness to use force in this specific context, 
but an incentive to misrepresent this resolve makes it difficult for leaders to reach a negotiated 
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ex-ante compromise, and thus avoid war (Fearon 1995). In short private information and the 
incentive to misrepresent create conditions necessary for a rational war to occur. If leaders at all 
times had information about exactly how much another leader was willing to sacrifice to achieve 
this or that, war would be unnecessary since these leaders could then simply negotiate a 
compromise, and to bluff would be impossible. In this study we have a situation not of 
incomplete information, but of an initial information asymmetry that evolves into incomplete 
information. In the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, Hezbollah holds information 
about both its and, to a certain extent, Israel’s resolve, while Israel only holds information about 
its own resolve. I expect that this information asymmetry explains both how Hezbollah has been 
able to prevail for so long in the confrontation with Israel, and how and when it is rational for 
Hezbollah to engage Israel. The mechanism of learning, discussed in chapter 2, however made it 
possible for Israel to update their belief about Hezbollah’s resolve, and this ended in Israel, in 
effect, calling Hezbollah’s bluff in 2006. Having failed to update their beliefs accordingly during 
the same period, Hezbollah failed to realize that it did not any longer hold information on Israel’s 
resolve, and thus pushed the conflict too far towards the brink of war without actually realizing it. 
I argue thus that if Hezbollah had held information on Israel’s actual resolve in 2006 the conflict 
would not have escalated, simply because Hezbollah would not have pushed as far as it pushed. 
In 2000 in contrast Hezbollah knew how far it could push without incurring a full scale war.  
I alluded to the difference between complex and simple learning in the theoretical chapter. The 
difference between these two concepts grows clearer if you distinguish between subjective and 
objective information. I can have subjective information about a situation, i.e. my own analysis of 
a situation, but this may deviate from the actual objective information about a situation. As an 
example I may believe that I am driving south on Highway 1 in California, while I am actually 
driving north and will soon enter San Francisco. My confidence, or trust, in my subjective 
information may also vary, and this is a crucial aspect. If I believe, erroneously, that I am driving 
south but my confidence in this belief is low, I will at some point stop, take a look at a map, 
discover that I am driving in the wrong direction, and change course. If on the other hand my 
confidence in my own information is very high, I am likely to continue south and not discover the 
error until I end up in Los Angeles40. This distinction I believe is crucial for understanding the 
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 There exists of course also a third possibility where my confidence is high, and the information is also correct. 
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conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. In game theoretic models what I here call confidence 
would be captured in Hezbollah’s prior belief about Israel’s value for war versus tit-for-tat or 
yielding, or more general Israel’s value for war vs. the status quo. The greater Hezbollah’s initial, 
i.e. pre 2006 war, expectation of Israel’s resolve is, the less effective Israel’s signals will be. I 
expect to find evidence supporting the view that Hezbollah’s confidence in its own analysis was 
high, while this analysis objectively was flawed. Hezbollah failed to take the dynamic of the 
conflict into account, and thus failed to see that Israel would consider the aggregate of the 
conflict and not just a particular incident. This created a situation where Hezbollah’s trust in their 
prediction of how Israel would behave went up, while this prediction actually was wrong.  
6.4 PREDICTIONS 
From the primary hypothesis one can deduce the prediction that conflicts marked by an 
information asymmetry over time are unstable, unpredictable and susceptible to escalation. As in 
the last two chapters, however, it is not feasible to test this prediction, so I have deduced 
predictions from the indicators and test the primary hypotheses and the theory through these. As I 
noted in the last chapters this manner of testing a theory is of course weaker than directly testing 
the primary hypothesis, but taken together these tests will give us a satisfactory picture of the 
strength or weakness of the theory (Van Evera 1997, 1999).  
1. From indicator 6.1 concerning audience cost one can deduce the prediction that 
Hezbollah’s popularity increases, instead of decreasing, in situations where 
Hezbollah threatens Israel but then backs down.   
2. From indicator 6.2 concerning brinkmanship one can deduce the prediction that 
miscalculation, flowing from the dynamics of crisis, marked the 2006 escalation. 
6.5 TESTING THE PREDICTIONS 
6.5.1 STANDING UP TO A BULLY 
The hypotheses and indicators of previous chapters, as well as the following here, have been 
designed to measure what I argue are important difference between the 2000 and 2006 cases, and 
which explain their drastically different trajectories. This indicator does not do that. The goal 
here is rather to establish that the Hezbollah leadership does not incur an audience cost if it makes 
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a show of force and then backs down. Not incurring an audience cost has two consequences that 
are relevant here: firstly, it makes it possible for the Hezbollah leadership to keep the conflict 
alive without loosing their popular support when they engage in rancorous rhetoric or other 
shows of force, and then in the end is forced to back down. Secondly, that it inhibits Hezbollah 
from sending costly signals, as will be discussed below, that allows it to reveal private 
information of its resolve and its intentions to Israel. The goal then is not to show that the 
Hezbollah leadership incurred an audience cost in 2000 but not in. This indicator does not explain 
variation in the dependent variable. Its relevance is instead tied to the next issue of brinksmanship 
which deals directly with variation in the dependent variable.  
James Fearon argues that: “Particularly in small, relatively powerless countries, publics may 
actually reward leaders for “standing up” against a larger state’s explicit or implicit threats (…) If 
public statements and threats create no audience cost or are actually beneficial even if the state 
will back down, then these signals will provide no information about its actual willingness to use 
force (1992: 184, 186). Over the years Hezbollah has carried out a vast amount of operations 
against Israeli forces, and many of these operations have been extremely successful. Success in 
this respect does not imply that Hezbollah time and again stroke a vital blow at Israel, it means 
rather that Hezbollah was able to project an image of success by carrying out its operations and 
not being effectively countered by Israel. In the period 1996 to 2000, i.e. the lead up to the Israeli 
withdrawal, Hamzeh lists as many as 4928 operations carried out by Hezbollah and its affiliates, 
while 16 operations were carries out in the period 2001 to 2004 (Hamzeh 2004: 89). The simple 
fact that Hezbollah has been so successful thus makes it rather difficult to study whether or not 
the leadership is susceptible to incurring an audience cost. The best case in point is an incidence 
in April of 2002. In this case Hezbollah initiated and escalated a crisis greatly, before it 
decisively backed down following threats from then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Sharon 
threatened to attack Syria if Syria did not reign in Hezbollah (Sobelman 2004). In this incidence 
the Hezbollah leadership made a show of force that would have created an audience cost had it 
been carried out by most other states. Instead though the leadership does not seem to have 
suffered at all from what could have been an embarrassing withdrawal, and instead seems to have 
come out of the incident strengthened (Harik 2004). Ideally I would have liked to examine more 
cases in more detail, but based on this admittedly limited pool of evidence I believe I can argue 
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that, in accordance with the prediction, the Hezbollah leadership does not loose support if they 
put on a show of force and then in the end back down. 
6.5.2 THE BRINK OF WAR 
When is it rational for Hezbollah to attack Israel? To answer that question I will draw on the 
literature on nuclear brinkmanship, and on the ideas of private information. In Robert Powell’s 
study of nuclear deterrence he examines the effect of longer crisis in which the nuclear armed 
parties take small steps towards the brink. In this model Powell finds that the parties “generally 
become less and less likely to escalate as the crisis unfolds. Each also becomes more and more 
confident that its adversary is resolute” (Powell 1990: 85). In this model the chance of a state 
escalating a crisis increases, perhaps contra-intuitively, as the resolve of the adversary increases. 
Conversely the chance of escalation increase as the challenger’s stake in the status quo increases. 
The second conclusion seems to hold for the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah as well, while 
the first conclusion does not. I will assume here that Hezbollah does not want a full scale war, but 
that it always prefers to make the first move. Israel on its side never makes the first move, but 
prefers a full scale war to continued incremental escalation after a certain point. The location of 
this point is unknown to Hezbollah, for now, but known to Israel. Hezbollah thus prefers a tit-for-
tat game, which means that Hezbollah will stop escalating if Israel does, and escalate further if 
Israel chooses to do so.  
Figure  6-1: Tit-for-Tat Game.  
      
                                Tit for tat Yield Escalate 
Tit for tat 2,3 2,1 2,2 
Yield 3,1 3,3 1,0 





An underlying assumption then is that Hezbollah always prefers to keep the conflict “alive”. 
Hezbollah escalates in its first move, and then matches Israel in every move after this. I assume 
for know that the parties can escalate indefinitely without actually going to full war. 
In the game in Figure 6-1 Hezbollah continues the tit-for-tat game if Israel continues it, and 
yields if Israel yields. Israel on its side yields if Hezbollah yields or tit-for-tats, but prefers to 
answer a Hezbollah escalation with a tit-for-tat move. Meaning that Israel will respond to 
Hezbollah’s escalatory move, but not expand the crisis. This game is meant to represent the 
situation at point t+1, at which point Hezbollah has already made its initial move. A game with 
this structure would be an ideal situation for Hezbollah since it more or less puts the organization 
in the driver’s seat. Whatever Hezbollah chooses to do, it does not risk a full war, in effect 
creating a situation where Hezbollah can continuously harass Israel without paying any cost for 
it. Clearly this is not an accurate presentation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, but 
this extremely simplistic game actually does highlight some important parts of the conflict 
dynamics. When Ehud Barak in October of 2000 chose not to respond more forcefully to the 
Hezbollah kidnappings he created a situation where Hezbollah was allowed to run the show, and 
as this game highlights, only a change in Israel’s preference structure can change the dynamics of 
the game. Had Barak been a more resolute actor and chosen to escalate instead of yielding from 
the tit-for-tat game, as he promised the electorate to do, Ehud Olmert would very probably not 
have found himself in the same situation six years later. This is the argument many commentators 
made after the war of 2006 (e.g: Harel and Issacharoff 2008). As it stands now the game also 
explains why Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was genuinely surprised by Israel’s forceful 
response to the July 2006 kidnappings. He expected Israel to do nothing, or at least not do 
anything more than continue the tit-for-tat sequence. The tit-for-tat game has interesting feature 
and reveals a great deal of information on the preference structure of the opponents. If Hezbollah 
believed that Israel’s preference structure resembled the one in this game it becomes clear why it 
chose to kidnap the IDF soldiers, but it also explains why Israel responded so forcefully. This 
becomes clear when one considers that Israel lacks the ability, in this game, to communicate to 
Hezbollah that Hezbollah’s view of Israel’s preference structure is faulty. Israel therefore has to 
signal that it will no longer play a tit-for-tat game by actually showing its willingness to respond 
forcefully, and not just threatens to do so. The game in Figure  6-1 is very static and the analogy 
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will only take us so far, but before I move on to dynamic games I want to look at one more static 
game, one of chicken. 
Crises are often modeled as games of chicken. In a classic game of chicken two actors drive 
towards each other on a collision course in order to establish which one is the toughest, i.e. to 
find out who is the chicken and swerves and who is though guy. Both actors however prefer 
surviving as a chicken to being a very tough dead guy (Elster 2007a). A game of chicken in 
normal form is depicted in Figure  6-2:  
Figure  6-2: Game of Chicken      
                            Swerve Not swerve 
Swerve 1,1 0,5 
Not swerve 5,0 -5,-5 
This game has two Nash equilibriums41: (Not swerve, swerve), and (swerve, Not swerve). In 
other words if one of the actors swerves, the other will stay the course. The game also shows that 
both players prefer swerving to not swerving. This type of game has been used as an analogy for 
modeling the interaction of nuclear armed opponents (Powell 1990: 34 - 37). In a crisis involving 
two nuclear opponents where nuclear war is a possibility, both actors would prefer not escalating 
a crisis further, and thus accepting the status quo, to launching a nuclear attack. In the case of the 
crisis between Israel and Hezbollah only one of the actors, Israel, has nuclear weapons, but I 
would argue that it borders on ridiculous to believe that using nuclear weapons against Hezbollah 
was ever a relevant option for Israel. I do however argue that parts of the analogy is interesting 
and relevant for my purposes here. In the crisis between Israel and Hezbollah I argue that 
Hezbollah wants to escalate the crisis as far as possible without actually starting a war, i.e. 
Hezbollah in the ultimate move prefers de-escalation to taking another step that might lead to 
war. Phrased less formally Hezbollah wants to push Israel as far as Israel is willing to be pushed 
without launching a war. Israel on its side wants war under some conditions, but only when it 
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 Formally a Nash equilibrium is: “a pair of strategies that are best replies to each other on the equilibrium path” 





believes that its ability to deter has been substantially undermined. Although this is a very simple 
abstraction it highlights one interesting feature about the Israel Hezbollah interaction. Modeled in 
this way Israel seems to be at an almost constant disadvantage. Up until the point where Israel 
chooses to launch a war, the initiative is in Hezbollah’s hands at all times. To launch a war is, 
however, an extremely costly decision. Israel will be very reluctant to take such a step, and Israel 
thus creates a situation were the dynamic of the interaction gives Hezbollah the initiative, and 
leaves Israel few, if any, possibilities for changing the status quo without launching a war. I will 
return to this below when we expand the game. Returning to the game of chicken Powell notes 
that this game in normal form is interesting, but that it quickly looses its usefulness since: “There 
is no sequence of plays, no series of interacting decisions, no process in the model. There is no 
way a state can take its adversary’s past actions into account in assessing the likelihood that the 
adversary will stand firm, for in the model there is no past actions” (Powell 1990: 37).  
Figure  6-3: Brinkmanship game with complete information42 
         ()             ()                     ()                ()                   ()  
      w  k            w              k      w  k             w             k                 w        
H   e N   I        e N       H       e             N           I w N (…)I 
       b             b                    b   b   b 
           ()    (	)                          (	)      (	)     (	)      
The game depicted in Figure  6-3 is a game of brinkmanship that explicitly brings the history of 
the conflict back into the analysis. The idea of a game of brinkmanship was developed by 
Shelling (1980). In discussing threats that leaves something to chance he writes: “Brinkmanship 
is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely 
control. It is the tactic of deliberately letting the situation get somewhat out of hand, just because 
its being out of hand my be intolerable to the other party and force his accommodation” 
(Schelling 1980: 200). More generally it is the idea that the “brink of war” might not be a neatly 
delineated point, but rather a “curved slope that one can stand on with some risk of slipping (…) 
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 The game tree can make it look as if “I” has two moves in a row, at the games last and second to last node, but this 
is not the case. It is assumed that “H” has made a move between the two “I” nodes at the end of the game, i.e. within 
the (…) part of the game.  
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the slope and the risk of slipping are rather irregular; neither the person standing there nor the 
onlookers can be quite sure just how great the risk is, or how much it increases when one takes a 
few steps more” (1980: 199). It is easy to see how misperception can come to play an important 
part in brinkmanship crisis. If one or both of the actors misperceives the other’s level of resolve, 
he may end up pushing the crisis beyond the brink while all the time believing that the adversary 
will submit and yield to the status quo before the crisis turns into a war. The war then can, 
because of misperception and private information, come about as an unintended consequence. 
This is also Fearon’s point when he argues that the combination of states concealing their true 
willingness to fight and private information can explain why rational leaders may end up fighting 
unwanted wars. 
The game in Figure  6-3 starts with a move by Hezbollah, labeled H, which can choose, in its first 
move, between backing down and thus accepting the status quo; escalating the crisis; and 
launching an attack that is certain to lead to a war. These alternatives are labeled b, e and w 
respectively. If H plays b in its first move the game ends, yielding a pay off of (w,z). The payoffs 
are ranked accordingly. For I: z>c>b>a, i.e. submitting is better than launching massive attack, up 
to a point where launching such an attack is better than submitting. For H: l>k>w, i.e. Hezbollah 
prefers backing down to enduring a full-scale war, but not at the cost of abandoning the conflict 
all together. It might be controversial to claim that Hezbollah does not want war, but Daniel 
Sobelman argues that Hezbollah’s: “activity is designed to reduce the danger of a massive Israeli 
response against Lebanon as much as possible, since it would be detrimental to Hezbollah and 
other parties aligned against Israel” (Sobelman 2004: 12). Escalating by itself does not yield a 
pay off since it is not seen as a goal in itself. Rather for Hezbollah the ultimate goal of escalation 
is to force Israel to accept the new status quo, while the goal for Israel is to force Hezbollah to 
back down. In its first move Hezbollah has to choose between b, e and w. If Hezbollah chooses to 
escalate and plays e, the onus of escalation shifts to Israel. Following Powell (1990: 39) the 
heightened risk of war caused by escalation is modeled by letting nature, N, make a move 
immediately following an escalation by H or I. Nature then increases the risk of war with k, and 
when this k reaches 1, the risk of war is certain. The reasons for the increase in the risk of war are 
plentiful, and some potential reasons were discussed in the last chapter such as audience cost 
incurred by the Israeli government, and pressure or criticism from the Knesset. The game can end 
at any time if I or H chooses to back down or launch a full scale war. After H has chosen to 
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escalate and Nature has increased the risk, player I now has to choose between escalating further, 
backing down or launching a full scale war. It might be useful to illustrate these choices with 
some real world examples. Throughout the period between 2000 and 2006 Israel and Hezbollah 
engaged in small scale skirmishes (Sobelman 2004). In our game then if Hezbollah plays e in its 
first move, this would be the equivalent of launching rockets at IDF posts in the Shabaa farms. 
An Israeli response that ignores the attack, or one which plays tit-for-tat and launches a very 
limited rocket attack at a Hezbollah position, would be equivalent to Israel playing b and thus 
accepting the status quo. If Israel instead chooses to launch a more massive assault by e.g. 
attacking Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut, Israel would in effect have escalated the situation and 
played e. This would raise the risk of full scale war and shift the onus of escalation back to 
Hezbollah. 
After Israel has played e and Nature has increased the risk, the play moves back to Hezbollah 
who can settle for the status quo or continue escalating. At this point however Hezbollah will 
only escalate if it feels reasonably certain that it is not to close to the brink, which in terms of our 
game would mean that Hezbollah was at its last node in the game tree and thus at the point where 
Israel would prefer war to backing down in its next move. The game moves along these lines 
with the onus of escalation shifting back and forth between Israel and Hezbollah, and Nature 
raising the risk of war after each step towards the brink. The game shows how Hezbollah’s 
miscalculation of Israeli resolve can be an important explanation. Hezbollah always wants to 
escalate to keep the conflict going, and in all but its last move this is rational, in the sense that the 
pay off for escalating is greater than for backing down. One could possibly also include a term in 
Hezbollah’s pay-off structure that captured the increased benefit Hezbollah receives for every 
extra step it pushes Israel. Recall that Hezbollah wants to push Israel as close to the brink as 
possible without actually incurring a war. Hezbollah’s payoff for getting Israel to submit and 
accept the status quo in a fourth round of escalation would thus be higher than the pay off it gets 
if Israel submits in the second round. At some point though the potential extra benefit of one 
more round of escalation would, for Hezbollah, be smaller than the increase in risk of war and 
Hezbollah would therefore submit at this node.  
With complete information this game greatly favors Hezbollah. Since Hezbollah always starts the 
game it has the ability to keep the conflict going, while all the time knowing when to stop short 
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of provoking Israel into war. Complete information obviously is an unreasonable assumption, but 
it has some cute features. Consider the above mentioned crisis between Israel and Hezbollah in 
2002. In April of 2002 Hezbollah engaged Israel in a series of attacks that targeted both military 
and civilian targets along the Lebanese – Israeli border. This constituted a clear act of escalation, 
but in the words of one analyst: “Israel was loath to retaliate against Hezbollah, lest a limited 
exchange escalate into war. Israeli sources did not hide their concern that Hezbollah might make 
use of its rocket arsenal to strike at Israeli civilian targets in retaliation to a serious Israeli 
offensive” (Zisser 2002: 5). Israel chose instead to warn Syria that it had to curb Hezbollah, and 
the confrontation eventually ended when Hezbollah by itself seized operations (Zisser 2002). 
There are two very interesting features about that incident which the complete information game 
captures. I will address these shortly, but first I should address a question that begs itself. Was a 
similar option as this present in 2006? For two reasons I would argue that this was not an option 
in 2006. Firstly, between 2002 and 2006 it had become clear that Iran wielded much more 
authority over Hezbollah then Syria. This became especially true after Syria was forced to 
withdraw from Lebanon in 2005. A similar threat in 2006 would hence have to be directed at 
Iran. Secondly such a threat directed at Iran would not be nearly as credible as the threat against 
Syria. This because an attack on Iran would be much more complicated, and its effect, in term of 
military impact, much more uncertain then the threat of an attack against Syria.  
Returning to the game at hand and the issue of signaling. In a game of brinkmanship as the one in 
Figure  6-3 where both parties wish to avoid full scale war, information will obviously play a vital 
part. In general both actors will look for signals for when the other party has been pushed to the 
brink, or when one can still push him a little further (Morrow 1994: ch. 8 on signaling games in 
general). This means that even though the two actors might start out with very limited 
information, the preference structure of the other actor may be revealed by his signals throughout 
the game, or from information the actors have on each others preferences learned from earlier 
encounters. Especially in combination these sources of information could plausibly give the 
actors a reasonably firm foundation for drawing conclusions about the other actor’s preferences. 
When looking at the April 2002 confrontation described above in light of this it seems clear, 
however, that there is a very big difference between the sources of information available to Israel 
and Hezbollah. It is not unreasonable to claim that Hezbollah “won” the April 2002 stand off, and 
this I argue is due primarily to information asymmetries. Israel is able to send costly and credible 
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signals to Hezbollah (see Fearon 1992: ch 3 on signaling in I.R), but the reverse is not true and 
this gives Hezbollah, because of the nature of the conflict, the upper hand. I will return to this, 
but first let me say a little bit more about signaling in the 2002 confrontation. Israel was pushed 
very far towards the brink of war in this confrontation, but before being pushed all the way to 
what would be the last node in Figure  6-3 Israel sent out a credible and costly signal. Israel 
threatened to attack Syria if it did not reign in Hezbollah. Clearly in the context of the gross 
relative level of power between Israel and Syria, which means that Israel quite easily could inflict 
massive destruction on Syria without having to fear retaliations43, an Israeli threat to target Syria 
is credible. One could argue that this also makes the signal cheap, as opposed to a costly signal, 
and therefore that it provides little information about Israel’s actual specific resolve. But I argue 
that the credibility and the cost of this threat are increased by the importance Israeli leaders put 
on its deterrent ability, an ability that would be undermined if Israel continuously threatened and 
then not followed through. Undoubtedly the leaders of Israel’s neighbors are aware of the 
importance Israel puts on its ability to deter. Such a threat would also create an audience cost. 
Israel therefore, in effect, revealed its hand in the 2002 confrontation and this made it possible for 
Hezbollah to push things as far as it wanted without incurring the cost of war. Or more precisely 
it made is possible for Hezbollah to push Israel as far as Israel was willing to go in this particular 
instance without launching a war. Had Israel had been willing to settle for less in 2002, 
Hezbollah would have pushed further. It is very plausible that Hezbollah expected Israel to do the 
same in 2006, but Israel did not. Interestingly Hezbollah on its side does not have the same ability 
to send credible signals as Israel. As I discussed in section  6.5.1 actions by the Hezbollah 
leadership does not create an audience cost. The question then is how Hezbollah can credible 
communicate its resolve to Israel. In discussing international relations Fearon (1997) 
distinguishes between signals which produce ex post and ex ante costs. Ex post cost are produced 
by audience cost, and is comparable to tying ones hands, while ex ante costs are produced by e.g. 
mobilizing troops and thus is equivalent to sunk costs. Now, if Hezbollah does not incur an 
audience cost, the only way it can send credible signals in Fearon’s framework is by mobilizing 
troops or in other ways paying a direct financial cost of its actions which sends a signal to Israel 
about Hezbollah’s resolve. This relative inability to send credible signals could potentially be 
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 An example of this could be the recent Israeli attacked on a alleged Syrian nuclear facility.  
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detrimental to Hezbollah, but as long as Hezbollah continues to hold the initiative the information 
asymmetry is a strength for the organization. This is so because to signal its intention is necessary 
for Israel, and it is necessary in very different ways than it is for Hezbollah. Israel can not be seen 
as launching massive attacks time and time again without drawing some line in the sand44 that 
makes it possible for Hezbollah to back down. If Israel was to launch massive attacks on Lebanon 
without some kind of warning the damage this would do to Israel’s standing in the long run 
would be so severe that the behavior would be unsustainable45. In essence then we have a 
situation not of complete information, but one of an information asymmetry that approaches one-
sided complete information. Hezbollah holds information on both its and, to some extent, Israel’s 
resolve, while Israel only holds information about its own resolve, i.e. private information. By 
resolve I here mean what Fearon (1992) terms specific resolve, i.e. resolve over this specific 
incident, and not general resolve, i.e. how tough Hezbollah is on average. Israel may hold 
information about Hezbollah’s general resolve. A game with one-sided incomplete information is 
shown in Figure  6-4. 
The game in Figure  6-4 below starts with a move by nature that determines which strategic types 
Hezbollah and Israel are. Hezbollah is informed of both of Nature’s choices, while Israel is only 
informed of what type it is. The game in this structure shows how Hezbollah was able, in 2002, to 
push Israel considerably without incurring a full scale war. What happened is that Israel revealed 
its hand, and Hezbollah hence decided to back down in its subsequent move. Thus far the model 
has explained, by looking at the role of private information, why no escalatory process took place 
in 2000 or in 2002. Since information is one-sided incomplete, Hezbollah in this model was able 
to back down before incurring a war. I have argued, furthermore, that this gives Hezbollah the 
initiative in the confrontation, and that this could give it the upper hand in the overall conflict. 
The next question is why the equilibrium that sustained peace in 2000 and 2002 broke down and 
was replaced by a war-equilibrium in 2006. Again I will turn to private information for an 
explanation.  
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 In international relations real ultimatums of the “back down now or I will attack” type are extremely rare. As the 
literature points out this is very probably due to the significance of being the first mover. Thus if I know that you will 
attack me tomorrow, I will attack you today to preempt it, and hence you would be wiser not to have given the 
ultimatum in the first place (see e.g. Van Evera 1999). The structure of the Israeli Hezbollah crisis is however very 
different and this kind reasoning is not likely to apply.  
45
 Consider e.g. Israel’s effort, failed or not, to look reasonable in the eyes of world opinion during the 2009 war in 
Gaza by warning the civilian population in Gaza in advance of attacks by sending out mobile text messages.  
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Figure  6-4: One-sided incomplete information 
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To tighten up the argument I will formalize it a little bit. The central ingredients in the discussion 
have been the actors resolve and their respective cost for war. Formalizing this yields the 
following equation for Israel’s and Hezbollah’s expected utility for fighting a war (EUW)46.  
= (p · + (1 – p) · ) -  =    ( 6-1) 
= (p · + (1 – p) · ) -  =    ( 6-2) 
In the equation p is the probability the actor will win the war,  is the cost of war, UW is the 
price gained from winning or loosing a war for the respective actor. This price is defined as an 
issue space X = [0,1] where 0 is Israel’s preferred point while 1 is Hezbollah’s. The probability 
that Israel will win the war is very high, so I define p for Israel as being 0.9, while the probability 
that Hezbollah will win is set as 0.1. The cost of war will be great for both parties, but it is 
                                                 
46
 This is a very common way for modeling expected utility, see e.g. Bueno de Mesquita (1983). It basically is the 
probability of getting something one wants; taken together with the probability of getting something one does not 
want, compared with the cost of fighting for it. This section draws heavily on Hegre (2009). 
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difficult to give this an intuitive value. Before I define it let me note that many authors model 
differences in resolve by including this in the cost parameter, and then letting this vary. Recall 
that Israel’s resolve is common knowledge, but Hezbollah’s is not, i.e. the incomplete 
information only goes one way. I set the cost of war at 0.6 for Hezbollah and 0.4 for Israel, thus 
implying that the cost of war is higher for Hezbollah then for Israel. I believe this is a reasonable 
assumption. After all although Israel’s direct financial cost of war will be much higher, at least in 
absolute terms, than Hezbollah’s, Hezbollah’s overall cost of war, taking into account the 
destruction Israel is capable of incurring, should be higher. By solving the equation we get the 
following expected utilities.  
= (0.1 · 1 + (1 – 0.1) · 0) – 0.4 = 0.1 – 0.4 = 0.3    ( 6-3) 
= (0.9 · 0 + (1-0.9) · 1) – 0.6 = 0.1 – 0.6 = 0.5      ( 6-4) 
The actors will initiate a war in this model if the status quo distribution (x) is smaller than the 
expected utility of war for the respective actor. Israel then would launch a war in this model if the 
status quo distribution, at the node it was at, was smaller than 0.5, while Hezbollah would initiate 
a war if the status quo distribution is smaller than 0.3. In other words if Hezbollah at a node in the 
game tree has escalated the situation up to a point where the status quo distribution is 0.4 for it, 
and therefore 0.6 for Israel, Israel may choose to escalate further but Israel will not launch a war 
since it is reasonably content with the situation as it is. If however Hezbollah’s action has resulted 
in the distribution being 0.4 for Israel, Israel will decide to launch a war since the distribution is 
smaller than the expected utility of war. The aim with this was to focus our attention firstly on the 
role of resolve, and secondly on the role of incomplete information. Let us define a status quo 
distribution, which Hezbollah and Israel have arrived at after a few rounds of escalation, as x=0.5 
for Hezbollah, and thus 0.5 for Israel as well. This may typically be a situation where Hezbollah 
has inflicted some casualties on Israel, while Israel has made limited retaliation. If this is the 
distribution, then at what cost of war will Israel be willing to launch an attack? Of course we 
already know this. As the equation above shows, given the probability of winning the cost of war 
Israel is willing to bear to challenge the status quo, with distribution 0.5, with a war is 0.6. A cost 
above this would mean that Israel had opted to not launch a war. This model, as noted, 
incorporates resolve in the “cost of war” term, meaning that a decrease in this term would 
increase Israel’s or Hezbollah’s resolve in the model. As the game progresses from the first node, 
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the status quo distribution changes in a manner positive to Hezbollah up to a certain point. It is of 
course conceivable that the situation was reverse, but in all the cases I have looked at, the 
confrontations starts with an action by Hezbollah that change the status quo distribution. As the 
confrontation progresses the distribution is altered and the question is when the distribution is 
seen as so unacceptable to Israel that they choose to launch a war. The focus is on Israel since I 
have argued that the decision to launch a war, for all intents and purposes, is a decision which is 
Israel’s and not Hezbollah’s.  
Two types of resolve are included in the cost of war term: specific and general (Fearon 1992: ch 
3). In the 2000 and 2002 confrontations Israel revealed its specific resolve. Specific resolve might 
seem like an abstract term, but in reality it merely is the cost of war Israel is willing to bear in 
order to change the situations as it is at that point. After Hezbollah carried out its kidnappings in 
2000 Israel revealed its resolve by in effect not retaliating at all. In 2002 Israel revealed its 
resolve by sending a costly signal, i.e. threatening to attack Syria. In both cases however what 
Israel revealed was its specific resolve over the particular issues at hand, not its general resolve. 
Based on the signals and the history of the earlier confrontations therefore Hezbollah is very 
likely to have anticipated the confrontation in 2006 to resemble the ones in 2000 and 2002, and 
that Israel would reveal its resolve and make the conflict resemble a game of one-sided 
incomplete information as in Figure 6-4. Hezbollah could then, as it did in 2000 and 2002, use 
the fact that it had private information of its resolve, while Israel’s resolve was “public 
knowledge”, to get as much as possible out of the confrontation without incurring a war. In other 
words to escalate the confrontation as far as possible towards the last node of Figure  6-4, without 
actually reaching this node since Israel at that point prefers war to the status quo.  
The game also highlights the important difference between simple and complex learning. 
Hezbollah engaged in form of learning best described as simple. The organization thus believed 
that they knew Israel’s preference structure, or in other words that they had ascertained how 
resolved Israel was. Based on the experience from earlier confrontations, therefore, it is very 
possible that Hezbollah in 2006 expected Israel firstly to not initially consider the kidnapping to 
be a casus belli. I.e. Hezbollah did not expect Israel to consider the cost of war to be too low 
compared to the status quo distribution. Secondly, also based on previous encounters, I argue that 
Hezbollah expected Israel to signal its resolve at a point in time where it would still be possible 
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for Hezbollah to back down. Thus creating a situation resembling the game in Figure 6-4. As we 
saw in the last chapter however, Israel’s first response to the Hezbollah operation was the 
harshest possible retaliatory move it could make. What we are left with then is that Hezbollah 
underestimated Israel’s resolve. It underestimated Israel’s general resolve by not appreciating that 
Israel would, rationally, learn from their earlier encounters, and reach the conclusion that a tit-
for-tat game was unacceptable. Hezbollah thus failed to realize that Israel’s general resolve since 
2000 and 2002 had increases and Israel was now much more likely to deem the cost of war 
acceptable at a point where it in the past would have settled for the status quo distribution. 
Hezbollah’s prediction of Israel’s behavior had been undermined by Hezbollah’s own previous 
actions, i.e. Hezbollah undermined its own prediction and thus miscalculated the situation. 
Hezbollah also failed to take into account the specific resolve of Israel in this particular situation. 
Based on the precarious situation of the government, as discussed in the last chapter, and what 
Israel perceived as its deteriorating strategic environment, as discussed in chapter four, Israel 
specific resolve was much greater in 2006 then in 2000. Had Hezbollah engaged in a more 
complex form of learning, and thus taken the dynamic of the conflict into their analysis, the 
leadership would have realized, at the very least, that they could not be overly confident in their 
prediction of how Israel would respond to another kidnapping. On the face of it this is somewhat 
trivial, but the important thing is how this ties into the question of information. 
The role of information makes the observation that Israel was more resolved in 2006 then in 2000 
decidedly non-trivial. Hezbollah had played the game in Figure  6-4 at its previous encounters 
with Israel, at least after Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. In 2006 however Hezbollah 
was not the only player with private information. Hezbollah expected, I have argued, that Israel 
would reveal its private information, thus allowing Hezbollah to once again exploit the fact that it 
was the only player who knew “all the facts”. Hezbollah failed to realize that it faced an 
adversary with much higher resolve in 2006 then earlier, and failed to realize that it would this 
time be playing a game of two-sided incomplete information where Hezbollah was not privy to 
Israel’s private information. Following the July 2006 kidnappings Israel choose to not engage in a 
more or less prolonged period of tit-for-tat escalation but instead initiated a move that raised the 
stakes immediately and made escalation to full scale war if not inevitable, then much more likely. 
If Hezbollah had recognized the signals from Israel about the strength of its resolve, I argue that 
Hezbollah would have backed down, in the sense that it would not have carried out the operation 
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at all. Hezbollah on its side was incapable of revealing to Israel that it did not want war, since the 
organization cannot send costly signals the same way as Israel. This implies that if Hezbollah had 
been willing to make serious concessions which would have altered the status quo distribution to 
the point were Israel was no longer willing to bear a war; Hezbollah would not have been able to 
communicate this. It had in essence lost the upper hand, and could no longer play the 
brinkmanship game it had relied on in the past. This analysis I believe establishes the plausibility 
of my indicators and predictions, but it also points to interesting insights into how to deal with 
non-state entities in general.  
6.6 CONCLUSION 
I find strong evidence for this chapter’s hypothesis. I have argued that Hezbollah leaders do not 
seem to incur an audience cost in the same way as Israel’s did, and that the combination of 
private information and learning appears to be a potent explanation. I have shown under which 
conditions it is rational for Hezbollah to attack Israel, and I analyzed this first as a tit-for-tat and a 
chicken game, before I drew on the insights from models on nuclear brinkmanship and looked at 
the conflict in light of these models. These bring to the front the importance of information, more 
precisely the importance of private information about ones resolve over an issue. The games 
highlighted that the structure of the Hezbollah – Israel interaction seems to have favored 
Hezbollah for quite some time. Hezbollah has been able to capitalize on the fact that it has held 
information about both its and Israel’s resolve, while Israel has held information only about its 
own resolve. In many earlier confrontations therefore, as the ones in 2000 and 2002 which I have 
looked at here, Hezbollah has been able to use this information asymmetry to determine exactly 
how far it was possible to push Israel without actually risking a full scale war. Hezbollah took 
advantage of the fact that Israel was both able, and often compelled, to send out costly and 
credible signals about its resolve before it launched a full scale war, meaning that Hezbollah 
could back down, as it did in 2002, immediately following such a signal.  
In 2006 however my analysis shows that Hezbollah failed to take into account the difference 
between general and specific resolve. Israel’s specific resolve over securing the return of a 
captured soldier may have been the same in 2006 as in 2000, but Israel strategic context, the 
precarious situation of the Olmert government, and the lessons Israel had drawn from earlier 
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encounters with Hezbollah had increased Israel’s general resolve in dealing with Hezbollah. In 
formal terms this meant that the cost of war Israel was prepared to bear in 2006, was much 
greater then it had been in 2000. An interesting conclusion might be drawn from this. Since most 
developed countries have to, for reasons relating to norms of conduct etc, send costly signals 
before going to war, non-state actors that are by default unable to send credible signals often have 
the upper hand. In many ways my discussion here has shown how Hezbollah most of the time 
held the initiative, while Israel was confined to merely reacting to Hezbollah actions. The result 
was that Israel in order to change the dynamic of the conflict had to launch a very war. The rather 
unintuitive result of the discussion is that Israel, and the region, might have fared better had Israel 
consistently denied Hezbollah the initiative in the conflict by introducing an element of chance 
into its interaction with Hezbollah. This had changed the information asymmetry and left 
Hezbollah guessing about Israel resolve. I am of course not arguing that Israel should flip a coin 
to decide how to react to Hezbollah actions, but by introducing other kinds of chance, e.g. by 
authorizing field commanders at lower levels to make decisions on how and when to retaliate, 
Hezbollah might have been much more efficiently deterred from conducting the numerous 





This thesis sough to uncover: which factors explain why the conflict between Israel and 
Hezbollah experiences sudden instances of escalation? Or more precisely why was not the 
Hezbollah operation of October 2000 followed by a process of escalation, in the same way as the 
almost identical Hezbollah operation of July 2006? I will summarize my findings on this question 
briefly below, but to pre-empt it a little, I have found that a mixture of domestic and international 
factors explain why Israel decided to escalate the conflict in 2006, but not in 2000. These factors 
relate to the regional balance of power, to the domestic situation of the Israeli government and to 
issues relating to information and then especially miscalculation and misperception. Had these 
factors been different, had e.g. the regional balance of power shifted differently and had the 
position of the government been altered, I argue that the trajectory of the crisis of both 2000 and 
2006 would have been different. In the following I will discuss which factors are necessary or 
sufficient for causing escalation, I will then sum up my findings, discuss what implications my 
findings have for theory, discuss issues relating to reliability and validity and end this thesis with 
some ideas for future research.  
7.2 NECESSARY VS. SUFFICIENT FACTORS 
A few days after Hezbollah carried out their kidnappings in the summer of 2006 the trajectory of 
the crisis was, I will argue, over-determined. By this I mean that at a certain point an 
accumulation of factors had taken place that made the escalation all but inevitable. Between 
Hezbollah’s 2000 and 2006 kidnappings four factors had come together that when combined with 
two factors that followed after the 2006 kidnapping increased the risk of escalation as far towards 
certain as possible. The factors occurring between the two kidnappings were: (1) a regional shift 
in the balance of power which increased Iran’s clout and deteriorated Israel’s strategic 
environment. (2) Together with this shift in power, Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran forced 
Israel to consider its wider strategic environment when engaging Hezbollah. (3) Hezbollah’s 
failure to distinguish between specific and general resolve and thus its inability to see that its 
prediction of how Israel would react to a kidnapping was wrong. In essence Hezbollah had thus 
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engaged in simple, in contrast to complex, learning, and this created a situation where Hezbollah 
had a high degree of confidence in its analysis, while this analysis in fact was unreliable. (4) This 
in turn meant that Israel could not easily signal its resolve on this issue, i.e. its willingness to 
fight. Those four factors created a situation which greatly increased the risk of escalation. When 
these four were combined with the following two, escalation became, I argue, all but inevitable. 
(1) Olmert’s show of force, both rhetorically and militarily, directly following the kidnappings 
created a situation where his government would have incurred a substantial audience cost had he 
backed down. (2) The pressure and criticism Olmert was subject to by the Knesset also created a 
situation where Olmert’s political future had been highly uncertain had he backed down47.  
These factors were all absent in October of 2000, and when they combined, as they did in the 
summer of 2006, they made the risk of escalation almost certain. Although none of these factors 
were by themselves sufficient for causing escalation, some were “more necessary” than others. I 
argue that of the seven above the following three factors are the most important for explaining the 
difference between 2000 and 2006: (1) Olmert’s substantial show of force; (2) Hezbollah’s 
inability to pick up on Israel’s signaling; and (3) the shift in the regional balance of power and the 
rise of Iran. The other factors then made the situation over-determined. Had these three factors 
been present at the time of the Hezbollah operation in October of 2000 the risk of escalation 
would have been much greater, and I believe the crisis at that time would have ended in a military 
confrontation. Any combination of the remaining four factors would also have increased the risk 
of escalation, but without these three the risk of war is substantially lower. The three factors 
combine long term change, the shift in power, a triggering factor, Olmert’s mounting audience 
cost, and a factor concerning the strategic interaction, the signaling problem caused by learning. 
They also combine both underlying “material” change, changes in the balance of power, and the 
effect of choices made by the actors just before the escalation, Olmert’s show of force. I have not 
tried to explain why Olmert choose to act the way he did, or why Barak choose to act the way he 
did, although this clearly would be interesting. The other factors are also important, but in 2006 
they mostly served to exacerbate the situation. I argue, thus, that pressure and criticism from the 
Knesset made the situation more dangerous, but Olmert could have survived, although wounded, 
if he had chosen to ignore the legislature. Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran also made the 
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 In retrospect Olmert’s handling of the war also ruined his political future, but that does not change my conclusions.  
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situation worse, but this factor is only important because of Iran’s relative rise. Hezbollah’s 
inability to distinguish between general and specific resolve also increased the risk, but had the 
organization been able to pick up on Israel signal and thus changed its view of how resolved 
Israel was, then this factor would have been less important. Once again, though, one can see how 
the interaction of these factors made the situation dangerous, and how no such interactions were 
in place when Hezbollah conducted its operation in October of 2000. 
7.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This study started out with two interrelated goals. These were explaining why the conflict 
between Israel and Hezbollah experiences sudden instances of escalation, and doing so by 
integrating, as far as possible, domestic and international relations into one coherent explanation. 
I have concentrated throughout on two crises. Both of these started when Hezbollah kidnapped 
IDF soldiers, but from there they had drastically different trajectories. I have argued that the 
similarity between the onset of the two crises and the startling different trajectories they followed 
after the onset gives these two cases a great deal of leverage in explaining important overall 
factors driving the conflict. In essence I am arguing that an in-depth study of these two particular 
instances provide important clues for understanding the dynamics of the overall conflict. Let me 
stress though that my focus is not on explaining the origins of the conflict or the conflict per se. 
My analysis has not been geared towards this, and it thus does not offer any explicit insights into 
why the conflict endures, why it started, or how it could end. The analysis have however 
explained why a more or less contained conflict from time to time escalates and evolves into a 
significant military confrontation or even war, in turn causing the death of hundreds of civilians.  
Information has been central to my study throughout, and has played important parts in every 
chapter. In chapter two I laid out the five mechanisms which I argue explain why an escalatory 
process took place in 2006 but not in 2000, and all of these five mechanisms have important 
information components. The five mechanisms were (1) audience cost, the (2) inclination to share 
responsibility, (3) standing up to a bully, (4) learning and (5) competition. Audience cost and 
standing up to a bully are essentially reverse mechanisms, but they both work to make actors 
able, or unable, to communicate resolve in an effective way. Audience cost in addition can have 
the consequence of locking actors in on a path due to the way the actor communicate its resolve. 
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The inclination to share responsibility, or to spread cost, has an information component in my 
study in that the focus has been on the way the legislature communicates its preferences. The 
way, essentially, it exerts pressure. Learning is basically a questions of taking past action to 
update your beliefs, which again of course is intimately tied to the concept of information. The 
last mechanism which I devoted chapter four to is to a lesser extent connected to information, but 
I focused in that chapter among other things on commitment problems arising due to Israeli 
uncertainty over who controls Hezbollah, and this uncertainty is again tied directly to 
information.  
In the first analytical chapter I dealt with the systemic sphere, concentrating on Israel’s 
relationship and interaction with Iran. I argued in that chapter that the relationship with Iran is 
Israel’s most important strategic relationship. One could argue that other states like Syria or 
Egypt are more important for Israel’s security, but considering that Israel, for the time being, has 
reasonably good relations with Egypt and is militarily totally and utterly superior to Syria, Iran 
emerges as the number one priority. Although Israel holds a significant military advantage over 
Iran, Iran’s size and ballistics capability makes it a potential threat which justifies a focus on that 
country. I found that Hezbollah’s precarious alliance with Iran is important for understanding 
Israel’s decision to escalate and go to war in 2006, and its decision not do so in 2000. I argued 
that Iran’s position as the founder, supporter, and arms supplier of Hezbollah, gives Israel’s 
interaction with Hezbollah an international dimension that it is necessary to understand in order 
to account for differences in Israeli behavior. By utilizing a consciously realist framework I 
focused on changes in the balance of power, along with the consequences of the Iran – Hezbollah 
alliance and argued that changes in these two factors are important for understanding the different 
trajectories of the 2000 and 2006 cases. Framed as a newspaper headline the gist of my findings 
is that when deciding how to respond to the Hezbollah kidnappings, Israel in 2006 had to 
consider its strategic position in relation to Iran, this it did not have to in 2000.  
In the fifth chapter I focused on internal Israeli politics. I argued that the mechanism of audience 
cost, and pressure and criticism from the Israeli Knesset are important parts of the explanation. In 
2006 Ehud Olmert came under severe criticism and pressure from the Knesset from the minute 
Hezbollah had carried out its attacks, and Olmert himself engaged in both a rhetoric and show of 
force that would have led to a considerable audience cost had he not followed through on his 
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threats. Following Hezbollah’s almost identical operation in October of 2000 Ehud Barak and the 
Knesset behaved very differently. I found no evidence of severe Knesset criticism, nor did Barak 
engage in a show of force or harsh rhetoric. Barak simply stated that Israel preserved the right to 
respond to the Hezbollah actions at a time and place they saw fit. Olmert in contrast authorized 
what a number of commentators called the harshest possible retaliations following the Hezbollah 
actions, thereby increasing, instead of deceasing as Barak did, the risk of war.  
In the sixth and final analytical chapter I analyzed the direct interaction between Israel and 
Hezbollah. Continuing the focus on information I studied the role of private information, 
miscalculation and the effect of a relative absence of an audience cost mechanism. I argued that 
Hezbollah prior to 2006 was able to predict Israel’s response to their actions. This was possible 
because Israel in the past revealed its resolve and showed how far it was willing to be pushed, 
and this in turn made it possible for Hezbollah to back down before risking a full scale war. In 
2006 on the contrary I argue that Hezbollah failed to realize that Israel at this point would 
respond not only to that summer’s provocations, but to the aggregate of Hezbollah actions 
following the June 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon. In effect Hezbollah by its own 
actions undermined their own prediction of how Israel would respond to kidnappings. The 
analysis showed how different kinds of learning can create unstable situations. During the crisis 
in 2006, up until the point where Israel attacked, the Hezbollah leadership was confident in its 
belief that Israel’s retaliations would be limited. The organization thus had a lot of confidence in 
a faulty analysis. This I argued came as a consequence of simple learning. Had Hezbollah 
engaged in more complex learning the organization would have realized that their past actions 
had undermined their prediction of how Israel would respond. Similarly Israel seems to have 
come to the conclusion that the tit-for-tat game was undesirable, and that it would no longer play 
by the game’s implicit rules. A problem had thus arisen that is likely to be important for not just 
this case, but for international crisis more in general. In a situation where one of the actors is very 
confident in its own information, information which is in fact faulty, signaling becomes 
problematic. In such a crisis the opposing actor, in this case Israel, has to send a very loud signal 
in order to be heard. This is so because a relatively more “quiet” signal will not be picked up by 
the other actor because of this actor’s confidence in its information. Had Hezbollah instead been 
less confident in its information it would have been possible for Israel to signal its preferences at 
a lot lower cost. It is possible, I argue, to imagine a situation e.g. where Hezbollah had less 
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confidence in its information and therefore yielded at the moment it picked up on Olmert’s 
signaling, i.e. the signal he was sending by increasing a possible ex post audience cost, and 
defused the situation by releasing the soldiers or seizing the launching of rockets. 
7.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
I have not explicitly designed this study to test, in the sense of trying to weaken or strengthen, a 
theory, but all my hypotheses were deduced from mechanisms which had in turn been taken from 
theoretically important international relations works. Had I therefore found no support for my 
hypotheses, I could have argued that it seems that the theoretical body from which the 
mechanisms were drawn is unfit for explaining the subject matter under study here. I did not, 
however, come to such a conclusion. Following Milner (1998), I did not draw on one grand 
theory, but utilized several theories which all shared the same foundation: rationalism. After 
having carried out this study I argue that to assume that actors are rational is “more often right 
than wrong” (Sobek 2009), and that rationalism is a very fruitful starting point for studying 
escalation of crisis. As for the different theoretical components, i.e. the mechanisms, making up 
my theoretical framework, I found that all of them had explanatory power. Audience cost, 
standing up to a bully, learning, sharing responsibility and competition where all operable in the 
way I have stated and operationalised them into hypotheses in 2006, but not in 2000. I designed 
this study as a plausibility probe (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2006) and as such I believe I 
have plausibly shown that the theoretical body I argue can explain both the 2006 escalation and 
the 2000 non-escalation, can in fact do so.  
I found strong evidence supporting the value of integrating domestic politics into international 
relations, and I am doubtful if I would have been able to provide as nuanced an explanation if I 
had concentrated only on either domestic or international politics. The three factors I above 
argued carry the most explanatory power combine international and domestic politics. The 
audience cost factor is internal, while the shift in balance of power and signaling difficulty are 
systemic. The integration of the perspectives was achieved by using a rationalist framework 
throughout my study, and by relaying on Andrew Moravcsiks two-step model. This model sees 
states as mechanisms for aggregating the preferences of diverse societal groups that vie for power 
and influence in the first step, and once the aggregation has taken place the different states 
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interact with one another at the systemic level in the second step (Moravcsik 1997). Integrating 
domestic and international relations in this fashion was not seamless, and the choice has forced 
me to at all times hold something constant. When I concentrated on the systemic sphere I held 
internal Israeli politics constant, and when I studied Israeli politics I held the systemic sphere 
constant. Using more sophisticated game-theory could have made it possible to model the direct 
interaction more explicitly and dynamically, but this has not been an option given the time and 
resources at my disposal.  
One of the key findings of chapter six was that the Hezbollah leadership’s belief in Israel’s 
resolve was mistaken. In his book on trust and mistrust during the cold war Andrew Kydd argues 
that “convergence on correct beliefs is more likely than convergence on incorrect beliefs”. He 
continues: “Mistaken beliefs may arise (…) but over time they are more likely to be corrected 
than to remain or be further exaggerated” (2005: 18 and 19). This is very interesting. Given that 
the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has been prolonged, it is surprising that the Hezbollah 
leadership miscalculated Israel’s resolve so drastically. It may be, of course, that the 2006 
Hezbollah leadership either suffered from a collective psychological bias or that the leadership 
for some reason has misrepresented their surprise over Israel’s response. I would argue that the 
former is highly unlikely since Hezbollah has been perfectly able to rationally update their belief 
of Israel’s resolve in the past, e.g. in the 2002 confrontation discussed above. The sincerity of 
Hezbollah’s surprise might be more questionable. It is easy to see how the organization might 
misrepresent their surprise e.g. in order to manage relations with Beirut. I am however not 
convinced by this. Although Hezbollah was remarkably successful at presenting an image of 
success as the war progressed, the organization was taken completely by surprise by the very 
effective Israeli Air Force strikes at the outset of the campaign. Available evidence does suggest 
that Hezbollah had not prepared for so harsh Israeli air strikes, and I would imagine that the 
organization had been better prepared had they actually expected them. The question then is why 
did not the beliefs of these two actors converge as Kydd argues it should? 
The simple answer is that the mechanism Kydd (2005) argues makes this convergence possible is 
cooperation, and no cooperation has taken place between Israel and Hezbollah. That, however, is 
not a satisfactory answer since it seems to suggest that the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah 
is destined to be unpredictable and marked by grave miscalculation indefinitely since no 
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cooperation on any issue is likely to take place. I do not of course claim that the answer is 
unsatisfactory because it is pessimistic. Rather I would argue that if cooperation is the only 
mechanism that causes convergence, then this does not explain why the conflict between Israel 
and Hezbollah most of the time does not escalate. Or more precisely it does not explain why 
effective signaling, which is dependent upon some level of belief convergence48, most of time is 
possible between Hezbollah and Israel. What is needed therefore is to identify other mechanisms 
that may foster the convergence of beliefs, and here we arrive, to the best of my knowledge, at a 
blind spot in the literature.  
7.5 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
Case studies are often seen as having high internal, but low external validity (Gerring 2006). I 
could have added more cases to this study, thus increasing at least in theory the external validity, 
but that would most likely have weakened the internal validity. For better or worse I have 
conducted a thorough and rigorous in-depth study of two cases, and it would not have been 
possible to go to comparable depths if I had increased the number of cases. An increase in cases 
could, potentially, have ruled out the effect of one or more of my mechanisms. The strength, 
however, of a plausibility probe of this kind is that having established that the factors making up 
this study do indeed carry explanatory power, it is now possible in a future next step to 
investigate them across a greater number of cases in a theoretically informed way. All of my 
factors can in principle be operationalised, quantified and tested statistically. Since we did not at 
the outset really know which factors were indeed important, doing this as the next step is more 
scientifically sound. I make this claim after having argued that the amount of literature that 
studies the interaction of actors comparable to Israel and Hezbollah is very limited. To be clear 
there is a lot of literature studying actors as Israel and Hezbollah, but the literature studying the 
direct interaction of an actor comparable to Israel and an actor comparable to Hezbollah is very 
limited. It is not self evident, therefore, that the factors underlying and driving conflicts between 
other types of actors should a priori be the same as the factors driving the conflict between Israel 
and Hezbollah. To establish which factors are important is thus the logical first step, and to test 
them statistically the logical next step. Although the external validity of my study may be 
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 It is important to be perfectly clear here. Signaling does not depend on perfect convergence of beliefs, but is actors 
consistently misjudge the resolve of the other actor – as Hezbollah in 2006 – then signaling becomes much more 
difficult.   
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questionable, the internal validity is much stronger. George and Bennett argue that case studies 
“allow a researcher to a achieve high levels of conceptual validity, or to identify and measure the 
indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure” (2005: 
19). I believe I have achieved this. The question then is if my funding would hold for other 
comparable cases as well. As I argued above, to ascertain whether or not this is the case is better 
done employing statistics, but I would nevertheless hypothesize that my findings would hold 
across comparable cases. 
According to King, Keohane and Verba “the most important rule for all data collection is to 
report how the data were created and how we came to possess them” (1994: 51). This issue 
concerns the reliability of the study, and the litmus test basically is: if another researcher had 
asked the same questions of the same cases, would she have gotten the same answers? Measuring 
indicators, especially in a qualitative study where clear cut cut-off points can not be established, 
always involve a degree of subjectivity. Another research may interpret this or that piece of 
evidence in a different way. By and large though I have tried to collect data from different 
sources on the same topic, and the pieces of evidence I am using are not controversial. I.e. my 
evidence is drawn from main stream sources, all of them freely available. I have never had to dig 
deep down and find obscure publications or low level civil servants in order to get satisfactory 
evidence. All in all therefore I argue that had another researcher looked at the same data he would 
have arrived, basically, at the same conclusions as I have. When I go beyond the evidence, e.g. 
when I offer some policy advice at the end of chapter six, this does not concern the reliability of 
this thesis’ conclusions. I do have one big regret, and that is that I have still not been able to read 
the full report of the Winograd commission. I am more than certain that had I been able to read it, 
it would have figured heavily in this study. I have however read the executive summary, and I 
have read comments on the report’s findings in newspaper articles, books and scholarly articles. 
No where have I found citations, conclusions or comments from the Winograd report which 
would have refuted the central arguments of this thesis.  
7.6 FUTURE RESEARCH 
I have already argued that this study should be followed by a large scale statistical study of the 
correlations of my proposed indicators, with escalation of international crisis. Such a study, 
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together with this, would be a very valuable supplement to the literature on the causes of war and 
on the escalation of crisis in general. As noted most of this literature deals either with civil wars 
or interstate wars, and I am not convinced that the factors driving such conflicts are the same as 
the factors driving conflicts between states and non-state actors. After all the factors driving civil 
wars are very different from the factors driving interstate wars, so at the very least an exploratory 
study is warranted.  
7.7 CONCLUSION 
I have the impression that a lot of people when they look at the conflicts in the Middle East, see 
intractable almost unsolvable conflicts. I thoroughly disagree. And writing this thesis has 
cemented that view. General Douglas Macarthur said that “War’s objective is victory – not 
prolonged indecision. In war, there is no substitute for victory” (quoted in: Iklé 2005: 1). Yet in 
every war Israel has fought since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, or even arguably since the 1967 Six 
Day War, the ultimate outcome has been indecisive. The same can be said for Israel’s 
adversaries, state or non-state. Ending a war is difficult. In the classic Every War Must End Fred 
Iklé writes that “The task of bringing an unsuccessful war to an end demands such a soul-
searching recording of objectives that many government leaders respond to it with failure of 
nerve” (Iklé 2005: 102). It appears that the task of bringing an unsuccessful prolonged conflict, as 
the one between Israel and Hezbollah, to an end can have the same effect on a leader. On 
examining the evidence from my two cases however, I can only draw the conclusion that when 
leaders have the ability to really record, analyze and arrange their objectives the settlement of a 
conflict is indeed possible. The Hezbollah leadership did this, as I have shown, in 2002 and the 
Barak government did it after Hezbollah carried out their kidnappings in October of 2000. I have 
consistently found that neither Israel’s nor Hezbollah’s leadership behave in a fanatical, overly 
zealous or irrational manner. The leaders of both actors clearly experience, from time to time, a 
clouded judgment, cognitive dissonance and seem to be prone to hyperbolic discounting49. When 
they are at their best however they behave strategically, and this I argue is the greatest cause for 
optimism. If the leaders of Hezbollah are able to see, in the middle of a confrontation as the one 
in April 2002, that to take one step further would be detrimental. And the leaders of Israel are 
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 Cognitive dissonance is present when the same actor holds inconsistent views and goals, hyperbolic discounting 
refers to the observation that people often prefer “quick and easy” smaller payments to a long term larger payment. 
On both see (Elster 2007a: esp chp 6 & 7).  
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able to realize that a provocation does not have to be answered with a tit for tat move, as Ehud 
Barak determined in October of 2000. Then the same actors are most definitely able, is my 
contention, to settle the conflict once and for all, even though this would force both sides to make 
severe compromises, both ideologically and economically. Given, as my rationalist framework 
has shown, that they are presented with a correct mixture of sticks and carrots to alter their 




Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikov. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. 2nd ed. New York: Longman. 
Alon, Gideon. (2000). Barak warns of possible terrorist attacks. Haaretz, 12/10/00. 
Aluf, Benn. (2000). Bloodied but unbowed, Barak soldiers on. Haaretz, 08/02/2000. 
Avraham, Tal. (2006). Preparing for the next war now. Haaretz, 17/08/06. 
Barnett, Michael N, and Raymond Duvall. (2005). Power in International Relations. International 
Organization 59 (1):39 - 75. 
Beevor, Anthony. (2007). Kampen om Spania: Den Spanske Borgerkigen 1936 - 1939. Oslo: 
Damm. 
Ben-Ami, Shlomo. (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
———. (2009). Telephone Interview with author.  26th February. 
Benn, Aluf. (2006). Strategic Appointment Haaretz, 25/08/06. 
Berman, Ilan. (2004). How to Tame Tehran. Middle East Quarterly 11 (2):1 - 8. 
Berrebi, Claude, and Esteban F Klor. (2008). Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence 
from the Israeli Electorate. American Political Science Review 102 (3):279 - 301. 
Blainey, Geoffrey (1988). The Causes of War. 3rd ed. New York: Free Press. 
Blanford, Nicholas. (2006). Deconstructing Hizbullah's Surprise Military Prowess. Jane's 
Intelligence Review (November). 
Bradly, Curtis A, and Jack L Goldsmith. (2005). Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism. Harvard Law Review 118 (7):2047 - 2133. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. (1983). The War Trap. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. (2005). The Quality of Terror. American Journal of Political Science 
49 (3):515 - 530. 
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. (2003). Regions and Powers. The Structure of International 
Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Checkel, Jeffrey (2001). Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. 
International Organization 55 (3):553 - 588. 
Checkel, Jeffrey, and Michael Zurn. (2005). Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism 
and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State. International Organization 59 (4):1045 - 
1079. 
Clausewitz, Carl von. (1976). On War. Translated by M. Howard and P. Paret. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Cohen, Stuart A. (1999). Israel's Three Strategic Challenges. Middle East Quarterly 6 (4):1 - 9. 
———. (2008). Israel and its Army. From Cohesion to Confusion. London: Routledge. 
Cordesman, Anthony. (2001). Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st 
Century. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 
———. (2005). Iran's Developing Military Capabilities. Washington: Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
———. (2007). Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War. Washington: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies. 
——— (2008). The Israeli and Syrian Conventional Military Balance - An Overview Arab-
Israeli Military Balance Washington D.C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
106 
 
Crawford, Neta. (2000). The Passions of World Politics: Propositions on Emotions and 
Emotional Relationships. International Security 24 (4):116 - 156. 
Creveld, Martin van. (1991). The Transformation of War. New York: Free Press. 
———. (1998). The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defence Force. New 
York: PublicAffairs. 
Dayan, Moshe. (1976). Story of My Life New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 
Diskin, Abraham, and Reuven Y Hazan. (2007). The Knesset Elections in Israel, March 2006. 
Electoral Studies 26:699 - 724. 
Doyle, Michael. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review 80 
(4):1151 - 1169. 
Eban, Abba. (1977). Abba Eban - An Autobiography New York: Random House. 
El-Hokayem, Emile. (2007). Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship. The 
Washington Quarterly 30 (2):35 - 52. 
Elman, Colin. (1996). Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? 
Security Studies 6 (1):7 - 53. 
Elster, Jon. (1999). Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. (2007a). Explaining Social Behavior - More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. (2007b). Formalisme på tomgang: hard obskurantisme. Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift (4):394-
402. 
Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. (1993). The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A 
Vector-Autoregression- Intervention Analysis. American Political Science Review 87 
(4):829 - 844. 
Fearon, James. (1991). Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. World 
Politics 43 (2):169 - 195. 
———. (1992). Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Relations. 
PhD Dissertation, Graduate Division, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley. 
———. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. 
American Political Science Review 88 (3):577 - 592. 
———. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3):379 - 414. 
———. (1997). Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 41 (1):68 - 90. 
———. (1998). Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. 
Annual Review of Political Science 1:289 - 313. 
———. (2004). Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others? Journal of Peace 
Research 41 (3):275-301. 
Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. (2002). Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Sceptical View. 
In Handbook of International Relations, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. 
Simmons. London: Sage. 
George, Alexander L, and Andrew Bennett. (2005). Case Study and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Gerring, John. (2004). What is a Case Study and What is it Good For? American Political 
Science Review 98 (2):341-54. 




Gideon, Alon, Shamir Shlomo, and Uni Assaf. (2006). U.S. blames Syria and Iran, demands 
Soldiers' release. Haaretz, 13/07/06. 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margreta Sollenberg, and Håvard 
Strand. (2002). Armed Conflict 1946 - 2001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 
39 (5):615 - 637. 
Gortzak, Yoav. (2005). How Great Powers Rule: Coercion and Positive Inducements in International 
Order Enforcement. Security Studies 14 (4):663 - 697. 
Gourevitch, Peter. (2002). Domestic Politics and International Relations. In Handbook of 
International Relations, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. London 
Sage Publications. 
Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. (2004). In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
Harel, Amos, Sharon Gal, and Aluf Benn. (2000). Prime Minister Ehud Barak issued an 
ultimatum to Palestinian leader. Haaretz, 08/10/00. 
Harel, Amos, and Avi Issacharoff. (2008). 34 Days. Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Harik, Judith Palmer. (2004). Hezbollah. The Changing Face of Terrorism. London: I. B. Tauris. 
Hazan, Reuven Y, and Abraham Diskin. (2000). The 1999 Knesset and prime ministerial 
elections in Israel. Electoral Studies 19:615 - 646. 
Hegre, Håvard. (2009). Rationalist Explanations of War. In Lecture Notes. Oslo: University of 
Oslo. 
ICG (2002). Old Game, New Rules: Conflict on the Israel-Lebanon Border ICG Middle East 
Report No. 7 Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group 
Iklé, Fred Charles. (2005). Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press. Original 
edition, 1971. 
Inbar, Efraim. (2006). The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran. Middle East Review of International 
Affairs 10 (1):85 - 104. 
Jerusalem-Post. (2006). Ehud Olmert earns 71 % approval rating. Jerusalem Post, 13/01/06. 
Johnston, Alastair Ian. (1996). Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China. In The Culture of 
National Security, edited by P. J. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press. 
U.S Congress. 2002. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces 
Against Iraq. 107th, H.J. Res. 114  
Kam, Ephraim (2007). A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done 
Memorandum 88 Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies 
Keohane, Robert. (2005). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Original edition, 1984. 
King, Gary, Sidney Verba, and Robert Keohane. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Kulick, Amir. 2006. Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimension. Strategic Assessment 9 
(3), The Institute for National Security Studies.17/11/08 
Kuperman, Ranan D. (2003). The Effect of Domestic and Foreign Pressure on Israeli Decisions 
To Use Limited Military Force. Journal of Peace Research 40 (6):677 - 694. 
Kydd, Andrew H. (2005). Tust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Lai, Brian, and Dan Reiter. (2005). Rally 'Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of 




Lake, David A, and Robert Powell. (1999). International Relations: A Strategic Choice 
Approach. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, edited by D. A. Lake and R. 
Powell. Princeton Princeton University Press. 
Lebow, Richard Ned. (1981). Between Peace and War. The Nature of International Crisis. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Levy, Jack S. (1998). The Causes of War and the Condtitions of Peace. Annual Review of 
Political Science 1:139 - 165. 
Luttwak, Edward. (1995). Toward Post-Heroic Warfare. Foreign Affairs 74 (3):109 - 122. 
Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. (2004). The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases 
in Comparative Research. American Political Science Review 98 (4):653-669. 
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. (2001). Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
McCarthy, Nolan, and Adam Meirowitz. (2007). Political Game Theory - An Introduction. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McKeown, Timothy J. (2004). Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative World View. In 
Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards edited by H. E. Brady and D. 
Collier. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Mearsheimer, John. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company Inc. 
Mearsheimer, John, and Stephen Walt. (2007). The Israel Lobby and U.S Foreign Policy. 
London: Allen Lane  
Merom, Gil. (2008). The Second Lebanon War: Democratic Lessons Imperfectly Applied. 
Democracy and Security 4 (1):5 - 33. 
Milner, Helen. (1997). Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
———. (1998). Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American and 
Comparative Politics. International Organization 52 (4):759 - 786. 
Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. (2006). The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and 
Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics. International Organization 51 (4):513 - 553. 
———. (1998). The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (2006). Politics Among Nations 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill  
Morris, Benny. (2001). Righteous Victims. A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881 - 2001. 
New York: Vintage Books. 
Morrow, James D. (1994). Game Theory for Political Scientists Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Munck, Gerardo L. (2004). Tools for Qualitative Research. In Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse 
Tools, Shared Standards, edited by H. E. Brady and D. Collier. Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Narizny, Kevin. (2007). The Political Economy of Grand Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Nicholson, Michael. (1992). Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Oren, Michael (2002). Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. 
New York: Presidio Press. 
109 
 
Orwell, George. (2003). Homage to Catalonia. London: Penguin Book. Original edition, 1938. 
Pape, Robert A. (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism American Political Science 
Review 97 (3):343 - 361. 
Parsi, Trita. (2007). Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Pierson, Paul. (2004). Politics in Time. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Powell, Robert. (1990). Nuclear Detterence Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. (1994). Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. 
International Organization 48 (2):313-344. 
———. (1999). In the Shadow of Power - States and Strategies in International Relations. 
Princeton: Princeton Uiversity Press. 
———. (2006). War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization 60 (1):169-203. 
———. (2007a). Allocating Defensive Resources with Private Information about Vulnerability. 
American Political Science Review 101 (4):799 - 809. 
———. (2007b). Efficient Secrecy: Public Versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy. 
American Political Science Review 101 (3):527-558. 
Prins, Brandon C, and Christopher Sprecher. (1999). Institutional Constraints, Political 
Opposition, and Interstate Dispute Escalation: Evidence from Parliamentary System, 1946 
- 89. Journal of Peace Research 36 (3):271 - 287. 
Raas, Whitney, and Austin Long. (2007). Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian 
Nuclear Facilities. International Security 31 (4):7 - 33. 
Rabinovich, Itamar, and Jehuda Reinharz, eds. (2008). Israel in the Middle East: Documents and 
Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present. Waltham, 
Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press. 
Rubin, Uzi (2007). The Rocket Campaign Against Israel During the 2006 Lebanon War Mideast 
Security and Policy Studies No. 71 Tel Aviv: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic 
Studies 
Rudge, David. (2000). Concern in North over border attacks. Sneh: Iran pressing Hizbullah to 
carry out attacks. Jerusalem Post, Oct 31, 2000. 
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. (2003). Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains? In 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by J. Mahoney and D. 
Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Russett, Bruce. (1993). Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1980). The Strategy of Conflict Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Original edition, 1960. 
Schiff, Ze'ev. (2006). Israel's war with Iran. Foreign Affairs 85 (6):23-31. 
Schiff, Ze'ev, and Ehud Ya'ari. (1984). Israel's Lebanon War. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Schindler, Colin. (2008). A History of Modern Israel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Segev, Tom. (2007). 1967 - Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. New 
York: Metropolitan Books. 
Shaara, Michael. (2001). The Killer Angels. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Shapir, Yiftah. (2009a). Iran. In Middle East Military Balance database: Institute for National 
Strategic Studies. 
———. (2009b). Israel. In Middle East Military Balance database: Institute for National 
Strategic Studies. 




Shlaim, Avi. (2001). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. New York: W. W Norton and 
Company. 
Simmons, Beth A, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garret. (2006). Introduction: The International 
Diffusion of Liberalism. International Organization 60 (781- 810). 
Singer, J. David. (1961). The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. World 
Politics 14 (1):77 - 92. 
Sobek, David. (2009). The Causes of War. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Sobelman, Daniel (2004). New Rules of the Game - Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal 
from Lebanon Memorandum No. 69 Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies 
Telhami, Shibley. (2002). Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy. Security Studies 11 
(3):158 - 70. 
Tolstoi, Lev. (2005). Krig og Fred. Oslo: Bokklubben. 
Tomz, Michael. (2007). Domestic Audience Cost in International Relations: An Experimental 
Approach. International Organization 61 (3):821 - 840. 
Traboulsi, Fawwaz. (2007). A History of Modern Lebanon. London: Pluto Press. 
Van Evera, Stephan. (1997). A Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
———. (1999). The Causes of War - Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Verter, Yossi. (2006). Alone at the top. Haaretz, 16/06/06. 
Verter, Yossi, Aluf Benn, and Jack Khoury. (2006). Poll: Most Israelis oppose PM Olmert's 
convergence plan. Haaretz, 08/06/06. 
Vonnegut, Kurt. (2005). Slaughterhouse-Five. New York: The Dial Press. Original edition, 1969. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. London: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company. 
———. (2000). Structural realism after the Cold War. International Security 25 (1):5 - 41. 
———. (2001). Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press. Original 
edition, 1959. 
———. (2008). The Originis of War in Neorealist Theory. In Realism and International Politics, 
edited by K. N. Waltz. New York: Routledge. 
Yoel, Marcus. (2000a). Barak must set himself an ultimatum. Haaretz, 21/11/2000. 
———. (2000b). On arrogance and credibility. Haaretz, 15/09/2000. 
Yoong, Sean. (2006). Ahmadinejad: Destroy Israel, End Crisis. The Washington Post, Online 
03/08/06. 
Zisser, Eyal. (2002). The Return of Hizbullah. Middle East Policy 9 (4):1 - 8. 
 
